本文選題：外部審計質(zhì)量　切入點：大股東“掏空”　出處：《內(nèi)蒙古財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在當(dāng)前我國證券市場的發(fā)展過程中，由于法律和公司制度的缺陷以及股權(quán)分置的特殊結(jié)構(gòu)，證券市場上出現(xiàn)了很多舞弊現(xiàn)象，如內(nèi)幕交易、欺詐客戶等。其中討論最集中的是大股東的“掏空”行為。“掏空”又稱為“隧道效應(yīng)（Tunneling）”，是指作為管理者的大股東通過地下通道轉(zhuǎn)移資產(chǎn)行為，既大股東利用自己的控制權(quán)，通過多種隱蔽手段如內(nèi)部關(guān)聯(lián)交易、證券回購等，從企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移資產(chǎn)和利潤到自己手中的各種合法或者非法的行為。這種行為已經(jīng)導(dǎo)致不容忽視的后果，如操縱了企業(yè)的財務(wù)信息，侵占了中小股東的利益，影響上市公司的自身發(fā)展以及證券市場的健康發(fā)展。大股東的“掏空”行為已經(jīng)成為制約我國證券市場持續(xù)健康快速發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵問題。 審計師審計作為一種重要的公司外部監(jiān)督機(jī)制，應(yīng)該有效的識別大股東的“掏空”行為，根據(jù)大股東“掏空”的嚴(yán)重程度出具恰當(dāng)?shù)膶徲嬕庖�。那么對我國這樣一個處于逐步發(fā)展階段的資本市場而言，審計師能否如預(yù)期那樣能夠識別大股東的“掏空”行為？針對不同“掏空”程度的上市公司，審計師出具何種審計意見類型？審計費用和審計師變更與大股東的“掏空”行為是否有關(guān)系呢？這樣的問題需要進(jìn)一步的研究。 本文首先根據(jù)我國滬兩深市上市公司2008-2010年連續(xù)3年年報披露的財務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)，綜合了影響外部審計質(zhì)量的三個主要方面：審計意見、審計費用和審計師變更，采用多元Logistic回歸的實證方法和建立對照組進(jìn)行對照分析，研究這三者對大股東“掏空”行為所產(chǎn)生的影響；其次研究這三者與大股東“掏空”之間的關(guān)系；最后站在公司治理的視角，主要是外部審計監(jiān)督的角度，對遏制大股東“掏空”行為提出具有指導(dǎo)性和現(xiàn)實性的建議。 根據(jù)實證得出的結(jié)果，本文得出如下主要結(jié)論： （1）2008-2010這3年中，，我國滬深兩市上市公司收到的審計意見與大股東擔(dān)�！疤涂铡本�1%的置信水平上顯著正相關(guān)。大股東通過擔(dān)保方式“掏空”上市公司，收到非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)審計意見的可能性更大。 （2）2008-2010這3年中，大股東通過資金占用“掏空”的上市公司，收到非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)審計意見的可能性較小。 （3）在這3年中，審計意見與總資產(chǎn)的自然對數(shù)均在1%的置信水平上顯著負(fù)相關(guān)。即上市公司的規(guī)模越大，就越不容易得到非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)審計意見。 （4）實證結(jié)果得出的結(jié)論：審計費用和審計師的變更與大股東擔(dān)�！疤涂铡焙痛蠊蓶|資金占用“掏空”不存在任何相關(guān)性。
[Abstract]:In the course of the development of the securities market in our country, because of the defects of the law and the company system and the special structure of the split share structure, there are many phenomena of fraud in the securities market, such as insider trading. "tunneling", also known as "tunneling", refers to the behavior of large shareholders who, as managers, transfer their assets through underground channels, in which the majority shareholders use their control rights, "tunneling" or "tunneling", or "tunneling," or "tunneling," or "tunneling," or "tunneling," or "tunneling," or "tunneling," or "tunneling." Through a variety of covert means, such as internal related party transactions, securities repurchase, and so on, all kinds of legal or illegal actions from enterprises to transfer assets and profits to their own hands. This kind of behavior has already led to consequences that cannot be ignored. Such as manipulating the financial information of the enterprise, encroaching on the interests of the minority shareholders, Affecting the development of listed companies and the healthy development of the securities market, the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders has become the key problem that restricts the sustained, healthy and rapid development of China's securities market. As an important external supervision mechanism, auditor audit should effectively identify the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders. According to the severity of "tunneling" of major shareholders, we can issue an appropriate audit opinion. Can auditors identify the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders as expected for China's capital market, which is in the stage of gradual development? What types of audit opinions are issued by auditors for listed companies with different "hollowing" levels? Is there any relationship between audit fees and auditor changes and the "hollowing" behavior of major shareholders? Such problems require further study. Based on the financial data disclosed by the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets for three consecutive years from 2008 to 2010, this paper synthesizes three main aspects that affect the quality of external audit: audit opinion, audit cost and auditor change. The empirical method of multiple Logistic regression and the control group were used to study the influence of these three factors on the "tunneling" behavior of the major shareholders, secondly, the relationship between the three factors and the "tunneling" behavior of the major shareholders was studied. Finally, from the perspective of corporate governance, mainly from the perspective of external audit and supervision, the author puts forward some instructive and realistic suggestions to curb the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders. Based on the empirical results, this paper draws the following main conclusions:. During the three years from 2008 to 2010, the audit opinions received by the listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets were significantly positively correlated with the "tunneling" guarantee of the major shareholders at the confidence level of 1%. The majority shareholders "hollowed out" the listed companies by way of guarantee. The possibility of receiving a non-standard audit opinion is higher. In the three years from 2008 to 2010, major shareholders are less likely to receive non-standard audit opinions through "hollowed" listed companies. 3) in these three years, the audit opinion is negatively correlated with the natural logarithm of the total assets at the confidence level of 1%, that is, the larger the scale of the listed company, the less easy it is to obtain the non-standard audit opinion. 4) the conclusion of the empirical results is that there is no correlation between the audit fees and the change of auditors with the guarantee of "tunneling" and the "tunneling" of the capital occupied by the majority shareholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：內(nèi)蒙古財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F239.4;F832.51;F224

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