本文選題：貨幣薪酬 + 股權激勵�。� 參考：《科技管理研究》2017年03期

【摘要】：以廣東戰(zhàn)略性新興企業(yè)為樣本,通過手工收集數(shù)據研究管理者薪酬對企業(yè)研發(fā)創(chuàng)新的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),高管貨幣薪酬激勵對企業(yè)研發(fā)投資有顯著正向促進作用,而高管持股卻并非如此,這與高管持股整體偏低以及企業(yè)股權激勵機制不健全有關。進一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn),當企業(yè)績效不佳時,高管薪酬對企業(yè)研發(fā)創(chuàng)新的影響并不顯著,說明業(yè)績欠佳時企業(yè)更關心的是生存而不是由研發(fā)創(chuàng)新推動的發(fā)展。最后指出企業(yè)做大與做強之間的矛盾。
[Abstract]:Taking Guangdong strategic emerging enterprises as a sample, this paper studies the effect of managers' compensation on enterprise R & D innovation by hand collecting data. The study found that executive monetary incentive has a significant positive effect on R & D investment, but not on executive ownership, which is related to the low overall executive ownership and inadequate corporate equity incentive mechanism. Further research found that when the performance of enterprises is poor, the impact of executive compensation on R & D innovation is not significant, which indicates that when performance is poor, companies are more concerned about survival than R & D innovation-driven development. Finally, the paper points out the contradiction between making enterprises bigger and stronger.
【作者單位】： 廣東金融學院區(qū)域金融政策重點研究基地;廣東金融學院會計系;
【基金】：國家社會科學基金項目“薪酬激勵偏好與高新技術企業(yè)研發(fā)創(chuàng)新研究”(15BJY012)
【分類號】：F273.1;F272.92;F276.44

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