發(fā)布時間：2018-04-22 23:00

  本文選題：上市公司 + 審計合謀��； 參考：《大連理工大學(xué)》2009年碩士論文

【摘要】： 近年來,國內(nèi)外上市公司審計合謀案件不斷出現(xiàn),而在我國,上市公司審計合謀這一問題則更為突出。自我國證券市場誕生以來,審計機構(gòu)與上市公司合謀欺騙審計委托人和社會公眾的案件就一直層出不窮,不論是數(shù)量,還是頻率,都較其他國家嚴重得多。 關(guān)于上市公司審計合謀現(xiàn)象為何在我國更為普遍這一問題,現(xiàn)有研究大多從審計活動本身入手來解釋我國的審計合謀問題,將原因歸結(jié)為委托人扭曲、審計市場結(jié)構(gòu)不合理、審計制度安排不當?shù)确矫?而很少考慮我國轉(zhuǎn)軌階段特殊的體制背景對上市公司審計合謀的影響。 然而,事實上,在現(xiàn)有研究基礎(chǔ)上提出的治理措施在實際實施過程中效果并不理想,遠未達到治理我國上市公司審計合謀的目的。因此,從新的研究視角重新審視我國上市公司合謀問題,探索我國上市公司審計合謀行為盛行的內(nèi)在原因以及影響傳統(tǒng)治理措施治理效果的體制因素,就顯得十分有必要。 本文通過構(gòu)建包含上市公司、審計機構(gòu)和監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的博弈模型,分析了由晉升博弈導(dǎo)致的地方政府官員激勵扭曲對我國上市公司審計合謀的影響。結(jié)果表明,當前的上市公司審計合謀博弈實際嵌套在地方政府官員的晉升博弈之中。這是導(dǎo)致我國審計合謀問題屢禁不止,以至成為業(yè)內(nèi)普遍現(xiàn)象的一個重要原因。要從根本上治理上市公司審計合謀問題,必需結(jié)合這種體制背景進行政策上的創(chuàng)新。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the audit collusion cases of listed companies at home and abroad appear constantly, but in our country, the problem of audit collusion of listed companies is more prominent. Since the birth of China's securities market, the cases of audit institutions and listed companies conspiring to deceive audit clients and the public have been emerging in endlessly, both in terms of quantity and frequency, which are much more serious than those in other countries. As to why the audit collusion of listed companies is more common in our country, most of the existing researches explain the audit collusion from the audit activity itself, which can be attributed to the distortion of the principal and the unreasonable structure of the audit market. However, the influence of the special institutional background on the audit collusion of listed companies is seldom considered. However, in fact, the governance measures put forward on the basis of the existing research are not ideal in the actual implementation process, and far from achieving the purpose of controlling the audit collusion of listed companies in our country. Therefore, it is necessary to re-examine the collusion of listed companies from a new perspective, explore the internal causes of the prevalence of audit collusion of listed companies in China and the institutional factors that affect the governance effect of traditional governance measures. By constructing a game model involving listed companies, audit agencies and regulators, this paper analyzes the influence of local government officials' incentive distortion on the audit collusion of listed companies in China, which is caused by the promotion game. The results show that the current audit collusion game of listed companies is actually nested in the promotion game of local government officials. This is an important reason that leads to the repeated prohibition of audit collusion in our country and even becomes a common phenomenon in the industry. In order to fundamentally control the audit collusion of listed companies, it is necessary to carry out policy innovation in combination with this institutional background.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：大連理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號】：F239.4

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