【摘要】：近年來,隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,企業(yè)制度的改革,我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)政策和規(guī)定逐步完善,很多上市公司為激勵(lì)和約束高層管理人員,完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),促進(jìn)實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)價(jià)值最大化,開始嘗試股權(quán)激勵(lì)方式,在此環(huán)境下,對(duì)于該激勵(lì)機(jī)制與公司績(jī)效問關(guān)系的研究就很有必要。本文通過實(shí)證研究考察分析了我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系,及不同激勵(lì)模式的實(shí)施效果,這對(duì)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)理論的完善和上市公司激勵(lì)有效性的增強(qiáng)有重要意義。 本文首先對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)股權(quán)激勵(lì)和公司績(jī)效關(guān)系的經(jīng)典文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了匯總和評(píng)析,對(duì)二者的相關(guān)概念和理論基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行了闡述,介紹和比較了各種股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式,分析了我國(guó)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的公司數(shù)量、行業(yè)、激勵(lì)方式、激勵(lì)比例等現(xiàn)狀。之后,本文以2011年首次公布實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的上市公司為樣本,選取同行業(yè)同規(guī)模同資本結(jié)構(gòu),未實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的上市公司為對(duì)比樣本,運(yùn)用獨(dú)立樣本T檢驗(yàn)法對(duì)二者進(jìn)行研究發(fā)現(xiàn),樣本公司在公布其計(jì)劃前,公司凈資產(chǎn)收益率和每股收益與對(duì)比樣本公司間不存在顯著差異,說明公司績(jī)效的好壞對(duì)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的實(shí)施與否并不存在影響。 在此前提基礎(chǔ)下,本文采用配對(duì)樣本T檢驗(yàn)法和回歸分析法對(duì)2010年實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的公司進(jìn)行研究發(fā)現(xiàn),股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施有利于公司業(yè)績(jī)的優(yōu)化,公司在實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃后,凈資產(chǎn)收益率有所增加但不明顯,每股收益有了顯著提高,且與股權(quán)激勵(lì)比例呈非線性相關(guān)關(guān)系,具有區(qū)間效應(yīng)；對(duì)每股收益與股權(quán)激勵(lì)關(guān)系進(jìn)一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn),當(dāng)激勵(lì)比例介于3%至6%之間時(shí),對(duì)公司業(yè)績(jī)產(chǎn)生的利益趨同效應(yīng)最大；對(duì)處于該區(qū)間的上市公司展開研究得知,在不同的激勵(lì)模式中,限制性股票的激勵(lì)效果最好。 最后,就我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)存在的問題,本文提出了相關(guān)建議,建議上市公司根據(jù)公司自身情況選取合適的股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式,在提倡推廣限制性股票激勵(lì)方式的基礎(chǔ)上,嘗試多種激勵(lì)模式,并建立科學(xué)的業(yè)績(jī)考核制度,增加非財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)與綜合指標(biāo)的權(quán)重,建立良好的制度環(huán)境,引入審計(jì)等外部中介機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)公司經(jīng)營(yíng)水平進(jìn)行監(jiān)管,重視并鼓勵(lì)利益相關(guān)者參與公司治理,不斷完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),改進(jìn)股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制,增強(qiáng)激勵(lì)有效性,使得激勵(lì)效應(yīng)達(dá)到最大化。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the development of economy and the reform of enterprise system, the related policies and regulations of equity incentive in China have been gradually improved. In this environment, it is necessary to study the relationship between the incentive mechanism and corporate performance. This paper analyzes the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance of listed companies in China, and the effect of different incentive models. This is of great significance to the improvement of relevant theories of equity incentive and the enhancement of incentive effectiveness of listed companies. This paper firstly summarizes and evaluates the classical literature on the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance at home and abroad, expounds the related concepts and theoretical basis of the two, and introduces and compares various equity incentive modes. This paper analyzes the current situation of the number, industry, incentive mode and incentive ratio of the stock right incentive companies in China. Then, this paper takes the listed companies that first published the equity incentive plan in 2011 as the sample, and selects the listed companies with the same scale and the same capital structure in the same industry as the contrast sample. Using the independent sample T test method, it is found that there is no significant difference between the sample company and the sample company before the announcement of its plan, the rate of return on net assets and earnings per share of the sample company are not significantly different from those of the sample company. It shows that the performance of the company has no effect on the implementation of the equity incentive plan. On the basis of this premise, this paper uses paired sample T test and regression analysis to study the companies that implemented equity incentive in 2010. It is found that the implementation of equity incentive is conducive to the optimization of corporate performance, and after the implementation of equity incentive plan, the implementation of equity incentive plan is beneficial to the optimization of corporate performance. The return on net assets has been increased but not obvious, the earnings per share has been significantly increased, and there is a nonlinear correlation with the equity incentive ratio, with interval effect; A further study on the relationship between earnings per share and equity incentive reveals that when the incentive ratio is between 3% and 6%, the benefit convergence effect on corporate performance is the greatest. According to the research of listed companies in this interval, the incentive effect of restricted stock is the best among the different incentive modes. Finally, on the problems of stock incentive of listed companies in our country, this paper puts forward some relevant suggestions, and suggests that listed companies should select appropriate equity incentive modes according to their own conditions, and promote restrictive stock incentive mode on the basis of promoting restrictive stock incentive methods. It tries to set up a scientific performance appraisal system, increases the weight of non-financial index and comprehensive index, establishes a good institutional environment, and introduces external intermediary organizations, such as audit, to supervise the management level of the company. We should pay attention to and encourage stakeholders to participate in corporate governance, improve the structure of corporate governance, improve the equity incentive mechanism, enhance the effectiveness of incentives, and maximize the incentive effect.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F272;F832.51;F224

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 張晗;;股票期權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值影響文獻(xiàn)述評(píng)[J];商場(chǎng)現(xiàn)代化;2013年20期

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本文編號(hào)：2424613