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農(nóng)村正規(guī)金融與非正規(guī)金融合作路徑研究

發(fā)布時間:2018-07-31 10:02
【摘要】:長期以來,我國農(nóng)村金融供給不足、金融效率低下的問題一直未能得到有效的解決,原因可能是多方面的,其中農(nóng)村正規(guī)金融與非正規(guī)金融的優(yōu)勢互補沒有很好的發(fā)揮出來,,兩者缺乏合作是其重要原因。從已有的實踐來看,農(nóng)村正規(guī)金融與非正規(guī)金融的合作一定程度上彌補了農(nóng)村金融供給不足,提高了金融效率,但是兩者的合作目前仍然處在淺層次階段。所以,如何更好地實現(xiàn)農(nóng)村正規(guī)金融與非正規(guī)金融的合作成為理論研究的重要課題。 本文以理論分析做鋪墊,首先詳細(xì)介紹了二元金融理論、交易成本理論、金融效率理論,著重分析了農(nóng)村正規(guī)金融與非正規(guī)金融合作的必要性與可行性。然后結(jié)合我國目前現(xiàn)實情況,分析了兩者合作的主要路徑,對兩者合作效果進(jìn)行了分析。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),目前我國農(nóng)村正規(guī)金融與非正規(guī)金融合作的整體效果良好,但是在現(xiàn)實中的實踐較少,客觀上仍然存在著一定的制約因素。在此基礎(chǔ)上,主要運用博弈論的方法來分析兩者合作可能帶來的收益成本,并且對其中的兩種合作路徑進(jìn)行了影響因素分析。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),從改革開放這幾十年來看,農(nóng)村非正規(guī)金融與政府所支持的正規(guī)金融合作的凈收益都是遠(yuǎn)大于不合作的收益,所以雙方博弈選擇的結(jié)果是合作;其合作受到多種因素的影響,其中監(jiān)管機構(gòu)對受托方違規(guī)查證成功的概率、查出受托方違規(guī)后的罰款等是委托貸款合作路徑的影響因素;超額利潤與合作成本是批發(fā)貸款合作模式的影響因素。綜合合作條件和影響因素來看,農(nóng)村正規(guī)金融與小額貸款公司或者專業(yè)放貸者的合作、與龍頭企業(yè)的合作、與擔(dān)保公司的合作、與小組金融或者專業(yè)合作社的合作這四種合作模式適宜在廣大農(nóng)村地區(qū)推廣;捆綁信貸的實施則受較多條件約束;而委托貸款、代辦中介業(yè)務(wù)、批發(fā)式貸款這三種合作模式的推廣具有較多的局限。最后針對我國農(nóng)村正規(guī)金融與非正規(guī)金融合作路徑出現(xiàn)的問題提出政策建議,從而推動兩者順利地進(jìn)行合作。
[Abstract]:For a long time, the problems of insufficient supply of rural finance and low efficiency of finance in our country have not been effectively solved for many reasons, among which the complementary advantages of rural formal finance and informal finance have not been brought into full play. The lack of cooperation between the two is an important reason. From the existing practice the cooperation between rural formal finance and informal finance to some extent make up for the shortage of rural financial supply and improve the financial efficiency but the cooperation between the two is still in a shallow stage. Therefore, how to better realize the cooperation between rural formal finance and informal finance has become an important subject of theoretical research. This paper first introduces the dual finance theory, transaction cost theory and financial efficiency theory in detail, focusing on the necessity and feasibility of rural formal and informal financial cooperation. Then, according to the current situation of our country, this paper analyzes the main ways of cooperation between the two, and analyzes the effect of the cooperation. The results show that the overall effect of the cooperation between rural formal finance and informal finance is good, but the practice in reality is less, and there are still some restrictive factors objectively. On this basis, the paper mainly uses the method of game theory to analyze the possible benefit and cost of the cooperation, and analyzes the influencing factors of the two kinds of cooperative paths. It is found that the net benefit of rural informal finance and the formal financial cooperation supported by the government is far greater than that of non-cooperation in the past few decades, so the result of game selection is cooperation. The cooperation is affected by a variety of factors, including the probability of the regulatory authority to verify the failure of the trustee, and the fine after the violation of the violation by the trustee is the influence factor of the cooperative path of the entrusted loan; Excess profit and cooperation cost are the influencing factors of wholesale loan cooperation mode. From the perspective of the conditions and influencing factors of cooperation, the formal rural finance and the cooperation of microfinance companies or professional lenders, the cooperation with leading enterprises, and the cooperation with guarantee companies, The four modes of cooperation with group finance or professional cooperatives are suitable to be popularized in the vast rural areas; the implementation of bundling credit is restricted by more conditions; and the commission of loans, agency intermediary business, The promotion of the three cooperation modes of wholesale loans has many limitations. Finally, some policy suggestions are put forward to promote the cooperation between rural formal finance and informal finance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:安徽財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2012
【分類號】:F832.35

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