【摘要】：所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)相互分離是現(xiàn)代企業(yè)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的主要特征之一,這種所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離導(dǎo)致公司所有者和公司管理層之間利益博弈,且這種利益博弈隨著公司經(jīng)營的復(fù)雜化變得更加激烈。大多數(shù)現(xiàn)代公司基本上由中高層管理人員組成的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)團(tuán)隊所控制,他們主要根據(jù)公司既定目標(biāo)制定實施計劃并保證能夠得到落實,針對公司外部所有者,他們僅需要提供一個讓投資者滿意的投資回報率。但是管理者與所有者存在信息、不對稱、公司控制權(quán)分離、效用函數(shù)不一致等問題,導(dǎo)致管理者更多的為自身利益考慮。公司所有者設(shè)計較為合理的薪酬體制來激勵管理層,而管理層又會利用薪酬體制最大化自我收益。這中間薪酬機(jī)制設(shè)計成為雙方博弈的焦點(diǎn)之一。 在現(xiàn)代公司治理研究中,對高管薪酬進(jìn)行大量學(xué)術(shù)探討和理論分析。國外涉及管理層薪酬激勵文獻(xiàn)研究的對象多數(shù)以股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)分散的公司為主,這與我國當(dāng)前股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)較為集中的國情有所差異。在國內(nèi)學(xué)術(shù)研究中,大部分以國有上市公司為研究對象,這體現(xiàn)了我國體制改革的大背景。國有企業(yè)是我國經(jīng)濟(jì)主體,背景較為特殊,國企改革時間較早,數(shù)據(jù)容易獲取,轉(zhuǎn)型過程中問題也較為突出,研究結(jié)果可為以后企業(yè)改革提供借鑒。伴隨經(jīng)濟(jì)體制轉(zhuǎn)向市場化,非國有企業(yè)在國民經(jīng)濟(jì)中的作用和地位迅速提升。相比國有企業(yè),非國企發(fā)展起步較晚,且大多數(shù)企業(yè)規(guī)模較小、管理不科學(xué)、企業(yè)運(yùn)作不規(guī)范、披露的信息質(zhì)量不高,因此對于民營企業(yè)的學(xué)術(shù)研究較晚。 從研究內(nèi)容看,國內(nèi)研究文獻(xiàn)引入在職消費(fèi)觀念時間較晚,將管理層貨幣性薪酬和在職消費(fèi)都進(jìn)行實證研究時間更短,得出結(jié)果也不盡然相同。從發(fā)展背景看,我國中小企業(yè)是在我國工業(yè)化初級階段和經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)軌時期崛起的。相比大型企業(yè),中小企業(yè)為數(shù)眾多,其總數(shù)占我國企業(yè)總數(shù)99%以上,并且吸納了超過七成的勞動力。中小企業(yè)不僅在多數(shù)領(lǐng)域?qū)Υ笮推髽I(yè)形成競爭態(tài)勢,促使經(jīng)濟(jì)的市場化,且相當(dāng)程度上解決了居民就業(yè)問題,中小企業(yè)對我國的濟(jì)發(fā)展起了舉足輕重作用。 2004年5月,經(jīng)國務(wù)院批準(zhǔn),中國證監(jiān)會批復(fù)同意深圳證券交易所在主板市場內(nèi)設(shè)立中小企業(yè)板塊。中小板上市公司中非國有企業(yè)比重較大,較符合我國中小企業(yè)以民營企業(yè)為主體的特點(diǎn)。相對主板公司,中小板上市公司具有規(guī)模小、以高科技創(chuàng)新型公司為主、公司成長性高等特點(diǎn)；而在公司治理方面,內(nèi)控制度的設(shè)計及執(zhí)行都與主板上市公司有一定差距。 那么,針對中小板上市公司,管理層薪酬在多大程度上影響公司價值?管理層貨幣性薪酬與在職消費(fèi)對公司價值的影響結(jié)果如何?中小板國有企業(yè)與非國有企業(yè)在薪酬激勵方面的區(qū)別及效果如何?本文試圖通過理論分析和實證檢驗回答上述問題。 文章共分為四個部分,具體安排如下： 第一章為緒論,重點(diǎn)說明研究背景與研究意義,并整理本文的研究思路和寫作框架。 第二章為文獻(xiàn)綜述,主要從管理層薪酬激勵相關(guān)內(nèi)容展開,分為國外文獻(xiàn)研究和國內(nèi)文獻(xiàn)部分。國外文獻(xiàn)從研究管理層貨幣性薪酬與公司績效開始,一直到最近幾年逐漸興起的在職消費(fèi)與公司業(yè)績關(guān)系,根據(jù)時間順序綜述各個時期較為代表性的學(xué)者文獻(xiàn),重點(diǎn)介紹近期國外文獻(xiàn)。國內(nèi)文獻(xiàn)根據(jù)寫作特點(diǎn)歸類為規(guī)范文獻(xiàn)和實證文獻(xiàn),規(guī)范文獻(xiàn)重點(diǎn)分析相關(guān)學(xué)者研究背景及成果；實證文獻(xiàn)劃分為三個階段,并評述得到實證結(jié)果的原因。在上述文獻(xiàn)綜述基礎(chǔ)上說明本文研究的意義。 第三章為相關(guān)概念界定和本文理論基礎(chǔ)。概念界定主要分析管理層薪酬、貨幣性薪酬、在職消費(fèi)和公司價值四個核心概念。在理論基礎(chǔ)部分列示了本文需要的四個理論。其中委托代理理論主要闡釋管理層與公司所有者之間博弈關(guān)系,由此引出所有者通過薪酬契約方式激勵管理層的原理；契約理論主要說明薪酬契約由于信息不對稱而導(dǎo)致契約內(nèi)容不完全；管理層權(quán)力理論闡述了管理層可能利用剩余控制權(quán)尋租,即超額貨幣性收益和過度在職消費(fèi)現(xiàn)象；激勵相容理論則說明了應(yīng)該如何有效的制定薪酬,使得管理層與公司所有者利益趨同,弱化管理層對于公司價值的侵蝕。 第四章為實證部分,也是文章核心。文章將管理層薪酬激勵分為貨幣性薪酬激勵和在職消費(fèi)兩方面,以2007-2010年中小板上市公司為樣本,按公司性質(zhì)分為國有企業(yè)和非國有企業(yè)對比分析。描述性統(tǒng)計部分利用EXCEL軟件,分別從總樣本、按企業(yè)性質(zhì)分組分析了管理層貨幣性薪酬、在職消費(fèi)、因變量和控制變量的年度趨勢變化,并對比分析國企和非國企樣本數(shù)據(jù)年度差異性。接著通過STATA軟件進(jìn)行相關(guān)變量的相關(guān)性分析,采取皮爾遜相關(guān)性檢驗方法,相關(guān)性分析主要是觀測相關(guān)變量的相關(guān)系數(shù)及P值�；貧w分析分為多元線性回歸和穩(wěn)健性檢驗。實證結(jié)果顯示：(1)在貨幣性薪酬與公司價值關(guān)系研究中,總樣本回歸結(jié)果是貨幣性薪酬與公司價值正相關(guān),顯著性水平較高；因此總體而言,我國中小板上市公司管理層貨幣性薪酬激勵對公司價值提升起到促進(jìn)作用。而分組檢驗同樣表明中小板公司管理層貨幣性薪酬與公司價值正相關(guān),但是國企樣本的顯著性水平較低,而非國有企業(yè)管理層貨幣性薪酬與公司價值顯著性水平很高,說明非國企薪酬設(shè)計體制更有效,非國有企業(yè)貨幣性薪酬起到了較好的激勵作用；(2)在職消費(fèi)與公司價值關(guān)系研究中,總樣本回歸結(jié)果是在職消費(fèi)與公司價值正相關(guān),且顯著性水平同樣較高,說明我國中小企業(yè)管理層在職消費(fèi)作為薪酬激勵的一種方式,其存在有利于公司價值提升。分組檢驗顯示了國企管理層在職消費(fèi)與公司價值顯著性水平更高,通過在職消費(fèi)更能促進(jìn)公司價值的提升；而非國有企業(yè)管理層在職消費(fèi)更為透明,在職消費(fèi)與公司價值顯著性水平偏低。 第五章是研究結(jié)論、政策建議及本文不足的分析。總結(jié)前文相關(guān)研究文獻(xiàn)及本文實證分析后發(fā)現(xiàn),雖然我國市場化改革已較為深入,但是中小型國有企業(yè)管理層薪酬管制依然存在,因此通過貨幣性薪酬激勵管理層的公司價值創(chuàng)造效果較差,在職消費(fèi)反而更能促進(jìn)國企管理層經(jīng)營水平,提升價值創(chuàng)造活動,而在職消費(fèi)水平多半是一種隱形的控制權(quán)消費(fèi),其消費(fèi)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)難以衡量和監(jiān)督,國企管理層能夠通過這種方式增加自己效用,而非國企管理層貨幣性薪酬激勵更有效。針對上述結(jié)論,提出相應(yīng)應(yīng)對措施,主要包括設(shè)計更為有效的薪酬契約,注重績效薪酬的合理性,合理分配薪酬中固定收入與變動收入；強(qiáng)化公司治理,加強(qiáng)公司董事會中薪酬委員會的作用,注重公司內(nèi)部控制,弱化管理層過度在職消費(fèi)傾向；加強(qiáng)公司外部監(jiān)管,通過經(jīng)理人市場和公司外部輿論監(jiān)督等方式約束管理層的自我激勵。 本文主要貢獻(xiàn)在于 (1)立足于中小板上市公司,對上市公司按企業(yè)性質(zhì)分組為國有企業(yè)和非國有企業(yè),研究結(jié)論更有現(xiàn)實意義。中小板上市公司作為中小型企業(yè)的代表,我國中小企業(yè)規(guī)模相對較小,數(shù)量眾多,且非國有企業(yè)占據(jù)大多數(shù),而本文符合條件的研究樣本有51個國有企業(yè)和122個非國有企業(yè),非國企樣本占比達(dá)70.52%,符合非國企占數(shù)量優(yōu)勢的現(xiàn)狀。 (2)將管理層薪酬激勵分為貨幣性薪酬與在職消費(fèi)兩個方面,分別研究兩類激勵方式對于公司價值的影響。貨幣性薪酬激勵與在職消費(fèi)作為管理層薪酬激勵的主要方式,它們對公司價值影響不同,產(chǎn)生的結(jié)果也迥然不同。研究結(jié)論發(fā)現(xiàn),對于貨幣性薪酬激勵,國企樣本并不顯著,其激勵效果對于公司價值的提升并不明顯,而非國企管理層貨幣性薪酬更能反映公司價值創(chuàng)造；管理層在職消費(fèi)都與公司價值正相關(guān),說明隨著公司價值逐步提升,管理層的在職消費(fèi)能力都有提高,且國有企業(yè)在職消費(fèi)水平與公司價值相關(guān)性更強(qiáng),說明國有企業(yè)管理層通過在職消費(fèi)更好的獲得了激勵效果,能夠為企業(yè)創(chuàng)造價值。 (3)研究數(shù)據(jù)界定為2007-2010年。2007年后新會計準(zhǔn)則在上市公司強(qiáng)制推行,新準(zhǔn)則對于公司信息披露更為嚴(yán)格,弱化了管理層公司內(nèi)部操控的空間,因此數(shù)據(jù)的更新提高研究結(jié)論的可靠性。 本文的不足之處： (1)本文選擇回歸方式是面板數(shù)據(jù)的GLS回歸,一般來說,面板數(shù)據(jù)年度跨期越長,回歸結(jié)果越有說服力。本文選擇中小板連續(xù)四年上市公司為研究樣本,研究樣本年度相對較短,這可能會對于回歸結(jié)果有一定影響。 (2)研究數(shù)據(jù)時間段受宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)影響較大。樣本期間選擇為2007-2010年度,這期間的國際金融危機(jī)和國家經(jīng)濟(jì)救助計劃對于公司價值和管理層薪酬披露都有一定的影響,本文未予考慮。 (3)在職消費(fèi)數(shù)據(jù)值得進(jìn)一步改進(jìn)。文章對于在職消費(fèi)的數(shù)據(jù)獲取采取絕對值法,而目前在職消費(fèi)界定的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)并不統(tǒng)一,因此其數(shù)據(jù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)也不同,這可能會對實證結(jié)果有一定影響。
[Abstract]:The separation of ownership and management is one of the main features of the corporate governance structure of a modern enterprise. The separation of ownership and management rights leads to the game of interests between the owners and the management of the company, and this interest game becomes more and more intense with the complexity of the company's management. Most modern companies are basically the middle and high level management. The leadership team of the staff is controlled by the team. They are mainly based on the established objectives of the company and ensure that they can be implemented. For the external owners of the company, they only need to provide an investor satisfaction rate of return. However, the manager and the owner have information, asymmetry, corporate control separation, utility function. The problem of inconsistency causes the managers to think more of their own interests. The owner of the company designs a more reasonable salary system to motivate the management, and the management will use the salary system to maximize the self benefit. The middle salary mechanism is one of the focal points of the game.
In the study of modern corporate governance, a large number of academic discussions and theoretical analyses are carried out on executive compensation. Most of the foreign companies involved in the study of management salary incentives are mainly based on companies with decentralized ownership structure, which are different from the current state of our country's more centralized ownership structure. In domestic academic research, most of them are publicly listed public. The company is the research object, which embodies the background of the reform of China's system. The state-owned enterprises are the main body of our economy, the background is more special, the time of the reform of state-owned enterprises is earlier, the data is easy to obtain, and the problems in the process of transformation are more prominent. The role and status of the national economy has rapidly improved. Compared to the state-owned enterprises, the development of non-state-owned enterprises started relatively late, and most of the enterprises are smaller, the management is unscientific, the operation of enterprises is not standardized and the information quality is not high. Therefore, the academic research on private enterprises is late.
From the research content, the domestic research literature has introduced the concept of on-the-job consumption late, and the empirical study of monetary compensation and on-the-job consumption in management is shorter, and the results are not the same. From the background of development, China's small and medium-sized enterprises are rising in the primary stage of industrialization and economic transition in China. There are a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises, which account for more than 99% of the total number of enterprises in our country, and absorb more than 70% of the labor force. Small and medium-sized enterprises have not only formed competition situation for large enterprises in most fields, promoted economic marketization, but also solved the problem of employment of residents to a considerable extent. Small and medium enterprises have played an important role in the economic development of our country. Effect.
In May 2004, with the approval of the State Council, the CSRC approved the establishment of small and medium enterprise plate in the main board market of the Shenzhen stock exchange. The proportion of non-state-owned enterprises in the medium and small board listed companies is larger, which is more consistent with the characteristics of the private enterprises in China's small and medium-sized enterprises. The main features of scientific and technological innovation companies and the high growth of the company, and in the corporate governance, the design and implementation of the internal control system have a certain gap with the main board listed companies.
So, to what extent does management salary affect the company value for small and medium board listed companies? What are the effects of monetary compensation and on-the-job consumption on corporate value? How are the difference and effect of the salary incentive between small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises? This paper tries to answer by theoretical analysis and empirical test. The above question.
The article is divided into four parts, which are arranged as follows:
The first chapter is the introduction, which focuses on the research background and significance, and collates the research ideas and writing framework.
The second chapter is the literature review, mainly from the related content of management salary incentive, which is divided into foreign literature research and domestic literature part. Foreign literature begins from the study of monetary salary and company performance in management, and has been gradually rising in recent years to the relationship between on-the-job consumption and corporate performance. The representative literature of scholars, focusing on recent foreign literature. Domestic literature is classified as standard literature and empirical literature according to the characteristics of writing. The research background and achievements of relevant scholars are analyzed. The empirical literature is divided into three stages, and the reasons for the results are reviewed. The meaning of the study.
The third chapter is the definition of related concepts and the theoretical basis of this paper. The concept definition mainly analyzes the four core concepts of management salary, monetary remuneration, on-the-job consumption and company value. In the theoretical basis, it shows the four theories needed in this paper. The principal agent theory mainly explains the game relationship between the management layer and the owner of the company. This leads to the principle that the owner motivate the management by means of compensation contract; the contract theory mainly shows that the compensation contract is incomplete because of information asymmetry; the management level theory expounds that management may use the residual control rent-seeking, that is, excess monetary benefit and excessive on-the-job consumption; incentive compatibility. The theory explains how to set up salary effectively, make the benefit of management and company owner converge, weaken the erosion of management to company value.
The fourth chapter is an empirical part and also the core of the article. The article divides the salary incentive of management layer into two aspects: monetary salary incentive and on-the-job consumption, with 2007-2010 year small and medium board listed companies as samples, according to the company nature, divided into state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. The descriptive statistics part uses EXCEL software, respectively from the total sample, respectively. The enterprise nature group analyses the monetary salary, the on-the-job consumption, the annual trend of the variable and the control variable, and compares and analyzes the annual difference of the sample data of the state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. Then the correlation analysis of the related variables is carried out by the STATA software, and the Pearson correlation test method is adopted. The correlation analysis is mainly observed. Correlation coefficient and P value of related variables. Regression analysis is divided into multiple linear regression and robustness test. The empirical results show: (1) in the study of the relationship between monetary compensation and corporate value, the regression result of the total sample is that the monetary compensation is positively related to the value of the company, and the significant level is higher; therefore, in general, China's small and medium listed companies are listed. The management layer monetary compensation incentive plays a promoting role in the company's value promotion. The group test also shows that the monetary compensation of the small and medium-sized board companies is positively related to the value of the company, but the significant level of the state-owned enterprise samples is low, while the non state-owned enterprise management level of monetary compensation and the value of the company value is very significant, indicating the non state-owned enterprises. The salary design system is more effective, and the monetary compensation of non-state-owned enterprises has played a better incentive role. (2) in the study of the relationship between the on-the-job consumption and the company value, the results of the total sample return are the positive correlation between the on-the-job consumption and the company value, and the significant level is high, indicating that the on-the-job consumption of the small and medium enterprises in our country is one of the salary incentive. The group test shows that the level of on-the-job consumption and the value of corporate value is higher, and the value of the company can be promoted by the on-the-job consumption, while the on-the-job consumption of the non state-owned enterprise management is more transparent, and the level of the on-the-job cancellation fee and the value of the company value are low.
The fifth chapter is the conclusion, the policy suggestion and the analysis of the insufficiency of this article. After summarizing the relevant literature and empirical analysis of the previous article, it is found that although the market reform in China has been more thorough, the compensation control of the management layer of the medium and small state-owned enterprises still exists, so the value creation effect of the management layer of the monetary incentive is more effective. On the contrary, on-the-job consumption can promote the management level of state-owned enterprise management and enhance the value creation activity, while the in-service consumption level is mostly invisible control consumption, and its consumption standard is difficult to measure and supervise. The state-owned enterprise management can increase its utility by this way, and the monetary incentive of non state-owned enterprise management is more effective. To the above conclusions, the corresponding measures are put forward, including the design of more effective compensation contract, the rationality of performance compensation, the rational distribution of fixed income and changing income in salary, strengthening the corporate governance, strengthening the role of the compensation committee in the board of directors, paying attention to the internal control of the company and weakening the excessive in-service consumption of management. To strengthen the external supervision of the company and restrain the self-motivation of the management through the supervision of the manager market and the company's external public opinion.
The main contributions of this article are
(1) based on the listed companies of small and medium board, the research conclusions are more practical. As the representative of small and medium enterprises, the small and medium-sized listed companies are relatively small, there are a large number of small and medium sized enterprises in China, and the majority of the non-state-owned enterprises in China, and this paper is in accordance with the conditions. There are 51 state-owned enterprises and 122 non-state-owned enterprises in the sample. The proportion of non-state-owned enterprises is 70.52%, which is in line with the current situation that non-state-owned enterprises have a predominant number.
(2) the management layer compensation incentive is divided into two aspects of monetary salary and on-the-job consumption, and the influence of the two types of incentive methods on the company value respectively. Monetary compensation incentive and on-the-job consumption are the main ways of management salary incentive, they have different influence on the company value and the results are very different. As for monetary compensation incentive, the sample of state-owned enterprises is not significant, its incentive effect is not obvious to the promotion of company value, but the monetary compensation of non state-owned enterprise management can reflect the value creation of the company more. The management level of on-the-job consumption is positively related to the company value. In addition, the level of the incumbency consumption of the state-owned enterprises is more relevant to the value of the company, which indicates that the management of the state-owned enterprises can better get the incentive effect through the on-the-job consumption and can create value for the enterprises.
(3) the research data is defined as the compulsory implementation of the new accounting standards in the listed companies after 2007-2010 years of.2007. The new guidelines are more stringent for the company information disclosure, weakening the space manipulated by the management companies, so the updating of the data improves the reliability of the research conclusions.
The shortcomings of this article are as follows:
(1) the regression method is selected as the GLS regression of panel data. Generally speaking, the longer the annual panel data is, the more convincing the regression results are. This paper chooses the four year listed companies as the research sample, and the sample year is relatively short, which may have a certain impact on the return results.
(2) the time period of the study is greatly influenced by the macro economy. The selection of the sample period is 2007-2010. The international financial crisis and the national economic assistance plan during this period have a certain influence on the value of the company and the compensation disclosure of the management level. This article is not considered in this paper.
(3) the on-the-job consumption data should be further improved. The article adopts the absolute value method for the data acquisition of on-the-job consumption, while the current definition of on-the-job consumption is not uniform, so the data standards are different, which may have a certain impact on the empirical results.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

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