本文選題：信息不對稱　切入點：逆向選擇　出處：《四川大學(xué)》2005年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：對上市公司獨立審計風險的控制是整個會計審計領(lǐng)域研究的重要課題之一,對獨立審計事業(yè)的發(fā)展乃至整個社會經(jīng)濟的健康發(fā)展都有著重要的意義。關(guān)于審計風險的控制,學(xué)術(shù)界已經(jīng)作了大量的、深入的研究,并且也已取得了較大的成果,對注冊會計師的實務(wù)工作起到了很大的理論指導(dǎo)作用。但是目前我國證券市場仍然頻頻出現(xiàn)審計失敗事件,注冊會計師及其所在會計師事務(wù)所(以下簡稱為審計主體)一再卷入法律訴訟案件,審計職業(yè)界的公信力越來越受到社會公眾的懷疑,對我國整個證券市場的良性發(fā)展產(chǎn)生了極為不利的影響。這種現(xiàn)狀急需得到改變,但是實務(wù)界的發(fā)展需要理論界的指導(dǎo),所以理論界肩負著改變現(xiàn)狀的歷史重擔。本文正是基于這樣一種背景選擇了上市公司獨立審計風險控制這一問題進行研究,并且力求從信息不對稱理論著手來分析上市公司獨立審計風險形成的原因,然后從降低信息不對稱水平角度來尋求控制審計風險的措施。 本文在運用信息不對稱理論進行分析的過程中,首先將信息不對稱分為兩大種類,即存在于委托代理關(guān)系中的信息不對稱(會帶來逆向選擇和道德風險問題)和不存在于委托代理關(guān)系中的信息不對稱(不會帶來逆向選擇和道德風險問題)。其次論證改革目前的注冊會計師聘用制度、正確定位審計委托人為股東的觀點。最后將上市公司股東聘請注冊會計師事務(wù)所進行審計的交易活動按照時間順序劃分為兩個階段,即股東與會計師事務(wù)所簽約前為第
[Abstract]:The control of independent audit risk of listed companies is one of the most important topics in the field of accounting audit. It is of great significance to the development of independent audit and even to the healthy development of the whole society and economy. Academic circles have done a lot of in-depth research, and have also made great achievements, which has played a great role in guiding the practical work of CPA. However, at present, there are still frequent audit failures in China's securities market. As certified public accountants and their accounting firms (hereinafter referred to as audit subjects) have repeatedly been involved in legal litigation cases, the credibility of the auditing profession has been more and more suspected by the public. This situation urgently needs to be changed, but the development of the practical circles needs the guidance of the theoretical circle. Therefore, the theoretical circle is shouldering the historical burden of changing the status quo. This paper chooses the issue of independent audit risk control of listed companies on the basis of such a background. And from the information asymmetry theory to analyze the causes of independent audit risk of listed companies, and then to reduce the level of information asymmetry to seek measures to control audit risk. In this paper, the information asymmetry is divided into two categories in the process of analysis by using the information asymmetry theory. That is, information asymmetry in principal-agent relationship (which will bring adverse selection and moral hazard problem) and information asymmetry that does not exist in principal-agent relationship (it will not bring adverse selection and moral hazard problem). To demonstrate the reform of the current system of employing certified public accountants, Finally, the transaction activities of the shareholders of listed companies employing CPA firms to audit are divided into two stages according to the time order, that is, the shareholders are the first before signing the contract with the accounting firms.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：四川大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2005
【分類號】：F239.4

【引證文獻】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 王樺;應(yīng)計質(zhì)量、審計師聘任與審計師決策[D];復(fù)旦大學(xué);2010年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前3條

1 張藝馨;我國上市公司治理風險預(yù)警研究[D];沈陽工業(yè)大學(xué);2010年

2 任亮;獨立審計舞弊的博弈分析與對策研究[D];黑龍江八一農(nóng)墾大學(xué);2008年

3 應(yīng)丹丹;中國企業(yè)會計信息主權(quán)的失控狀況評估[D];華東師范大學(xué);2012年

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本文編號：1608652