旅行社共創(chuàng)O2O模式的互補(bǔ)性資源投入決策研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-08-07 09:49
【摘要】:旅游運(yùn)營(yíng)商與在線旅行社通過(guò)合作發(fā)揮資源互補(bǔ)優(yōu)勢(shì)實(shí)現(xiàn)雙方的O2O模式,但互補(bǔ)性資源的投入會(huì)產(chǎn)生機(jī)會(huì)主義風(fēng)險(xiǎn),協(xié)調(diào)成本會(huì)使資源遭受效率損失。本文綜合考慮資源投入的收益與效率損失構(gòu)建了合作收益模型,運(yùn)用Stackelberg博弈分析了雙方互補(bǔ)性資源的最優(yōu)投入策略,并通過(guò)算例和案例對(duì)模型主要部分結(jié)論進(jìn)行了驗(yàn)證。結(jié)果表明:合作主導(dǎo)者收益達(dá)到其閥值時(shí),雙方才能達(dá)成合作;資源之間存在不完全互補(bǔ)關(guān)系,資源與合作努力之間存在替代關(guān)系;雙方可調(diào)整資源與合作努力投入比例,控制資源效率損失;雙方互補(bǔ)性資源投入和合作努力投入比例與其在共創(chuàng)O2O模式中的成本收益比相一致。
[Abstract]:Tourism operators and online travel agencies realize the O _ 2O mode by cooperating with each other's complementary advantages. However, the investment of complementary resources will produce opportunistic risks, and coordination costs will make the resources suffer efficiency losses. In this paper, the cooperative income model is constructed by considering the benefit and efficiency loss of resource input, and the optimal input strategy of complementary resources is analyzed by using Stackelberg game, and the main conclusions of the model are verified by examples and cases. The results show that the cooperation can be reached only when the profit of the cooperation leader reaches its threshold, the resources are not completely complementary, the resources and the cooperative efforts are substituted, and the proportion of resources and cooperative efforts can be adjusted by both sides. The ratio of complementary resource input and cooperative effort investment is consistent with the cost-benefit ratio in creating O _ 2O model.
【作者單位】: 重慶大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與工商管理學(xué)院;
【基金】:國(guó)家高等學(xué)校博士學(xué)科點(diǎn)專項(xiàng)科研基金“基于供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)同的聯(lián)盟模式與創(chuàng)新類型關(guān)系研究”(201101191110031) 重慶市研究生科研創(chuàng)新項(xiàng)目“旅行社合作共創(chuàng)O2O商業(yè)模式的資源投入決策研究”(CYB160004)
【分類號(hào)】:F592.6;F724.6
本文編號(hào):2169646
[Abstract]:Tourism operators and online travel agencies realize the O _ 2O mode by cooperating with each other's complementary advantages. However, the investment of complementary resources will produce opportunistic risks, and coordination costs will make the resources suffer efficiency losses. In this paper, the cooperative income model is constructed by considering the benefit and efficiency loss of resource input, and the optimal input strategy of complementary resources is analyzed by using Stackelberg game, and the main conclusions of the model are verified by examples and cases. The results show that the cooperation can be reached only when the profit of the cooperation leader reaches its threshold, the resources are not completely complementary, the resources and the cooperative efforts are substituted, and the proportion of resources and cooperative efforts can be adjusted by both sides. The ratio of complementary resource input and cooperative effort investment is consistent with the cost-benefit ratio in creating O _ 2O model.
【作者單位】: 重慶大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與工商管理學(xué)院;
【基金】:國(guó)家高等學(xué)校博士學(xué)科點(diǎn)專項(xiàng)科研基金“基于供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)同的聯(lián)盟模式與創(chuàng)新類型關(guān)系研究”(201101191110031) 重慶市研究生科研創(chuàng)新項(xiàng)目“旅行社合作共創(chuàng)O2O商業(yè)模式的資源投入決策研究”(CYB160004)
【分類號(hào)】:F592.6;F724.6
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