天堂国产午夜亚洲专区-少妇人妻综合久久蜜臀-国产成人户外露出视频在线-国产91传媒一区二区三区

當(dāng)前位置:主頁 > 管理論文 > 審計管理論文 >

基于信息不對稱理論的政府投資建設(shè)項(xiàng)目審計風(fēng)險研究

發(fā)布時間:2018-01-16 09:21

  本文關(guān)鍵詞:基于信息不對稱理論的政府投資建設(shè)項(xiàng)目審計風(fēng)險研究 出處:《江西理工大學(xué)》2010年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文


  更多相關(guān)文章: 政府審計 信息不對稱 博弈模型 風(fēng)險對策


【摘要】: 信息經(jīng)濟(jì)時代,信息作為一種重要生產(chǎn)力資源影響著社會生活的方方面面。充分占有信息的優(yōu)勢方,在競爭日趨激烈的今天,往往能把握全局,規(guī)避風(fēng)險,最終獲得成功;而處于信息弱勢的一方,在市場經(jīng)濟(jì)中舉步為艱,隨時面臨著遭遇損失和失敗的風(fēng)險。因此,研究在信息不對稱條件下,采用什么樣的手段,運(yùn)用何種方法將由于信息不對稱帶來的風(fēng)險降到承受范圍之內(nèi),對增強(qiáng)市場經(jīng)濟(jì)參與者把握全局和參與市場競爭的能力,有著重要而深遠(yuǎn)的意義。 政府審計作為受托經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)物,代表政府行使監(jiān)督審查職能,在保障社會主義市場經(jīng)濟(jì)健康有序地運(yùn)行上發(fā)揮著越來越重要的作用。由于審計是受托經(jīng)濟(jì)的產(chǎn)物,所以審計與被審計之間天然存在著信息不對稱,這種不對稱直接影響審計監(jiān)督的質(zhì)量,引發(fā)審計風(fēng)險。要樹立好政府審計的權(quán)威,做好社會主義市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的“守夜人”,政府審計必須研究和掌握信息不對稱狀況下,審計風(fēng)險產(chǎn)生的機(jī)制,并有針對性地研究和制定緩解審計風(fēng)險的方法、措施和手段。 本文試圖在信息不對稱的大前提下,結(jié)合作者在政府審計部門的工作經(jīng)驗(yàn),運(yùn)用喬治·阿克洛夫和邁克爾·斯彭斯的信息不對稱理論,分析闡述審計風(fēng)險產(chǎn)生機(jī)制,并從實(shí)用的角度提出緩解審計風(fēng)險的對策和建議。本文首先介紹政府審計的基本概念和現(xiàn)狀;其次介紹了信息不對稱下政府審計風(fēng)險的特征和具體表現(xiàn)以及審計風(fēng)險形成的原因;再次引用案例具體詳細(xì)的分析了在信息不對稱下政府投資項(xiàng)目的審計風(fēng)險并進(jìn)行了評價,同時運(yùn)用信息不對稱理論深入分析了審計各參與方的博弈行為并建立了博弈模型;最后,結(jié)合前面的分析和案例,以及作者從事審計工作的經(jīng)驗(yàn),突出實(shí)用性,有針對性地提出信息不對稱條件下控制政府審計風(fēng)險的一些對策和建議。
[Abstract]:In the age of information economy, information, as an important productive resource, affects all aspects of social life. To succeed in the end; In the information weak side, in the market economy is difficult, at any time facing the risk of loss and failure. Therefore, under the information asymmetry conditions, what kind of means to use. How to reduce the risk caused by asymmetric information to the range of bearing is of great significance to enhance the ability of market economy participants to grasp the overall situation and participate in market competition. As the entrusted economic product, the government audit performs the function of supervision and examination on behalf of the government. It plays a more and more important role in ensuring the healthy and orderly operation of socialist market economy. Because audit is the product of entrusted economy, there is a natural information asymmetry between audit and being audited. This asymmetry directly affects the quality of audit supervision and causes audit risk. It is necessary to establish the authority of government audit and be the "nightly watchman" of socialist market economy. Government audit must study and master the mechanism of audit risk under the condition of asymmetric information, and study and formulate the methods, measures and means to mitigate audit risk. This paper attempts to apply George Akrov and Michael Spence's theory of asymmetric information in the context of information asymmetry and the author's experience in government auditing. This paper analyzes and expounds the mechanism of audit risk, and puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to mitigate audit risk from a practical point of view. Firstly, this paper introduces the basic concepts and present situation of government audit; Secondly, it introduces the characteristics and concrete performance of government audit risk under asymmetric information and the reasons for the formation of audit risk. The case is cited to analyze the audit risk of government investment projects under asymmetric information and the evaluation is carried out. At the same time, the theory of information asymmetry is used to deeply analyze the game behavior of audit participants and establish a game model. Finally, combined with the previous analysis and cases, as well as the author's experience in auditing work, the author puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to control the government audit risk under the condition of asymmetric information.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:江西理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2010
【分類號】:F239.4

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 朱志珍;信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)發(fā)展概述[J];安徽大學(xué)學(xué)報;1994年04期

2 楊建榮,孫斌藝;政策因素與中國房地產(chǎn)市場發(fā)展路徑——政府、開發(fā)商、消費(fèi)者三方博弈分析[J];財經(jīng)研究;2004年04期

3 曹正漢;國有企業(yè)多重委托代理關(guān)系中的合謀問題:一個博弈論模型[J];佛山科學(xué)技術(shù)學(xué)院學(xué)報(社會科學(xué)版);1999年02期

4 宮瀚飆;;淺談跟蹤審計在基本建設(shè)項(xiàng)目管理中的作用[J];工程與建設(shè);2006年04期

5 王早生;改革政府投資工程建設(shè)管理勢在必行[J];建筑;2003年08期

6 烏家培;信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)動態(tài);1997年08期

7 曾國安;論信息不對稱產(chǎn)生的原因與經(jīng)濟(jì)后果[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)動態(tài);1999年11期

8 時現(xiàn);我國建設(shè)項(xiàng)目審計存在的風(fēng)險[J];中國審計;2001年09期

9 時現(xiàn);投資績效審計理論與實(shí)踐的探索[J];中國審計;2003年13期

10 胡志勇;;審計公告制度與國家審計風(fēng)險[J];審計與理財;2006年07期

,

本文編號:1432464

資料下載
論文發(fā)表

本文鏈接:http://sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/shenjigli/1432464.html


Copyright(c)文論論文網(wǎng)All Rights Reserved | 網(wǎng)站地圖 |

版權(quán)申明:資料由用戶8b308***提供,本站僅收錄摘要或目錄,作者需要刪除請E-mail郵箱bigeng88@qq.com