【摘要】：大股東的侵占主要是股權(quán)過于集中導致的。以LLSV為代表的學者認為，大股東一方面與小股東共享收益，并利用其控制地位而獨享私有收益，大、小股東之間的利益沖突產(chǎn)生。中國，由于其制度的不完善性，證券市場上信息的不對稱，造成了上市公司和它所下屬的上市公司、關(guān)聯(lián)公司之間上演著復雜的關(guān)聯(lián)交易，而上市公司的盈利能力與大股東現(xiàn)金流量的所有權(quán)存在著一定的關(guān)系，就會使得大股東通過利用控制權(quán)從而取得私人收益。中國的上市公司實行著金字塔結(jié)構(gòu)下的大股東利益侵占激勵機制，股權(quán)集中度相當高，而對中小股東利益實行保護的法律體系又不完備，大股東侵占的行為又多采取不正當?shù)氖侄蝸磉_到其目的，大股東侵占中小股東的利益現(xiàn)象屢見不鮮，影響了中國證券市場的有序進行。所以，要從根本上解決大股東侵占行為的發(fā)生就必須從根源上來探索影響大股東侵占行為因素和內(nèi)在動因機制，具有理論和現(xiàn)實意義。 本文首先對大股東侵占行為影響因素的研究文獻做了一個綜述，并進行了相關(guān)理論的分析。接著討論了大股東侵占的途徑和產(chǎn)生大股東侵占的制度與環(huán)境分析。然后選取了2004年和2009年上市公司作為樣本，用logistic模型實證分析了大股東侵占行為發(fā)生的影響因素，發(fā)現(xiàn)股權(quán)分置度變量與大股東侵占行為的發(fā)生呈重要的負相關(guān)關(guān)系，公司規(guī)模有重要的正相關(guān)關(guān)系；然后，選取了2004、2005、2009和2010年的上市公司為樣本，使用panel data模型實證分析了大股東侵占度的影響因素，發(fā)現(xiàn)資產(chǎn)負債率、監(jiān)事會規(guī)模與大股東侵占度呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系，股權(quán)分置度和公司規(guī)模與大股東侵占度呈負相關(guān)關(guān)系。公司規(guī)模在抑制大股東侵占行為發(fā)生和減輕侵占度的作用正好相反，這是個有趣的結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:The occupation of major shareholders is mainly caused by excessive concentration of equity. Scholars, represented by LLSV, believe that on the one hand, the major shareholders share the income with the minority shareholders, and use their control status to enjoy the private income, and the conflicts of interest between the large shareholders and the minority shareholders arise. In China, due to the imperfection of its system and the asymmetry of information in the securities market, the listed companies and their listed companies, and affiliated companies, are performing complex related transactions. There is a certain relationship between the profitability of listed companies and the ownership of large shareholders' cash flow, which will make the large shareholders obtain private income by using control rights. The listed companies in China implement the incentive mechanism of large shareholders' interests embezzlement under the pyramid structure, the concentration of equity is quite high, and the legal system of protecting the interests of small and medium shareholders is not perfect. The behavior of embezzlement by large shareholders often adopts improper means to achieve its purpose. The phenomenon of large shareholders encroaching on the interests of small and medium shareholders is not uncommon, which affects the orderly progress of China's securities market. Therefore, in order to fundamentally solve the occurrence of large shareholder embezzlement, it is of theoretical and practical significance to explore the factors and internal motivation mechanism that influence the behavior of large shareholder embezzlement from the root. At first, this paper reviews the literature on the influencing factors of the major shareholders' embezzlement, and analyzes the relevant theories. Then it discusses the ways of major shareholders' embezzlement and the system and environment analysis of the major shareholders' embezzlement. Then selected the listed companies in 2004 and 2009 as samples, using the logistic model to analyze the influencing factors of the large shareholder embezzlement, found that the degree of ownership separation variable and the occurrence of the major shareholder embezzlement behavior has an important negative correlation. The size of the company has an important positive correlation; Then, the listed companies in 2004, 2005, 2009 and 2010 are selected as samples, and the panel data model is used to analyze the influencing factors of the invasion degree of large shareholders. It is found that the ratio of assets and liabilities, the size of the board of supervisors and the degree of invasion of large shareholders have a positive correlation. There is a negative correlation between the degree of ownership separation and the size of the company and the degree of occupation of the major shareholders. It is an interesting conclusion that corporate size has the opposite effect on restraining the occurrence of large shareholder embezzlement and reducing the degree of encroachment.
【學位授予單位】：福建農(nóng)林大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;F224

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