本文關(guān)鍵詞： 商業(yè)銀行 SUR模型 經(jīng)濟(jì)增加值回報(bào)率(REVA) 薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制　出處：《西安財(cái)經(jīng)學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào)》2017年05期 　論文類(lèi)型：期刊論文

【摘要】：文章在引入綜合績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo)REVA(經(jīng)濟(jì)增加值回報(bào)率)的基礎(chǔ)上,建立基于面板數(shù)據(jù)的SUR模型進(jìn)行橫向分析并建立帶有虛擬變量的混合效應(yīng)模型做縱向分析,研究了商業(yè)銀行REVA和員工薪酬激勵(lì)的關(guān)系,檢驗(yàn)薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的有效性。研究表明:國(guó)有控股商業(yè)銀行的員工薪酬對(duì)REVA作用不顯著;而中小股份制商業(yè)銀行、城市商業(yè)銀行的員工薪酬和REVA是顯著正相關(guān)的,薪酬激勵(lì)作用是有效的,且巴塞爾協(xié)議Ⅲ實(shí)施后,樣本銀行的員工薪酬激勵(lì)作用明顯加強(qiáng)。
[Abstract]:On the basis of introducing the comprehensive performance evaluation index (Reva), this paper establishes a SUR model based on panel data for horizontal analysis and a mixed effect model with virtual variables for longitudinal analysis. This paper studies the relationship between REVA and employee compensation incentive in commercial banks, and tests the effectiveness of compensation incentive mechanism. The research shows that the compensation of state-owned holding commercial banks does not play a significant role in REVA, while the small and medium-sized joint-stock commercial banks, The employee compensation and REVA of the city commercial banks are significantly positive correlation, the compensation incentive effect is effective, and after the implementation of Basel III, the sample bank staff compensation incentive role is obviously strengthened.
【作者單位】： 湖南大學(xué)金融與統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：湖南省博士后科研資助專(zhuān)項(xiàng)計(jì)劃(2014RS4015)
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.33

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4 尹s，

本文編號(hào)：1542867