內(nèi)部控制、信息披露與投資者保護(hù)的實(shí)證研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-12-23 18:17
【摘要】：投資者保護(hù)中的兩個(gè)重要問題是：(1)如何降低控股股東對(duì)中小股東的利益侵占；(2)如何抑制管理層機(jī)會(huì)主義行為的發(fā)生。因企業(yè)所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離,產(chǎn)生了不同類型投資者之間、投資者與管理層之間的委托代理關(guān)系,而在內(nèi)部管理人員掌握企業(yè)經(jīng)營決策權(quán)的情況下,中小投資者處于代理關(guān)系中的信息劣勢地位,進(jìn)而引發(fā)了上市公司內(nèi)部普遍存在不同程度的控股股東或管理層侵占中小投資者利益的現(xiàn)象(李增泉等,2004),且來自公司內(nèi)部的侵占方式比較隱蔽,不易被察覺,因而不容易控制。因此,要切實(shí)保護(hù)投資者的利益,首先應(yīng)當(dāng)解決兩個(gè)主要的問題：信息問題和代理問題(Healy和PalePu,2001)。 繼美國SOX法案之后,我國監(jiān)管部門對(duì)上市公司內(nèi)部控制建設(shè)也提出了相應(yīng)的要求,作為企業(yè)內(nèi)部人實(shí)現(xiàn)權(quán)力制衡、防范錯(cuò)誤與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的基本措施(楊雄勝,2005),有效的內(nèi)部控制能夠合理保證企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)與管理信息的真實(shí)可靠性；而充分的信息披露能夠確保管理層將有效內(nèi)部控制制度生成的可靠信息及時(shí)準(zhǔn)確的傳遞給投資者,從而緩解市場參與者之間的信息不對(duì)稱程度和代理問題。但從現(xiàn)有的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)來看,以國外學(xué)者的研究居多,針對(duì)我國特殊的公司治理機(jī)制及資本市場制度背景,這些結(jié)論適用性還值得進(jìn)一步的驗(yàn)證。基于以上分析,本文從委托代理關(guān)系及代理問題的角度出發(fā),對(duì)上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量、內(nèi)部控制有效性與投資者保護(hù)之間關(guān)系的研究,應(yīng)當(dāng)具有一定的理論意義和應(yīng)用價(jià)值。 本文的研究內(nèi)容主要包括以下六個(gè)部分：第一部分為緒論,主要介紹了本文的研究背景、研究意義、研究思路與方法等；第二部分為文獻(xiàn)綜述,從國內(nèi)外學(xué)者對(duì)投資者利益侵占的方式、影響因素等的研究,以及信息披露質(zhì)量、內(nèi)部控制制度與投資者保護(hù)的關(guān)系三個(gè)方面進(jìn)行梳理和總結(jié),并做了簡要評(píng)述；第三部分為基礎(chǔ)理論分析與本文的研究假設(shè),主要闡述了現(xiàn)代企業(yè)中雙重委托代理關(guān)系及其代理問題的產(chǎn)生,并從緩解代理問題的視角出發(fā),進(jìn)一步分析了上市公司的信息披露質(zhì)量、內(nèi)部控制有效性對(duì)投資者保護(hù)的影響,繼而提出本文的研究假設(shè)；第四部分為研究設(shè)計(jì),主要介紹本文實(shí)證研究的數(shù)據(jù)來源、變量定義方法與模型的建立；第五部分為實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),在描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、單變量相關(guān)性分析的基礎(chǔ)上,對(duì)樣本公司的信息披露質(zhì)量、內(nèi)部控制有效性與兩類代理成本的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了多元回歸分析,并利用Heckman兩階段處理效應(yīng)模型,計(jì)算逆米爾斯比率來校正變量間的自選擇與內(nèi)生性問題；第六部分為研究結(jié)論與政策建議,在理論分析與實(shí)證研究的基礎(chǔ)上,總結(jié)本文的研究結(jié)論與研究不足,并據(jù)此提出相應(yīng)的政策建議。 其中,在變量選擇方面,本文以深交所的信息披露考評(píng)結(jié)果作為上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量的代理變量,對(duì)內(nèi)部控制有效性從兩個(gè)角度來描述,一是是否披露內(nèi)部控制鑒證報(bào)告,二是內(nèi)部控制經(jīng)營效率和效果目標(biāo)的完成程度,并以資金占用率來衡量大股東的利益侵占,以管理費(fèi)用率來衡量管理層的代理成本。通過理論分析與實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),本文得出的主要研究結(jié)論有： (1)高質(zhì)量的信息披露能夠有效的抑制大股東的資金占用、降低經(jīng)理人與股東之間的代理成本。 (2)從內(nèi)部控制目標(biāo)完成程度的角度來看,內(nèi)部控制與兩類代理成本均呈現(xiàn)出顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；而從是否聘請(qǐng)審計(jì)師對(duì)內(nèi)部控制進(jìn)行鑒證的角度來看,內(nèi)部控制的有效運(yùn)行能夠抑制大股東的資金占用,但是否進(jìn)行審計(jì)鑒證與公司管理費(fèi)用率的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系在統(tǒng)計(jì)上不顯著。 (3)上市公司的信息披露質(zhì)量、內(nèi)部控制的有效性與兩類委托代理成本之間,存在自選擇或內(nèi)生性的問題,在運(yùn)用兩階段處理效應(yīng)模型進(jìn)行控制之后,研究結(jié)論更為穩(wěn)健。
[Abstract]:Two important issues in investor protection are: (1) how to reduce the controlling shareholder's interest and occupation of small and medium-sized shareholders; and (2) how to restrain the occurrence of management opportunism. Due to the separation of the ownership of the enterprise and the management right, the principal-agent relationship between the investors and the management is generated, and the information and disadvantage position of the small and medium-sized investors in the agency relationship is in the case of the internal management personnel grasping the decision-making power of the enterprise. In addition, the phenomenon of controlling the interests of small and medium-sized investors (Li Zengquan et al., 2004), which is common to different degree of controlling shareholders or the management of the listed company, is also raised, and the occupation mode from the inside of the company is relatively hidden, and is not easy to be perceived, and therefore is not easy to control. Therefore, to effectively protect the interests of investors, two major issues should be addressed first: information and agency issues (Healiy and PalePu, 2001). Following the SOX Act of the United States, the regulatory authorities of our country have also put forward corresponding requirements for the internal control and construction of the listed companies, as the basic measures to balance the power and prevent the errors and risks of the internal people of the company (Yang Xiong-sheng, 2005) The effective internal control can reasonably ensure the real reliability of the enterprise's financial and management information; and the sufficient information disclosure can ensure the management to timely and accurately transfer the reliable information generated by the effective internal control system to the investment The information asymmetry between the market participants and the agent's question are mitigated by the person However, from the existing relevant literature, the research of foreign scholars is mostly based on the special corporate governance mechanism and the background of the capital market system, and the applicability of these conclusions is worth further examination. Based on the above analysis, in this paper, the relationship between the quality of the information disclosure, the effectiveness of the internal control and the protection of the investors should be studied from the perspective of the relationship between the agency and the agency. The research contents of this paper mainly include the following six parts: the first part is the introduction, the research background, the research significance, the research thought and the method of this paper are mainly introduced, and the second part is the literature review, from the domestic and foreign scholars to the investor's interest. The third part is the basic theory analysis and the research of this paper. In this paper, the relationship of the double-trust agent and its agent problem in the modern enterprise are mainly discussed, and the influence of the information disclosure quality and the internal control effectiveness of the listed company on the investor protection is further analyzed from the point of view of the agent problem, and then the research of this paper is put forward. The fourth part is divided into the research and design, mainly introduces the data source, the variable definition method and the establishment of the model in this paper. The fifth part is the empirical test, on the basis of descriptive statistics and single-variable correlation analysis, the information of the sample company is analyzed. The relationship between the quality of dew, the effectiveness of internal control and the cost of two types of agents is analyzed, and the self-selection and endogenous problem between variables are corrected by using the two-stage treatment effect model of Heckman. The sixth part is divided into the study conclusion and the government. Based on the theoretical analysis and the empirical study, the paper sums up the conclusions and shortcomings of this paper and puts forward the corresponding government accordingly. In the aspect of variable selection, the paper uses the information of SZSE as a proxy variable of the information disclosure quality of the listed company, describes the effectiveness of the internal control from two angles, and one is whether to disclose the internal control. System assurance report, two is the degree of completion of internal control and operation efficiency and effect target, and measure the interests of large shareholders with the capital occupation rate to measure the management cost rate to measure the management level Based on the theoretical analysis and the empirical test, the main results of this paper are as follows: The conclusions are as follows: (1) High-quality information disclosure can effectively restrain the capital occupation of large shareholders, and reduce the managers and shareholders (2) From the point of view of the degree of the internal control objective, the internal control and the two types of agency costs have a significant negative correlation; and from whether to engage the auditor to control the internal control From the point of view of authentication, the effective operation of internal control can restrain the capital occupation of large shareholders, but whether to carry out the negative correlation between the audit assurance and the company's rate of management The relationship is not statistically significant. (3) The quality of the information disclosure of the listed company, the effectiveness of the internal control and the cost of the two types of entrusted agents, the problem of self-selection or endogenous nature, and the control of the two-stage processing effect model
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F233;F832.51;F224
本文編號(hào)：2390069
[Abstract]:Two important issues in investor protection are: (1) how to reduce the controlling shareholder's interest and occupation of small and medium-sized shareholders; and (2) how to restrain the occurrence of management opportunism. Due to the separation of the ownership of the enterprise and the management right, the principal-agent relationship between the investors and the management is generated, and the information and disadvantage position of the small and medium-sized investors in the agency relationship is in the case of the internal management personnel grasping the decision-making power of the enterprise. In addition, the phenomenon of controlling the interests of small and medium-sized investors (Li Zengquan et al., 2004), which is common to different degree of controlling shareholders or the management of the listed company, is also raised, and the occupation mode from the inside of the company is relatively hidden, and is not easy to be perceived, and therefore is not easy to control. Therefore, to effectively protect the interests of investors, two major issues should be addressed first: information and agency issues (Healiy and PalePu, 2001). Following the SOX Act of the United States, the regulatory authorities of our country have also put forward corresponding requirements for the internal control and construction of the listed companies, as the basic measures to balance the power and prevent the errors and risks of the internal people of the company (Yang Xiong-sheng, 2005) The effective internal control can reasonably ensure the real reliability of the enterprise's financial and management information; and the sufficient information disclosure can ensure the management to timely and accurately transfer the reliable information generated by the effective internal control system to the investment The information asymmetry between the market participants and the agent's question are mitigated by the person However, from the existing relevant literature, the research of foreign scholars is mostly based on the special corporate governance mechanism and the background of the capital market system, and the applicability of these conclusions is worth further examination. Based on the above analysis, in this paper, the relationship between the quality of the information disclosure, the effectiveness of the internal control and the protection of the investors should be studied from the perspective of the relationship between the agency and the agency. The research contents of this paper mainly include the following six parts: the first part is the introduction, the research background, the research significance, the research thought and the method of this paper are mainly introduced, and the second part is the literature review, from the domestic and foreign scholars to the investor's interest. The third part is the basic theory analysis and the research of this paper. In this paper, the relationship of the double-trust agent and its agent problem in the modern enterprise are mainly discussed, and the influence of the information disclosure quality and the internal control effectiveness of the listed company on the investor protection is further analyzed from the point of view of the agent problem, and then the research of this paper is put forward. The fourth part is divided into the research and design, mainly introduces the data source, the variable definition method and the establishment of the model in this paper. The fifth part is the empirical test, on the basis of descriptive statistics and single-variable correlation analysis, the information of the sample company is analyzed. The relationship between the quality of dew, the effectiveness of internal control and the cost of two types of agents is analyzed, and the self-selection and endogenous problem between variables are corrected by using the two-stage treatment effect model of Heckman. The sixth part is divided into the study conclusion and the government. Based on the theoretical analysis and the empirical study, the paper sums up the conclusions and shortcomings of this paper and puts forward the corresponding government accordingly. In the aspect of variable selection, the paper uses the information of SZSE as a proxy variable of the information disclosure quality of the listed company, describes the effectiveness of the internal control from two angles, and one is whether to disclose the internal control. System assurance report, two is the degree of completion of internal control and operation efficiency and effect target, and measure the interests of large shareholders with the capital occupation rate to measure the management cost rate to measure the management level Based on the theoretical analysis and the empirical test, the main results of this paper are as follows: The conclusions are as follows: (1) High-quality information disclosure can effectively restrain the capital occupation of large shareholders, and reduce the managers and shareholders (2) From the point of view of the degree of the internal control objective, the internal control and the two types of agency costs have a significant negative correlation; and from whether to engage the auditor to control the internal control From the point of view of authentication, the effective operation of internal control can restrain the capital occupation of large shareholders, but whether to carry out the negative correlation between the audit assurance and the company's rate of management The relationship is not statistically significant. (3) The quality of the information disclosure of the listed company, the effectiveness of the internal control and the cost of the two types of entrusted agents, the problem of self-selection or endogenous nature, and the control of the two-stage processing effect model
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F233;F832.51;F224
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