本文選題：盈余操縱　切入點：成因　出處：《武漢大學(xué)》2005年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在我國,隨著資本市場的日漸發(fā)展和上市公司的大量涌現(xiàn),上市公司的盈余操縱問題逐漸凸現(xiàn),成為我國會計理論與實務(wù)界的新課題。盈余操縱使公司盈余信息背離公司實際,沒有真實的反映公司的財務(wù)狀況與經(jīng)營業(yè)績,不利于廣大會計報表使用者正確決策。盈余操縱在上市公司中泛濫,嚴(yán)重?fù)p害了廣大投資者的利益,極大地阻礙了我國證券市場的規(guī)范運作,不利于國民經(jīng)濟的持續(xù)健康發(fā)展。要解決我國目前的會計信息失真并促進資本市場的發(fā)展,就必須對上市公司的盈余操縱行為進行研究。有鑒于此,本文對我國上市公司盈余操縱的成因、手段進行系統(tǒng)分析,并立足于獨立審計,提出了相關(guān)對策。 全文共分四個部分: 第一部分,緒論。首先,提出研究背景和選題意義,并對國內(nèi)外的研究成果進行總結(jié);其次,指出本文的研究思路與可能的創(chuàng)意;最后,對盈余操縱這一基本概念進行界定。 第二部分,分析我國盈余操縱產(chǎn)生的原因。首先,上市公司在相關(guān)利益的驅(qū)使下,具備盈余操縱的種種動機;其次,會計準(zhǔn)則本身的不完善為其提供可乘之機;再者,公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的不健全,不能形成良好的內(nèi)部制約機制;最后,證券監(jiān)管的不完善更助長了上市公司盈余操縱的氣焰。 第三部分,歸納總結(jié)上市公司盈余操縱的各種手段。包括利用會計政策選擇與變更、濫用會計估計、利用關(guān)聯(lián)方交易、收入與費用的確認(rèn)等手段。 第四部分,從獨立審計視角,提出盈余操縱的治理對策。首先,要提高獨立審計權(quán)威,保持注冊會計師獨立性;其次,加強注冊會計師行業(yè)職業(yè)道德與執(zhí)業(yè)水平建設(shè);再次,明確審計法律責(zé)任,建立民事賠償機制;最后,指出審計實務(wù)中,注冊會計師識別盈余操縱的常用方法。 盈余操縱不僅是一個會計問題,而且是一個復(fù)雜的社會問題,不能依靠注冊會計師行業(yè)一方面的改進來達到治理的目的,需要社會各個相關(guān)部門聯(lián)合起來綜合治理,才能從根本上抑制上市公司的盈余操縱行為,保證我國證券市場和國民經(jīng)濟的健康有序發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:In our country, with the development of the capital market and the emergence of a large number of listed companies, the problem of earnings manipulation of listed companies has gradually emerged, which has become a new topic in the field of accounting theory and practice in China. Earnings manipulation makes the earnings information of companies deviate from the actual situation of the company. The lack of a true reflection of the financial situation and operating performance of the company is not conducive to the correct decision of the majority of the users of the accounting statements. Earnings manipulation is rampant in the listed companies, which seriously damages the interests of the majority of investors. It greatly hinders the normal operation of China's securities market, and is not conducive to the sustained and healthy development of the national economy. It is necessary to solve the current distortion of accounting information in China and promote the development of the capital market. It is necessary to study the earnings manipulation behavior of listed companies. In view of this, this paper systematically analyzes the causes and means of earnings manipulation of listed companies in China, and puts forward relevant countermeasures based on independent audit. The full text is divided into four parts:. The first part is introduction. Firstly, the research background and the significance of the topic are put forward, and the research results at home and abroad are summarized. Secondly, the research ideas and possible ideas are pointed out. Finally, the basic concept of earnings manipulation is defined. The second part analyzes the reasons of earnings manipulation in China. Firstly, listed companies have a variety of motives for earnings manipulation driven by relevant interests; secondly, the imperfections of accounting standards provide opportunities for them to take advantage of. The imperfect corporate governance structure can not form a good internal restraint mechanism; finally, the imperfect securities supervision encourages the arrogance of earnings manipulation of listed companies. The third part summarizes the various methods of earnings manipulation of listed companies, including the use of accounting policy selection and change, misuse of accounting estimates, use of related party transactions, revenue and expense recognition and other means. The fourth part, from the perspective of independent audit, put forward the governance countermeasures of earnings manipulation. First, to improve the independent audit authority, to maintain the independence of certified public accountants; secondly, to strengthen the professional ethics and professional standards of certified public accountants; third, Finally, it points out the common methods for CPA to identify surplus manipulation in audit practice. Earnings manipulation is not only an accounting problem, but also a complex social problem. We cannot rely on the improvement of the CPA industry to achieve the goal of governance. In order to restrain the earnings manipulation of listed companies fundamentally and ensure the healthy and orderly development of China's securities market and national economy.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2005
【分類號】：F239.4

【引證文獻】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 張大翠;基于舞弊行為的審計策略與方法研究[D];蘇州大學(xué);2008年

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本文編號：1645504