中國商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬激勵機制研究及設計
發(fā)布時間：2019-01-29 20:02
【摘要】：不論是與銀行普通員工相比還是與其他行業(yè)同等級別的高級管理人員相比,銀行業(yè)高級管理人員的薪酬水平都非常高。2008年國際金融危機之后,這一問題再次引起極大關注。國外許多金融機構出現赤字,但同時,這些企業(yè)依然為高級管理人員支付天價薪酬：國內情況相對較好,盡管金融機構高管薪酬過高也受到公眾詬病(其中又以銀行業(yè)為代表),但至少這些企業(yè)處于持續(xù)盈利狀態(tài),情況看起來不及國外嚴峻,但不能否認的是,金融機構高管薪酬的確過高。 在大量閱讀國內外學者對商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬激勵機制的研究文獻之后,本文將中國上市商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬制度及其激勵機制與匯豐控股、花旗集團兩大全球金融機構進行對比：制度上看,匯豐控股和花旗集團對高管薪酬激勵有一系列明確規(guī)定,并且在年報中除了會披露當年及前一年高管薪酬總額及其構成之外,還會詳細解釋每部分的變動原因；比較而言,中國上市商業(yè)銀行僅披露當期高管薪酬,部分銀行甚至出現數據缺失,會披露薪酬構成更是寥寥無幾；結構上看,匯豐控股和花旗集團都采用長期激勵為主、短期激勵為輔的激勵方式,而中國上市商業(yè)銀行則呈現出短期激勵為主、長期激勵缺失的現狀。 數據統(tǒng)計分析的結果顯示,中國目前上市商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬呈現以下三個特征：(1)不論是與其他行業(yè)高管相比,還是與銀行普通員工相比,商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬都過高；(2)與世界大型商業(yè)銀行相比,中國商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬似低實高；(3)股份制商業(yè)銀行的高管薪酬問題比五大國有商業(yè)銀行以及城市商業(yè)銀行的高管薪酬問題更加突出和嚴峻。 此后我們利用實證分析研究了上市商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬的影響因素,研究發(fā)現我國上市銀行高管薪酬與銀行總資產、不良貸款率、資本充足率、每股收益、高管激勵力度、股東權益增長率正相關,與凈資產收益率負相關,其中與總資產和每股收益的相關性較大。 由此可知,我國目前銀行高管薪酬結構不合理,可以利用E值(E=N1/COM3×N1/TA)對高管薪酬進行合理性分析,作為來年制定高管薪酬的標準之一,同時根據資本充足率和不良貸款率兩大銀行特征指標對高管薪酬進行調整,使高管薪酬回歸到正常合理的水平。同時在薪酬體系中逐步建立長期激勵機制,遵循先引入再調整最后擴大這三個步驟,實現長期激勵機制從無到有、從少到多的改變,形成短期激勵為輔、長期激勵為主的薪酬制度和激勵格局。
[Abstract]:The pay levels of senior executives in the banking sector are very high, compared with the average bank staff and senior managers at the same level in other industries. This issue has once again attracted great attention in the wake of the international financial crisis in 2008. Many foreign financial institutions are running deficits, but at the same time, these companies are still paying sky-high salaries to senior executives: the domestic situation is relatively good. Although financial institutions have also been criticized for their high executive pay (represented by the banking sector), at least these companies are in a state of sustained profitability, and the situation seems too late to be grim abroad, but it cannot be denied that, Financial institutions are overpaid for executives. After reading a large number of domestic and foreign scholars' research literature on executive compensation incentive mechanism of commercial banks, this paper combines the executive compensation system of listed commercial banks in China and its incentive mechanism with HSBC Holdings. Citigroup contrasts with two major global financial institutions: HSBC Holdings and Citigroup have a series of clear rules on executive compensation incentives, and in their annual reports, in addition to disclosing the total and composition of executive compensation for the current year and the previous year, The reasons for each change will also be explained in detail; In comparison, Chinese listed commercial banks only disclose the current executive compensation, some banks even have missing data, will disclose the composition of compensation is very few; Structurally, HSBC Holdings and Citigroup use long-term incentives, short-term incentives are supplemented by incentives, while China's listed commercial banks are showing short-term incentives, long-term incentive is missing. The results of statistical analysis show that the executive compensation of listed commercial banks in China is characterized by the following three characteristics: (1) whether compared with other industry executives or ordinary bank employees, the executive compensation of commercial banks is too high; (2) compared with the large commercial banks in the world, the executive compensation of Chinese commercial banks seems to be lower and higher; (3) the problem of executive compensation of joint-stock commercial banks is more serious than that of five state-owned commercial banks and city commercial banks. Then we use empirical analysis to study the influencing factors of executive compensation in listed commercial banks, and find out that the executive compensation of listed banks in China is related to total assets, non-performing loan ratio, capital adequacy ratio, earnings per share, executive incentive. The growth rate of shareholders' equity is positively correlated with the return on net assets, especially with the total assets and earnings per share. It can be seen that the structure of executive compensation is unreasonable in our country, so we can use E value (E=N1/COM3 脳 N1/TA) to analyze the rationality of executive compensation, as one of the standards for formulating executive compensation in the coming year. At the same time, according to the capital adequacy ratio and non-performing loan ratio of the two major bank characteristics of the adjustment of executive compensation, so that executive compensation to return to a normal and reasonable level. At the same time, the long-term incentive mechanism is gradually established in the compensation system, following the three steps of first introducing and then adjusting and finally expanding, so that the long-term incentive mechanism can be changed from nothing to much, and the formation of short-term incentive will be supplemented by the formation of short-term incentive. Long-term incentive-based compensation system and incentive pattern.
【學位授予單位】：復旦大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.33;F272.92
本文編號：2417815
[Abstract]:The pay levels of senior executives in the banking sector are very high, compared with the average bank staff and senior managers at the same level in other industries. This issue has once again attracted great attention in the wake of the international financial crisis in 2008. Many foreign financial institutions are running deficits, but at the same time, these companies are still paying sky-high salaries to senior executives: the domestic situation is relatively good. Although financial institutions have also been criticized for their high executive pay (represented by the banking sector), at least these companies are in a state of sustained profitability, and the situation seems too late to be grim abroad, but it cannot be denied that, Financial institutions are overpaid for executives. After reading a large number of domestic and foreign scholars' research literature on executive compensation incentive mechanism of commercial banks, this paper combines the executive compensation system of listed commercial banks in China and its incentive mechanism with HSBC Holdings. Citigroup contrasts with two major global financial institutions: HSBC Holdings and Citigroup have a series of clear rules on executive compensation incentives, and in their annual reports, in addition to disclosing the total and composition of executive compensation for the current year and the previous year, The reasons for each change will also be explained in detail; In comparison, Chinese listed commercial banks only disclose the current executive compensation, some banks even have missing data, will disclose the composition of compensation is very few; Structurally, HSBC Holdings and Citigroup use long-term incentives, short-term incentives are supplemented by incentives, while China's listed commercial banks are showing short-term incentives, long-term incentive is missing. The results of statistical analysis show that the executive compensation of listed commercial banks in China is characterized by the following three characteristics: (1) whether compared with other industry executives or ordinary bank employees, the executive compensation of commercial banks is too high; (2) compared with the large commercial banks in the world, the executive compensation of Chinese commercial banks seems to be lower and higher; (3) the problem of executive compensation of joint-stock commercial banks is more serious than that of five state-owned commercial banks and city commercial banks. Then we use empirical analysis to study the influencing factors of executive compensation in listed commercial banks, and find out that the executive compensation of listed banks in China is related to total assets, non-performing loan ratio, capital adequacy ratio, earnings per share, executive incentive. The growth rate of shareholders' equity is positively correlated with the return on net assets, especially with the total assets and earnings per share. It can be seen that the structure of executive compensation is unreasonable in our country, so we can use E value (E=N1/COM3 脳 N1/TA) to analyze the rationality of executive compensation, as one of the standards for formulating executive compensation in the coming year. At the same time, according to the capital adequacy ratio and non-performing loan ratio of the two major bank characteristics of the adjustment of executive compensation, so that executive compensation to return to a normal and reasonable level. At the same time, the long-term incentive mechanism is gradually established in the compensation system, following the three steps of first introducing and then adjusting and finally expanding, so that the long-term incentive mechanism can be changed from nothing to much, and the formation of short-term incentive will be supplemented by the formation of short-term incentive. Long-term incentive-based compensation system and incentive pattern.
【學位授予單位】：復旦大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.33;F272.92
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，本文編號：2417815
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