【摘要】：金融危機(jī)之后，不少瀕臨破產(chǎn)邊緣依靠政府救助得以幸存的商業(yè)銀行仍然支付其高管高額薪酬。民間紛紛指責(zé)這一不公平現(xiàn)象，學(xué)術(shù)界也認(rèn)為高薪缺乏優(yōu)秀業(yè)績(jī)的支撐，各國政府也都出臺(tái)了相關(guān)政策來規(guī)范銀行高管薪酬問題。本文正是在這樣的背景下來，以中國十六家上市商業(yè)銀行作為樣本，，從風(fēng)險(xiǎn)角度來對(duì)商業(yè)銀行薪酬問題進(jìn)行研究。以幾家有代表性的國際性大銀行作為參照對(duì)象，本文發(fā)現(xiàn)中國銀行業(yè)總體薪酬水平還有上升空間。目前股份制商業(yè)銀行的薪酬水平最高。大部分商業(yè)銀行普遍實(shí)施了固定薪酬與變動(dòng)薪酬相結(jié)合的激勵(lì)措施，但是后者比例較低�；诠蓹�(quán)價(jià)值的激勵(lì)和中長(zhǎng)期的激勵(lì)方案，無論在管理層還是普通員工中間均很少實(shí)施。 基于面板數(shù)據(jù)的實(shí)證模型研究了高管薪酬水平對(duì)銀行違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響，發(fā)現(xiàn)高管薪酬水平對(duì)銀行違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響呈“倒U形”關(guān)系，并且高管薪酬水平對(duì)國有大型商業(yè)銀行違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響高于對(duì)股份制商業(yè)銀行和城市商業(yè)銀行的影響。另外，總體薪酬成本作為銀行一項(xiàng)重要的人力資本成本，水平越高對(duì)銀行違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響也越大。但是這并不意味著總薪酬成本越低越好，銀行應(yīng)提高提高經(jīng)營效率，從而提高人力資本效率。因此本文在分析了干預(yù)手段-間接的資本充足率限制和直接的薪酬干預(yù)的基礎(chǔ)上，提出建議，金融監(jiān)管部門應(yīng)加強(qiáng)對(duì)銀行薪酬干預(yù)的力度，擴(kuò)大干預(yù)范圍，尤其應(yīng)加強(qiáng)對(duì)薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)的干預(yù)和規(guī)范，增加中長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)和基于股權(quán)價(jià)值的激勵(lì)。
[Abstract]:After the financial crisis, many commercial banks, on the brink of bankruptcy, survived by government bailouts, still paying high salaries for their executives. Civil society has criticized this unfair phenomenon, academia also believes that high-paid lack of excellent performance support, governments have issued relevant policies to regulate the issue of bank executive compensation. Under this background, this paper takes 16 listed commercial banks in China as a sample to study the compensation of commercial banks from the point of view of risk. Taking several representative international banks as the reference object, this paper finds that the overall compensation level of Chinese banks still has room to rise. At present, the joint-stock commercial banks pay the highest level. Most commercial banks generally implement a combination of fixed and variable pay incentives, but the latter ratio is low. Equity value-based incentives and medium-and long-term incentives are rarely implemented either among management or ordinary employees. Based on the empirical model of panel data, this paper studies the impact of executive compensation level on bank default risk, and finds that the impact of executive compensation level on bank default risk is "inverted U" relationship. And the effect of executive compensation level on default risk of state-owned large commercial banks is higher than that on joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks. In addition, as an important cost of human capital, the higher the level of compensation cost, the greater the impact on the default risk of banks. However, this does not mean that the lower the total compensation costs, the better, banks should improve operational efficiency, thereby improving the efficiency of human capital. Therefore, based on the analysis of the indirect capital adequacy ratio restriction and the direct compensation intervention, this paper puts forward some suggestions that the financial regulatory departments should strengthen the intervention to the bank compensation and expand the scope of the intervention. In particular, we should strengthen the intervention and regulation of salary structure, increase the medium-and long-term incentive and incentive based on equity value.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.33

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