【摘要】：由于股東與管理層之間的代理沖突、股東與債權(quán)人之間的信息不對(duì)稱以及管理層自身特質(zhì)的影響,使得上市公司的投資決策并非完全有效,具體表現(xiàn)為過度投資和投資不足,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性由于能夠及時(shí)地確認(rèn)投資損失,促使上市公司采用穩(wěn)健的會(huì)計(jì)信息,同時(shí)也能通過降低股東與債權(quán)人之間的契約成本來緩解投資不足,因而有助于改善投資效率。但是,近年來,以FASB為首的會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)界開始質(zhì)疑會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的積極作用,認(rèn)為會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性低估了企業(yè)凈資產(chǎn),從而導(dǎo)致投資者放棄一些本該投資的項(xiàng)目,進(jìn)而加劇投資不足的發(fā)生,國內(nèi)也有學(xué)者表明,我國上市公司的會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性其實(shí)只是上市公司“洗大澡”、進(jìn)行盈余管理造成的。本文以此為背景,采用2007—2010年我國A股上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)作為樣本觀測(cè)值,驗(yàn)證會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性對(duì)我國上市公司非效率投資行為的影響。 研究結(jié)果表明,2007—2010年間,我國上市公司的會(huì)計(jì)政策總體上是穩(wěn)健的,并且有助于改善投資效率。從全樣本分析的結(jié)果來看,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性能夠緩解上市公司的非效率投資行為,進(jìn)一步將非效率投資分為過度投資組和投資不足組的結(jié)果表明,我國上市公司的會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性有助于抑制過度投資和投資不足行為的發(fā)生,但是從結(jié)果的顯著性來看,只有投資不足組的結(jié)果是顯著的,其抑制過度投資的作用并不顯著,而從實(shí)際控制人的性質(zhì)來看,實(shí)際控制人為國有的上市公司,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的投資效用相對(duì)較弱,具體表現(xiàn)為,實(shí)際控制人為國有的上市公司,其會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性抑制過度投資的效果不如非國有上市公司,且其會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性緩解投資不足的效果也不如非國有的上市公司,但這一結(jié)論并不顯著。穩(wěn)健性測(cè)試沒有支持本文提出的有關(guān)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性有助于抑制過度投資的假設(shè),究其原因,可能是由于我國上市公司的高管權(quán)力過大,影響了會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性作用的發(fā)揮。
[Abstract]:Due to the agency conflict between shareholders and management, the information asymmetry between shareholders and creditors and the influence of management's own characteristics, the investment decision of listed companies is not completely effective, which is manifested by overinvestment and underinvestment. Accounting conservatism not only can confirm the investment loss in time, but also can reduce the contract cost between shareholders and creditors to alleviate the underinvestment, which will help to improve the investment efficiency. However, in recent years, the accounting profession, led by FASB, has begun to question the positive role of accounting conservatism, believing that accounting conservatism undervalues the net assets of an enterprise, thus leading investors to give up some projects that they should have invested in. Some domestic scholars also show that the accounting conservatism of listed companies in our country is actually caused by "taking a big bath" and carrying out earnings management. Based on this background, this paper uses the data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2010 as sample observations to verify the influence of accounting conservatism on the non-efficient investment behavior of listed companies in China. The results show that the accounting policies of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2010 are generally sound and contribute to the improvement of investment efficiency. According to the results of the whole sample analysis, accounting conservatism can alleviate the inefficient investment behavior of listed companies, and further divide the inefficient investment into overinvestment group and underinvestment group. The accounting conservatism of listed companies in China is helpful to restrain the occurrence of overinvestment and underinvestment, but from the significance of the results, only the results of underinvestment group are significant, and the effect of restraining overinvestment is not significant. In view of the nature of the actual controller, the investment utility of accounting conservatism is relatively weak for the listed company with actual control being state-owned. The concrete manifestation is that the listed company with actual control is state-owned. The effectiveness of accounting conservatism in restraining excessive investment is not as good as that of non-state-owned listed companies, and the effect of accounting conservatism in alleviating underinvestment is not as good as that of non-state-owned listed companies, but this conclusion is not significant. The conservatism test does not support the hypothesis that accounting conservatism helps to curb excessive investment. The reason may be that the executive power of listed companies in our country is too large, which affects the exertion of accounting conservatism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F233;F832.51

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