本文選題：獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量 + 盈余管理�。� 參考：《重慶大學(xué)》2006年博士論文

【摘要】： 獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量是審計(jì)學(xué)領(lǐng)域的重要課題。我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)從產(chǎn)生、發(fā)展到逐漸走向成熟已歷經(jīng)十余年,作為資本市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管體系重要組成部分的獨(dú)立審計(jì)也就成為政府監(jiān)管部門、廣大股東和會(huì)計(jì)審計(jì)信息使用者所關(guān)注的核心和焦點(diǎn)問題。同時(shí),它亦為會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)術(shù)界和職業(yè)界研究及爭(zhēng)論的主題之一。盡管目前我國(guó)上市公司獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量已有了很大的提高,但是部分上市公司會(huì)計(jì)審計(jì)信息失真,甚至舞弊仍然十分嚴(yán)重,這在一定程度上對(duì)我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展產(chǎn)生了較大的負(fù)面影響。 隨著理性投資者越來越注意將上市公司會(huì)計(jì)及審計(jì)信息作為重要的投資決策依據(jù),人們?cè)桨l(fā)關(guān)注審計(jì)報(bào)告所傳遞的公司經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)信息,學(xué)術(shù)界對(duì)獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量展開了大量研究,取得了不少有意義的理論研究成果。本論文在充分吸收和借鑒國(guó)內(nèi)外對(duì)獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量大量研究成果的前提下,大膽創(chuàng)新和嘗試,運(yùn)用契約理論、委托—代理理論、有效市場(chǎng)假說、博弈論與信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué),在理論上系統(tǒng)地對(duì)獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量的本質(zhì)、涵義、衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、影響因素進(jìn)行了分析研究,構(gòu)建出直接運(yùn)用盈余管理程度指標(biāo)測(cè)度標(biāo)準(zhǔn)審計(jì)意見的上市公司獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量,同時(shí)以是否出具非標(biāo)意見專門針對(duì)自愿性會(huì)計(jì)政策變更盈余管理的審計(jì)質(zhì)量進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究的框架,根據(jù)我國(guó)上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)實(shí)證分析了獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量的現(xiàn)實(shí)狀況及其影響因素,并提出改進(jìn)獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量的對(duì)策。 全文研究工作分三部分,共十章內(nèi)容,具體概述如下: 第一部分包括4章。其中第1章緒論,本章首先闡述了選題背景和動(dòng)機(jī),以及選題的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。其次,是國(guó)內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀,最后是本文的研究方法和分析框架,以及本文的研究?jī)?nèi)容、特色及創(chuàng)新。第2章獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量的基本理論借鑒,本章主要介紹了現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中的契約理論、委托代理理論,有效市場(chǎng)理論、博弈論與信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)四種理論的主要觀點(diǎn)以及對(duì)本研究的借鑒意義。第3章獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量概念的辨析與思考,本章首先介紹了關(guān)于獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量本質(zhì)的幾種代表性觀點(diǎn),并對(duì)其進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià)和整合,其次介紹和探討了獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量的涵義,其三評(píng)析了現(xiàn)行的關(guān)于衡量獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的主流觀點(diǎn),最后提出了獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量的實(shí)證研究基礎(chǔ)和影響和制約獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量的四維因素觀點(diǎn)。第4章我國(guó)上市公司獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量的博弈分析,本章運(yùn)用博弈論和信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論,刻畫了獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量選擇行為的博弈模型,通過多階段動(dòng)態(tài)博弈分析,探討了獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量的主要影響因素及其形成機(jī)理,為后文的實(shí)證研究假設(shè)及政策建議廓清了思路。 第二部分共四章,包括5-8章,是全文整體的核心。第5章基于盈余管理視角的我國(guó)上市公司獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量刻畫。在數(shù)學(xué)模型的構(gòu)建中利用了修正的Jones
[Abstract]:The quality of independent audit is an important subject in the field of auditing. It has been more than ten years since the capital market came into being and gradually matured. As an important part of the capital market supervision system, the independent audit has become the government supervision department. Shareholders and accounting audit information users are concerned about the core and focus issues. At the same time, it is also one of the topics of research and debate in the accounting academic and professional circles. Although the quality of independent audit of listed companies in China has been greatly improved, the accounting audit information of some listed companies is distorted, and even fraud is still very serious. To a certain extent, this has had a great negative impact on the development of China's capital market. As rational investors pay more and more attention to the accounting and audit information of listed companies as the important basis for investment decision, people pay more and more attention to the company performance information transmitted by audit reports, and academic circles have carried out a lot of research on the quality of independent audit. Many meaningful theoretical research results have been obtained. On the premise of absorbing and drawing lessons from a large number of domestic and foreign researches on the quality of independent audit, this thesis makes bold innovations and attempts, applies contract theory, principal-agent theory, efficient market hypothesis, game theory and information economics. In theory, the essence, meaning, measurement standard and influencing factors of independent audit quality are analyzed and studied systematically, and the independent audit quality of listed company is constructed by using earnings management degree index directly to measure the quality of independent audit quality of listed companies. At the same time, the framework of empirical research on the audit quality of voluntary accounting policy changes in earnings management is carried out on the basis of whether or not to issue non-standard opinions. Based on the empirical data of listed companies in China, this paper analyzes the actual situation of independent audit quality and its influencing factors, and puts forward some countermeasures to improve the quality of independent audit. The full text research work is divided into three parts, altogether ten chapters content, the concrete summary is as follows: The first part includes four chapters. The first chapter introduces the background and motivation of the topic, as well as the theoretical and practical significance of the topic. Secondly, the present situation of the research at home and abroad, and finally the research methods and analysis framework of this paper, as well as the research content, characteristics and innovation of this paper. Chapter 2 refers to the basic theory of independent audit quality. This chapter mainly introduces the contract theory, principal-agent theory, efficient market theory in modern economics. The main points of view of four theories of game theory and information economics and their reference significance to this study. In chapter 3, the concept of independent audit quality is analyzed and considered. Firstly, this chapter introduces several representative viewpoints on the essence of independent audit quality, and then introduces and discusses the meaning of independent audit quality. The third part analyzes the current mainstream views on measuring the quality of independent audit, and finally puts forward the empirical research basis of the quality of independent audit and the viewpoint of four dimensional factors that influence and restrict the quality of independent audit. Chapter 4 is the game analysis of independent audit quality of listed companies in China. This chapter uses game theory and information economics theory to depict the game model of independent audit quality selection behavior, through multi-stage dynamic game analysis. This paper probes into the main influencing factors and the formation mechanism of independent audit quality, and clarifies the ideas for the empirical research hypotheses and policy suggestions. The second part consists of four chapters, including 5-8 chapters, which are the core of the whole paper. Chapter 5 describes the independent audit quality of listed companies in China from the perspective of earnings management. The modified Jones is used in the construction of mathematical model.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2006
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4;F224

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前2條

1 孫娜;劉富國(guó);;我國(guó)IPO審計(jì)質(zhì)量實(shí)證研究[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2009年18期

2 劉宇;;證券市場(chǎng)審計(jì)質(zhì)量、盈余管理與信息含量——基于1999～2007年滬深市場(chǎng)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)[J];山西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2010年06期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前3條

1 管亞梅;我國(guó)上市公司審計(jì)合謀治理機(jī)制研究[D];江蘇大學(xué);2009年

2 曹細(xì)鐘;有限理性與審計(jì)質(zhì)量[D];暨南大學(xué);2010年

3 陳煒煜;上市公司審計(jì)質(zhì)量提高路徑研究[D];西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2011年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 趙志衛(wèi);基于信息噪音的審計(jì)信息質(zhì)量研究[D];重慶大學(xué);2008年

2 劉鑫;簽字注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師輪換制度對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量影響的實(shí)證研究[D];南京財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2008年

3 王仲祥;上市公司獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量研究[D];天津師范大學(xué);2012年

4 秦堯;我國(guó)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)重述與獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量[D];南京農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué);2010年

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本文編號(hào)：1819825