發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-18 00:37

  本文選題：審計(jì)委員會(huì)制度　切入點(diǎn)：公司治理　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2005年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：英美的審計(jì)委員會(huì)作為公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中的重要組成部分，能夠有效地防止財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的不實(shí)披露、欺詐與舞弊情形，幫助董事會(huì)解除他們的法律責(zé)任，經(jīng)實(shí)證研究已具效果。而在我國(guó)年輕的證券市場(chǎng)里，層出不窮的股市欺詐案同樣困擾著市場(chǎng)投資者和監(jiān)管者，目前我國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)期望在我國(guó)上市公司中引入獨(dú)立董事和審計(jì)委員會(huì)制度，旨在完善上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)、促進(jìn)上市公司規(guī)范運(yùn)作。本文對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司審計(jì)委員會(huì)引入的必要性、有效性及責(zé)任結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行分析和研究，以期對(duì)我國(guó)審計(jì)委員會(huì)制度的構(gòu)建和完善提供借鑒意義。 首先，從審計(jì)委員會(huì)的歷史演進(jìn)入手，得出審計(jì)委員會(huì)乃為董事會(huì)內(nèi)部的獨(dú)立的對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告呈報(bào)體系進(jìn)行監(jiān)督的制度安排。其次，針對(duì)我國(guó)公司治理的現(xiàn)狀，對(duì)審計(jì)委員會(huì)在我國(guó)上市公司中設(shè)置的必要性進(jìn)行詳細(xì)分析，首先運(yùn)用公司治理理論和博弈論對(duì)審計(jì)委員會(huì)設(shè)置的必要性提供理論上的依據(jù)，再?gòu)募訌?qiáng)董事會(huì)監(jiān)督功能和彌補(bǔ)監(jiān)事會(huì)監(jiān)督的缺失兩方面對(duì)審計(jì)委員會(huì)設(shè)置的必要性提供現(xiàn)實(shí)上的依據(jù)，并重點(diǎn)強(qiáng)調(diào)審計(jì)委員會(huì)的建立加強(qiáng)了董事會(huì)對(duì)經(jīng)理層提供的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的監(jiān)督與控制。再次，對(duì)審計(jì)委員會(huì)在我國(guó)的有效性進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究：通過(guò)審計(jì)委員會(huì)是否設(shè)置與審計(jì)意見(jiàn)的一元線(xiàn)性回歸模型和審計(jì)委員會(huì)是否設(shè)置與公司業(yè)績(jī)一元線(xiàn)性回歸模型的構(gòu)建，對(duì)它們的相關(guān)性進(jìn)行了實(shí)證分析，得出審計(jì)委員會(huì)在我國(guó)沒(méi)有發(fā)揮其核心功能——監(jiān)督財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的結(jié)論。最后，依據(jù)審計(jì)委員會(huì)在我國(guó)的需求分析和實(shí)證結(jié)論對(duì)審計(jì)委員會(huì)的責(zé)任結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行了重構(gòu)，，同時(shí)對(duì)審計(jì)委員會(huì)成員在我國(guó)的法律責(zé)任進(jìn)行了探討。
[Abstract]:As an important part of the corporate governance structure, the audit committee in the United States and the United States can effectively prevent the false disclosure of financial reports, fraud and fraud, and help the board of directors to relieve them of their legal liability. Empirical research has been effective. But in our country's young securities market, stock market fraud in endlessly is also puzzling market investors and regulators. At present, the CSRC expects to introduce the independent director and audit committee system into the listed companies in China, aiming at perfecting the governance structure of the listed companies and promoting the standardized operation of the listed companies. The effectiveness and responsibility structure are analyzed and studied in order to provide reference for the construction and perfection of audit committee system in China. First of all, from the historical evolution of the audit committee, it is concluded that the audit committee is an independent financial report reporting system within the board of directors. Secondly, in view of the current situation of corporate governance in China, The necessity of setting up audit committee in listed companies in China is analyzed in detail. Firstly, the theory of corporate governance and game theory are used to provide theoretical basis for the necessity of setting up audit committee. Furthermore, from two aspects of strengthening the supervisory function of the board of directors and making up for the lack of supervision by the board of supervisors, it provides a realistic basis for the necessity of setting up the audit committee. It is emphasized that the establishment of the audit committee has strengthened the supervision and control of the financial reports provided by the board of directors. An empirical study on the effectiveness of audit committee in our country is carried out: whether the audit committee sets up a univariate linear regression model with audit opinion and whether the audit committee sets up a univariate linear regression model with corporate performance. This paper makes an empirical analysis of their relevance and concludes that the Board of auditors has failed to perform its core function of supervising financial reports in China. Finally, According to the demand analysis and empirical conclusion of the audit committee in China, this paper reconstructs the responsibility structure of the audit committee, and probes into the legal liability of the members of the audit committee in our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2005
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F239.2

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前3條

1 張勇;應(yīng)超;;審計(jì)委員會(huì)制度能有效防止上市公司信息披露違規(guī)嗎——來(lái)自2003-2007年滬深兩市A股的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2009年05期

2 喬春華;蔣蘇婭;;審計(jì)委員會(huì)若干理論問(wèn)題的探討[J];審計(jì)研究;2008年02期

3 管考磊;劉劍超;;董事會(huì)、審計(jì)委員會(huì)與監(jiān)事會(huì)關(guān)系研究[J];中南財(cái)經(jīng)政法大學(xué)研究生學(xué)報(bào);2006年04期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 陳慶發(fā);董事會(huì)特征對(duì)盈余管理影響的實(shí)證分析[D];華東交通大學(xué);2005年

2 孫燕;我國(guó)上市公司審計(jì)委員會(huì)治理有效性研究[D];西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2007年

3 關(guān)旭;基于公司治理的上市公司審計(jì)委員會(huì)制度研究[D];東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2007年

4 江正春;上市公司董事會(huì)專(zhuān)業(yè)委員會(huì)制度在我國(guó)的運(yùn)行探討[D];中央民族大學(xué);2009年

本文編號(hào)：1627242