【摘要】：獨立董事制度作為降低代理成本,提升公司治理水平的制度安排,有利于提高管理層在做出并購等涉及公司重大投資經(jīng)營決策時的決策科學(xué)性,從而提高經(jīng)營業(yè)績,其對企業(yè)并購績效的重要性不言而喻。然而,獨立董事能否切實履行其職能卻可能受到獨立董事與包括CEO在內(nèi)的管理層之間社會關(guān)系的影響,這直接關(guān)系到公司的治理水平和經(jīng)營業(yè)績。社會關(guān)系如何度量是一個現(xiàn)實問題,因為它可以包括校友、同鄉(xiāng)甚至軍隊?wèi)?zhàn)友在內(nèi)的多種關(guān)系,具有不確定性。與社會關(guān)系不同的是,地緣關(guān)系是社會關(guān)系的承載,具有外生性。因此,將地緣關(guān)系作為社會關(guān)系代理變量研究獨立董事在并購中的作用是一個更具有可操作性的方向。本文以收購方公司內(nèi)部的獨立董事與CEO個體之間的地緣關(guān)系為研究的切入點,通過對首次公告日在2005年-2012年期間上市公司并購非上市公司的并購事件作為樣本的實證研究,探討了與CEO具有地緣關(guān)系的獨立董事能否真正履行其職責(zé),從而影響并購績效。本文的主要發(fā)現(xiàn)是:一、收購方公司的獨立董事與CEO具有地緣關(guān)系確能影響并購績效。如收購方聘請與CEO存在地緣關(guān)系的獨立董事,會對并購績效有不利的影響,且獨立董事與CEO具有地緣關(guān)系的公司,比沒有地緣關(guān)系的并購績效低3.2%。二、根據(jù)分樣本結(jié)果,地緣關(guān)系的并購績效受以下因素的影響:獨立董事的在職時間越短,并購績效越差;獨立董事的年齡越小,并購績效越差;收購方公司的規(guī)模越小,并購績效越差;收購方所在地市場化指數(shù)越低,并購績效越差;收購方所在地政治干預(yù)指數(shù)越高,并購績效越差。本文從獨立董事與CEO的地緣關(guān)系出發(fā),為獨立董事與CEO之間的社會關(guān)系找到了—個新的度量方法。本文的研究驗證了獨立董事的地域特征可以影響?yīng)毩⒍侣毮艿陌l(fā)揮進(jìn)而影響并購績效,從而為完善上市公司的獨立董事制度,提高公司的治理水平提供了借鑒意義。
[Abstract]:The independent director system, as a system arrangement to reduce the agent cost and improve the corporate governance level, is beneficial to the improvement of the decision-making science of the management in the decision-making of the major investment operation of the company, such as M & A and so on, so as to improve the operation performance, and the importance of the independent director system to the enterprise's M & A performance is self-evident. However, the ability of independent directors to effectively perform their functions may be affected by the social relationship between independent directors and management, including the CEO, which is directly related to the level of governance and performance of the company. The measure of social relations is a real problem, because it can include many kinds of relations, including the alumni, the same township and even the army comrades-in-arms, and has the uncertainty. In contrast to the social relations, the relationship between the land and the land is the bearing of the social relations, and has the external character. Therefore, the role of the independent director in the M & A is a more operable way to study the relationship as a proxy variable of the social relationship. In this paper, based on the relationship between the independent director and the CEO in the acquirer's company, this paper makes an empirical study on the acquisition and acquisition of non-listed companies by the listed companies in the period from 2005 to 2012. The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether the independent director with the relationship with the CEO can truly perform his/ her duties, thus affecting the performance of the M & A. The main findings of this paper are as follows:1. The relationship between the independent director of the purchaser and the CEO can affect the performance of the M & A. If the purchaser employs an independent director with a relationship with the CEO, it will have a negative impact on the performance of the M & A, and the independent director and the CEO have a relationship with the CEO, which is 3.2% lower than the acquisition performance without the relationship. 2. Based on the results of the sub-samples, the M & A performance of the land relationship is affected by the following factors: the shorter the in-service time of the independent director and the worse the acquisition performance; the smaller the age of the independent director, the worse the acquisition performance; and the smaller the size of the acquirer's company, the worse the acquisition performance; The lower the market index of the purchaser is, the worse the M & A performance is; the higher the political interference index of the purchaser is, the worse the M & A performance. Based on the relationship between the independent director and the CEO, this paper finds a new measure method for the relationship between the independent director and the CEO. The research in this paper proves that the geographical characteristics of independent directors can influence the function of independent director and influence the performance of merger and acquisition, so as to provide reference for improving the independent director system of the listed company and improving the corporate governance level.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海外國語大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F271;F271

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 雷倩華;羅黨論;陳暉麗;;上市公司獨立董事發(fā)揮怎樣的作用?——中國上市公司獨立董事辭職市場感知的視角[J];財經(jīng)論叢;2017年04期

2 葉青;趙良玉;劉思辰;;獨立董事“政商旋轉(zhuǎn)門”之考察:一項基于自然實驗的研究[J];經(jīng)濟研究;2016年06期

3 周建;羅肖依;張雙鵬;;獨立董事個體有效監(jiān)督的形成機理——面向董事會監(jiān)督有效性的理論構(gòu)建[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2016年05期

4 陳睿;王治;段從清;;獨立董事“逆淘汰”效應(yīng)研究——基于獨立意見的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2015年08期

5 嵇尚洲;陳偉;晉涵;;獨立董事地緣關(guān)系與企業(yè)董事會決策[J];上海對外經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)學(xué)報;2015年03期

6 孫亮;劉春;;公司為什么聘請異地獨立董事?[J];管理世界;2014年09期

7 何賢杰;孫淑偉;朱紅軍;牛建軍;;證券背景獨立董事、信息優(yōu)勢與券商持股[J];管理世界;2014年03期

8 劉誠;楊繼東;;獨立董事的社會關(guān)系與監(jiān)督功能——基于CEO被迫離職的證據(jù)[J];財經(jīng)研究;2013年07期

9 沈維濤;葉小杰;;市場化程度、獨立董事獨立性與公司價值——基于獨立董事辭職公告的實證檢驗[J];經(jīng)濟管理;2012年12期

10 陳運森;謝德仁;;董事網(wǎng)絡(luò)、獨立董事治理與高管激勵[J];金融研究;2012年02期

，

本文編號：2512567