中國(guó)上市公司盈余管理與審計(jì)任期相關(guān)性實(shí)證研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-02-27 12:21
本文關(guān)鍵詞: 盈余管理 審計(jì)任期 實(shí)證研究 出處:《湖南大學(xué)》2006年碩士論文 論文類(lèi)型:學(xué)位論文
【摘要】: 近20年來(lái),上市公司盈余管理及其所帶來(lái)的一系列的問(wèn)題一直是國(guó)內(nèi)外會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)界廣泛研究的課題。2001年的“安然事件”,引申出了一個(gè)更具爭(zhēng)議的話題,即審計(jì)任期對(duì)上市公司盈余管理、會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所審計(jì)質(zhì)量和審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的影響,其核心是長(zhǎng)審計(jì)任期是否會(huì)影響審計(jì)師對(duì)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告盈余操縱的制約作用。我國(guó)的證券市場(chǎng)作為一個(gè)新興市場(chǎng),除了有新興市場(chǎng)的共性以外,更有著其自身獨(dú)特的特點(diǎn):以政府為主導(dǎo)的監(jiān)管模式,以國(guó)有企業(yè)改組上市為主的上市公司群體,以審計(jì)客戶為主導(dǎo)的審計(jì)服務(wù)需求方市場(chǎng),這些都使得我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)呈現(xiàn)出不同于別國(guó)的獨(dú)特特點(diǎn)。在我國(guó),上市公司盈余管理是否與審計(jì)任期長(zhǎng)短相關(guān),如何來(lái)防范和減少上市公司盈余管理,充分發(fā)揮會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所對(duì)上市公司盈余管理的制約作用,這些問(wèn)題具有理論與實(shí)踐意義。 為此,本文圍繞“盈余管理與審計(jì)任期的相關(guān)性”這一核心展開(kāi)研究,深入分析了盈余管理產(chǎn)生的理論基礎(chǔ)及其在我國(guó)特定制度下形成的誘致性動(dòng)因、影響審計(jì)任期發(fā)生變更的因素、我國(guó)對(duì)審計(jì)師輪換和審計(jì)任期的監(jiān)管政策、盈余管理與審計(jì)任期的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系;針對(duì)我國(guó)A股股票市場(chǎng)的特點(diǎn),采用截面基本Jones模型鑒定盈余管理,并對(duì)盈余管理與審計(jì)任期的相關(guān)性用實(shí)證研究方法進(jìn)行了檢驗(yàn),檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果表明,我國(guó)上市公司盈余管理與審計(jì)任期負(fù)相關(guān);诖,本文提出,防范和減少上市公司盈余管理的基本途徑之一是提高對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所變更的監(jiān)管力度,加強(qiáng)對(duì)過(guò)短的審計(jì)任期的監(jiān)管和信息披露。
[Abstract]:In the past 20 years, earnings management of listed companies and a series of problems brought about by them have been the subject of extensive research in the accounting circles at home and abroad. In 2001, the Enron incident brought out a more controversial topic. That is, the influence of audit term on earnings management, audit quality and audit independence of listed companies, The core of it is whether the long audit term will influence the auditor's restriction on the earnings manipulation of listed companies' financial reports. As an emerging market, the securities market of our country has the commonness of emerging markets. It has its own unique characteristics: the government-led regulatory model, state-owned enterprises to restructure the listed group of listed companies, audit customer-led audit service demand-side market, All these make the stock market of our country show unique characteristics different from other countries. In our country, whether the earnings management of listed companies is related to the length of audit tenure, how to prevent and reduce the earnings management of listed companies, It is of theoretical and practical significance to give full play to the restriction of accounting firms on earnings management of listed companies. Therefore, this paper focuses on the core of "the correlation between earnings management and audit tenure", and deeply analyzes the theoretical basis of earnings management and its inductive motivation under the specific system of our country. The factors affecting the change of audit tenure, the supervision policy of auditor rotation and audit tenure, the internal relationship between earnings management and audit tenure, and the characteristics of A-share stock market in China, The cross-sectional basic Jones model is used to identify earnings management, and the correlation between earnings management and audit tenure is tested by empirical research. The results show that earnings management and audit tenure of listed companies in China are negatively correlated. This paper proposes that one of the basic ways to prevent and reduce the earnings management of listed companies is to enhance the supervision of the change of accounting firms and to strengthen the supervision and information disclosure of the short audit tenure.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2006
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】:F275;F239.4
【引證文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條
1 吳彩蓮;審計(jì)師法律責(zé)任安排與審計(jì)質(zhì)量的關(guān)聯(lián)性研究[D];湖南大學(xué);2007年
,本文編號(hào):1542647
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