本文選題：管理層舞弊　切入點：誘因結構　出處：《南京大學》2005年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】： 財務報告舞弊問題是學術界和實務界長期必須面對的問題。本文以中國上市公司管理層舞弊為主要研究對象,主要采用規(guī)范研究方法對管理層舞弊的誘因及其結構、行為人互動機制以及政府有效監(jiān)管三個問題進行了深入的研究: 1、管理層舞弊多因論。借鑒激勵期望理論建立起管理層舞弊誘因模型,同時運用社會控制論、文化傳遞論等理論構建起管理層舞弊的誘因體系;并在此基礎上,運用理性經濟人效用函數構建起管理層舞弊效用函數,從而在管理層舞弊誘因系統(tǒng)理論化基礎上深入地剖析了管理層舞弊的成本收益的影響因素結構。在誘因結構研究上突破有:提出并分析了舞弊行為人內部控制系統(tǒng)內涵;提出并分析了舞弊行為人心理成本內涵;提出了判斷主次誘因的標準;指出了我國管理層舞弊的主要誘因。 2、管理層舞弊過程論。在管理層舞弊誘因結構研究基礎上,通過論證內部人控制問題導致的會計監(jiān)管“三位一體”體系失衡以及失衡體系中的行為人效用變動因素,構建起管理層舞弊互動行為模型;并以此為基礎,指出了我國管理層舞弊的主要類型,建立起管理層舞弊的博弈模型,深入剖析了管理層舞弊過程的利益分割及其制約因素、因素的影響強度和方向;并用案例進行了模型檢驗。 3、舞弊有效監(jiān)管論。在論證了監(jiān)控管理層舞弊的公司內部治理有限性、政府有效監(jiān)管的效率理論基礎上,文章構建了政府有效監(jiān)管的博弈模型,深入剖析了一定時點的社會可承受的管理層舞弊量及其影響因素,以及以此為前提的政府監(jiān)管力度、懲罰強度和懲罰方式選擇的理論問題。 在論證這三個問題基礎上,文章提出了相應的治理管理層舞弊的政策原則和建議。
[Abstract]:The problem of financial reporting fraud is a problem that the academic and practical circles must face for a long time. This paper takes the management fraud of listed companies in China as the main research object, mainly adopts the normative research method to the inducement and structure of management fraud. The interaction mechanism of the actors and the effective supervision of the government are studied deeply. 1. The multi-cause theory of management fraud. The incentive model of management fraud is established by using incentive expectation theory, and the inducement system of management fraud is constructed by using social cybernetics and cultural transfer theory. Using rational economic man utility function to construct management fraud utility function, On the basis of the theory of management fraud inducement system, the paper deeply analyzes the structure of influencing factors of cost and income of management fraud. The breakthrough in the research of inducement structure includes: putting forward and analyzing the connotation of internal control system of fraud perpetrator; This paper puts forward and analyzes the connotation of psychological cost of fraud perpetrator, puts forward the standard of judging primary and secondary inducement, and points out the main inducement of fraud by management in our country. 2. The theory of management fraud. On the basis of the research on the inducement structure of management fraud, this paper demonstrates the imbalance of accounting supervision "trinity" system caused by the problem of insider control and the changing factors of actor's utility in the unbalanced system. Based on this model, this paper points out the main types of management fraud in China, establishes a game model of management fraud, and analyzes the benefit segmentation and its restricting factors of management fraud process. The influence of factors on intensity and direction of the model was tested with a case study. 3. The theory of fraud effective supervision. On the basis of demonstrating the limitation of internal governance and the efficiency theory of effective government supervision, this paper constructs a game model of effective government supervision. This paper deeply analyzes the amount of management fraud and its influencing factors at a certain time, and the theoretical problems of government supervision, punishment intensity and the choice of punishment mode based on this. On the basis of demonstrating these three problems, the paper puts forward the corresponding policy principles and suggestions of management fraud.
【學位授予單位】：南京大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2005
【分類號】：F239.4

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