發(fā)布時間：2018-02-17 08:58

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 混合所有制改革 貨幣薪酬 股權(quán)激勵 在職消費 協(xié)同效應(yīng)　出處：《重慶理工大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：混合所有制改革是新時期國企改革的方向和突破口,其中高管激勵問題是改革和完善公司治理機制的重要方面�；旌纤兄破髽I(yè)與單一制企業(yè)相比,在高管顯性激勵與隱性激勵的效果上會存在差異,如何對混合所有制改革后的企業(yè)高管進行有效激勵具有一定的研究價值。本文基于國有企業(yè)進行混合所有制改革的大背景,研究混合所有制企業(yè)內(nèi)部高管激勵問題,為國企混合所有制改革提供相關(guān)借鑒參考。本文綜合利用文獻分析、理論演繹與實證分析的方法,對混合所有制企業(yè)高管激勵的兩類主要機制——顯性激勵(貨幣薪酬激勵和股權(quán)激勵)和隱性激勵(主要是在職消費)分別與公司績效的關(guān)系及兩者結(jié)合所發(fā)揮的協(xié)同效應(yīng)進行了探討研究。首先,總結(jié)評述了之前學者關(guān)于國有企業(yè)混合所有制改革、高管顯性激勵經(jīng)濟后果、高管隱性激勵經(jīng)濟后果以及顯性激勵與隱性激勵關(guān)系方面的研究。其次,根據(jù)委托代理理論、激勵理論、契約理論和管理層權(quán)力理論就高管貨幣薪酬、持股比例、在職消費對公司績效的影響以及前兩者與后者的協(xié)同效應(yīng)關(guān)系進行了理論分析,并提出了相應(yīng)假設(shè)及研究模型。再次,以2013-2015年連續(xù)三年在中國A股市場中已經(jīng)建立混合所有制形式的469家上市公司為研究樣本,通過描述性統(tǒng)計分析、相關(guān)性分析及多元回歸分析對假設(shè)進行了實證檢驗。為確保研究結(jié)果的可靠性,本文還對實證模型做了穩(wěn)健性檢驗。本文的研究結(jié)果顯示:混合所有制上市公司高管顯性激勵對公司績效有顯著提升作用,不論是對高管進行的貨幣薪酬激勵還是股權(quán)激勵都發(fā)揮了積極效果;混合所有制上市公司的高管隱性激勵——在職消費與公司績效呈現(xiàn)出倒U型關(guān)系,即隨著在職消費的增加公司績效先提高后下降,證明了高管在職消費既存在合理性,同時其超額部分也存在負面性;混合所有制上市公司的高管顯性激勵與隱性激勵之間并不是完全的協(xié)同效應(yīng),其中貨幣薪酬激勵和在職消費激勵具有顯著的協(xié)同效應(yīng),而股權(quán)激勵與在職消費激勵的協(xié)同效應(yīng)不顯著,但發(fā)現(xiàn)了高管股權(quán)激勵對超額在職消費的抑制效果。最后,本文在總結(jié)研究結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上,提出了在國有企業(yè)進行混合所有制改革中如何對高管進行有效激勵的政策建議,并總結(jié)了本文研究中的不足,探討了未來該領(lǐng)域的研究方向。
[Abstract]:The reform of mixed ownership is the direction and breakthrough of the reform of state-owned enterprises in the new period, in which the issue of executive incentive is an important aspect of reforming and perfecting the corporate governance mechanism. There will be differences in the effect of explicit incentive and implicit incentive. How to effectively motivate the executives after the mixed ownership reform has some research value. This paper is based on the background of the state-owned enterprises to carry out the mixed ownership reform. In order to provide reference for the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises, this paper makes comprehensive use of literature analysis, theoretical deduction and empirical analysis methods. The relationship between explicit incentive (monetary compensation incentive and equity incentive) and implicit incentive (mainly on the job consumption) and corporate performance, and the combination of them, are two main mechanisms of executive incentive in mixed ownership enterprises: explicit incentive (monetary compensation incentive and equity incentive) and implicit incentive (mainly on the job consumption). The synergistic effect is studied. First of all, This paper summarizes and reviews the previous researches on the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, the economic consequences of executive explicit incentive, the economic consequences of executive implicit incentive and the relationship between explicit incentive and implicit incentive. Secondly, according to the principal-agent theory, Incentive theory, contract theory and management power theory analyze the influence of monetary compensation, shareholding ratio, in-service consumption on corporate performance and the relationship between the former two and the latter. The corresponding hypothesis and research model are put forward. Thirdly, taking 469 listed companies which have established the mixed ownership form in China's A-share market for three consecutive years from 2013-2015 as the research sample, the descriptive statistical analysis is carried out. Correlation analysis and multivariate regression analysis are used to test the hypothesis. The results show that the dominant incentive of executives in mixed ownership companies has a significant effect on corporate performance. Both monetary and equity incentives for executives have played a positive role; the implicit incentive of executives in mixed ownership listed companies-the relationship between in-service consumption and corporate performance is inversely U-shaped. That is, with the increase of in-service consumption, the corporate performance first increases and then drops, which proves that the in-service consumption of senior executives is not only reasonable, but also negative in the excess part. There is not a complete synergistic effect between overt incentive and implicit incentive in mixed ownership listed companies, in which monetary compensation incentive and in-service consumption incentive have significant synergistic effect. However, the synergistic effect of equity incentive and on-the-job consumption incentive is not significant, but the inhibition effect of executive equity incentive on excess on-the-job consumption is found. This paper puts forward some policy suggestions on how to effectively motivate senior executives in the reform of mixed ownership in state-owned enterprises, summarizes the shortcomings of this study, and probes into the research direction in this field in the future.
【學位授予單位】：重慶理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F276.1;F272.92

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