發(fā)布時間：2019-07-25 14:39

【摘要】：在沖突博弈過程中,能通過適當(dāng)?shù)姆绞将@取對手的偏好認(rèn)知信息對提升自身利益將起著不可估量的作用。本文依據(jù)沖突分析圖模型理論,建立了沖突局中人的偏好認(rèn)知模型。該模型通過邏輯分析首先得出某個局中人的理想沖突結(jié)局一定是其沖突對手不想看到的結(jié)果,即對手一定希望在該結(jié)局的偏好值越小越好;其次給出了Nash和SEQ穩(wěn)定性的最小偏好值的求解方法,并利用反問題求解模型得到了在該值下分別滿足相應(yīng)穩(wěn)定性的偏好序集;然后構(gòu)建偏好序分布信息熵對該偏好序集中包含的信息進(jìn)行挖掘,得到維持理想沖突結(jié)局穩(wěn)定需要特別關(guān)注的對手的偏好信息。最后,以"古巴導(dǎo)彈危機(jī)"為例,通過偏好認(rèn)知模型解析,得出美國要想在其理想沖突結(jié)局取得Nash和SEQ均衡,需要首先關(guān)注的可行狀態(tài)以及采取的相應(yīng)策略;同時也驗(yàn)證了該方法的有效性和優(yōu)越性。偏好認(rèn)知模型可以從戰(zhàn)略層面為沖突中的一方提供決策依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:In the process of conflict game, the ability to obtain the preference cognitive information of opponents in an appropriate way will play an inestimable role in promoting their own interests. Based on the theory of conflict analysis graph model, this paper establishes a cognitive model of human preference in conflict. Through logical analysis, the model first obtains that the ideal conflict outcome of a certain game must be a result that its conflict opponent does not want to see, that is, the smaller the preference value of the outcome, the better. Secondly, the solution method of the minimum preference value of Nash and SEQ stability is given, and the preference ordered set satisfying the corresponding stability under this value is obtained by using the inverse problem solving model. Then the information entropy of preference order distribution is constructed to mine the information contained in the preference order set, and the preference information of opponents who need special attention to maintain the stability of ideal conflict outcome is obtained. Finally, taking the "Cuba missile crisis" as an example, through the analysis of preference cognitive model, the feasible state and the corresponding strategy that the United States needs to pay first attention to in order to achieve Nash and SEQ equilibrium in the ideal conflict outcome of the United States are obtained, and the effectiveness and superiority of the method are also verified. Preference cognitive model can provide decision-making basis for one side of conflict from the strategic level.
【作者單位】： 南京航空航天大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;江蘇師范大學(xué)計(jì)算機(jī)學(xué)院;江蘇師范大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目(71471087,71301064) 國家社科重點(diǎn)基金資助項(xiàng)目(12AZD102) 江蘇省普通高校研究生科研創(chuàng)新計(jì)劃項(xiàng)目(KYZZ15_0102) 中央高校基本科研業(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)專項(xiàng)基金資助
【分類號】：C934

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