【摘要】：農(nóng)地經(jīng)營權(quán)抵押貸款等農(nóng)地抵押融資方式的試點緩解了在土地規(guī)模經(jīng)營中由抵押物缺乏造成的農(nóng)戶融資難問題。但是，在某些約束條件下農(nóng)戶農(nóng)地抵押借款行為在一定程度上并未得到優(yōu)化，一些缺乏資金的農(nóng)戶對農(nóng)地經(jīng)營權(quán)抵押貸款缺乏有效需求或還款積極性不足。為此，，論文以山東省臨沂市為例，研究在不同約束條件下農(nóng)戶與金融機構(gòu)進行的借款博弈行為，從而為完善農(nóng)地經(jīng)營權(quán)抵押貸款制度設(shè)計提供參考依據(jù)。 論文首先回顧總結(jié)了我國農(nóng)地抵押發(fā)展歷程和現(xiàn)狀，并分析了山東臨沂等試點地區(qū)農(nóng)戶農(nóng)地抵押借款現(xiàn)狀及存在的問題。在此基礎(chǔ)上，從融資方式選擇行為角度，對山東省臨沂市農(nóng)地經(jīng)營權(quán)抵押貸款試點中樣本農(nóng)戶農(nóng)地抵押借款行為影響因素進行了實證分析。通過多分類logistic回歸分析得出：土地流轉(zhuǎn)和專業(yè)合作社的發(fā)展對農(nóng)戶選擇農(nóng)地經(jīng)營權(quán)抵押貸款具有顯著正向影響，而流轉(zhuǎn)服務(wù)體系不健全、農(nóng)村社會保障滯后和現(xiàn)行禁止性法律具有制約作用。 其次，運用完全信息和不完全信息動態(tài)博弈模型對不同約束條件下農(nóng)戶農(nóng)地抵押借款博弈行為進行分析，進一步歸納出農(nóng)戶農(nóng)地抵押借款博弈行為在由制約因素造成的約束條件下的惡化狀況，及其對農(nóng)地金融創(chuàng)新的影響。在當?shù)厝狈α鬓D(zhuǎn)服務(wù)機構(gòu)、流轉(zhuǎn)合同不規(guī)范和現(xiàn)行禁止性法律的約束下，農(nóng)戶農(nóng)地抵押借款的還款積極性不足，融資方式仍然受限；在農(nóng)地評估費用過高的約束下，農(nóng)戶對農(nóng)地經(jīng)營權(quán)抵押貸款的選擇受限；在農(nóng)地評估價值虛高和農(nóng)地價值波動預(yù)測失誤的約束下，農(nóng)地經(jīng)營權(quán)抵押物不能完全補償金融機構(gòu)的不良貸款損失，農(nóng)戶的融資方式選擇行為受到制約。 再次，運用完全信息和不完全信息動態(tài)博弈模型，分析了無約束條件下農(nóng)戶農(nóng)地抵押借款博弈行為。在不存在約束條件的最優(yōu)狀態(tài)下，農(nóng)戶農(nóng)地抵押借款博弈過程中的融資方式選擇行為和還款行為均得到顯著優(yōu)化，農(nóng)戶融資難問題得以解決。 最后，進行全文總結(jié)，并根據(jù)博弈分析的結(jié)果，從優(yōu)化農(nóng)戶農(nóng)地抵押借款博弈行為、完善農(nóng)地抵押相關(guān)制度和提高金融機構(gòu)服務(wù)水平方面提出了政策建議。
[Abstract]:The agricultural land mortgage financing methods such as farmland management right mortgage loan have alleviated the farmers' financing difficulties caused by the lack of collateral in the land scale management. However, the behavior of rural land mortgage loan has not been optimized to a certain extent under some constraints, and some farmers who lack funds lack effective demand for agricultural land management right mortgage loan or lack enthusiasm for repayment. Therefore, taking Linyi City of Shandong Province as an example, this paper studies the game behavior of borrowing between farmers and financial institutions under different constraints, thus providing a reference for improving the design of mortgage loan system of farmland management right. Firstly, the paper reviews the development and current situation of farmland mortgage in China, and analyzes the current situation and problems of rural land mortgage loan in Linyi, Shandong province. On this basis, from the angle of financing mode choice, this paper makes an empirical analysis on the influencing factors of sample farmers' agricultural land mortgage loan behavior in Linyi City, Shandong Province. Through multi-classification logistic regression analysis, it is concluded that the land circulation and the development of specialized cooperatives have a significant positive impact on the farmers' choice of farmland management right mortgage, while the circulation service system is not perfect. Rural social security lag and the current prohibition of the role of the law. Secondly, the dynamic game model of complete information and incomplete information is used to analyze the game behavior of agricultural land mortgage loan under different constraints. Furthermore, the paper summarizes the deterioration of the game behavior of rural land mortgage loan under the restrictive conditions caused by the constraints, and its influence on the agricultural land financial innovation. In the absence of local circulation service organizations, the non-standard transfer contract and the current prohibition law, the farmers have insufficient enthusiasm for repayment of agricultural land mortgage loans, and the financing methods are still limited; under the constraints of excessive agricultural land evaluation costs, The farmer's choice of the farmland management right mortgage loan is restricted, under the constraint of the false high value of the farmland evaluation and the wrong forecast of the farmland value fluctuation, the farmland management right mortgage can not completely compensate the non-performing loan loss of the financial institution. The farmer's financing way choice behavior is restricted. Thirdly, using the dynamic game model of complete information and incomplete information, this paper analyzes the game behavior of rural land mortgage loan under unconstrained conditions. In the optimal condition without constraint conditions, the choice of financing mode and repayment behavior in the process of farm land mortgage game have been significantly optimized, and the problem of farmers' financing difficulty can be solved. Finally, based on the result of game analysis, the paper puts forward some policy suggestions on optimizing the game behavior of farm land mortgage loan, perfecting the relevant system of farmland mortgage and improving the service level of financial institutions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北農(nóng)林科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.43;F224.32

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