發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-05-15 12:20

【摘要】： 金融業(yè)的特殊性質(zhì)使得上至銀行行長(zhǎng),下至銀行普通職員,都可以接觸巨額資金,都有產(chǎn)生腐敗的可能。文獻(xiàn)回顧發(fā)現(xiàn)：在“純”腐敗及金融腐敗的研究中,腐敗的分類沒有得到足夠的重視,并由此導(dǎo)致腐敗的資源配置效應(yīng)也存在爭(zhēng)議,并強(qiáng)調(diào)腐敗是金融機(jī)構(gòu)自身的行為選擇,金融腐敗必然導(dǎo)致企業(yè)破產(chǎn)概率的提高,企業(yè)家比例的下降,并降低金融資源的配置效率。那么這個(gè)判斷是否準(zhǔn)確? 本文以銀行業(yè)信貸腐敗為研究對(duì)象,對(duì)上述觀點(diǎn)提出了挑戰(zhàn)。將信貸腐敗劃分為無盜竊腐敗與有盜竊腐敗,分別考察不同類型的信貸腐敗對(duì)企業(yè)破產(chǎn)概率與企業(yè)家比例的影響,并分析相應(yīng)的資源配置效應(yīng)。分析過程借鑒了Blackburn Sarmah(2006)的思路,但放棄腐敗是金融機(jī)構(gòu)自身行為決策的假設(shè),將信貸腐敗視為銀行從業(yè)人員與申請(qǐng)貸款企業(yè)私下的交易,隱瞞于金融機(jī)構(gòu),且腐敗收入由腐敗人員個(gè)人獲得。 得出的主要結(jié)論如下： (1)信貸腐敗一方面增加了企業(yè)的融資需求,導(dǎo)致資金的稀缺性增加,另一方面扭曲了企業(yè)的投資條件。 (2)無盜竊腐敗的發(fā)生使得企業(yè)破產(chǎn)概率提高,社會(huì)中能夠進(jìn)行創(chuàng)新型投資的企業(yè)家比例下降。并且隨著賄賂金額的增加,企業(yè)家人口比例進(jìn)一步減少；有盜竊腐敗對(duì)企業(yè)破產(chǎn)概率及企業(yè)家人口比例的影響存在不確定性。 (3)不論是無盜竊腐敗還是有盜竊腐敗的信貸市場(chǎng),優(yōu)質(zhì)企業(yè)都被迫付出較高的賄賂以獲得貸款,從而促進(jìn)了金融資源向高效使用者手中的轉(zhuǎn)移與配置；而在無腐敗信貸市場(chǎng)中,由于缺乏激勵(lì),放貸人員的隨機(jī)放貸行為可能產(chǎn)生無效率的貸款使用。 如果僅僅從經(jīng)濟(jì)效率的角度考慮,容忍一定程度的金融腐敗將有助于金融資源的高效率使用,是對(duì)金融資源嚴(yán)重壟斷形勢(shì)下所導(dǎo)致低效率狀態(tài)的一種改進(jìn)。
[Abstract]:The special nature of the financial industry makes it possible for bank governors, as well as ordinary bank employees, to have access to huge amounts of money and the possibility of corruption. It is found that in the study of "pure" corruption and financial corruption, the classification of corruption has not been paid enough attention, and the resource allocation effect of corruption is also controversial, and it is emphasized that corruption is the behavior choice of financial institutions themselves. Financial corruption will inevitably lead to the improvement of enterprise bankruptcy probability, the decrease of entrepreneur proportion, and the reduction of the allocation efficiency of financial resources. So is this judgment accurate? This paper takes the banking credit corruption as the research object and challenges the above point of view. Credit corruption is divided into non-theft corruption and theft corruption. the effects of different types of credit corruption on the probability of enterprise bankruptcy and the proportion of entrepreneurs are investigated respectively, and the corresponding resource allocation effects are analyzed. The analysis process draws lessons from the idea of Blackburn Sarmah (2006), but abandons the assumption that corruption is the behavior decision of financial institutions themselves, regards credit corruption as a private transaction between bank practitioners and loan applicants, and conceals it from financial institutions. And the income from corruption is obtained by the corrupt individual. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) on the one hand, credit corruption increases the financing demand of enterprises, which leads to the increase of capital scarcity, on the other hand, it distorts the investment conditions of enterprises. (2) the occurrence of corruption without theft increases the probability of enterprise bankruptcy, and the proportion of entrepreneurs who can make innovative investment in society decreases. With the increase of bribe amount, the proportion of entrepreneur population decreases further, and there is uncertainty about the influence of theft and corruption on the probability of enterprise bankruptcy and the proportion of entrepreneur population. (3) whether there is theft or corruption in the credit market, high-quality enterprises are forced to pay higher bribes to obtain loans, thus promoting the transfer and allocation of financial resources to efficient users; In the non-corrupt credit market, due to the lack of incentives, random lending by borrowers may lead to inefficient loan use. If we only consider from the point of view of economic efficiency, tolerating a certain degree of financial corruption will contribute to the efficient use of financial resources, and it is an improvement to the inefficient state caused by the serious monopoly of financial resources.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號(hào)】：F272;F832.3

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