發(fā)布時間：2018-06-28 15:08

  本文選題：村鎮(zhèn)銀行 + 主發(fā)起行��； 參考：《西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：農(nóng)村金融歷來都是我國金融體系中最薄弱的環(huán)節(jié)。國有商業(yè)銀行的撤離,農(nóng)村信用社經(jīng)營的壟斷與低效等等因素都使得我國農(nóng)村地區(qū)金融供需嚴(yán)重失衡。為解決此問題,迫切需要改革完善農(nóng)村地區(qū)當(dāng)下的金融體制。村鎮(zhèn)銀行也正是在這種背景下出現(xiàn)的。作為農(nóng)村金融組織創(chuàng)新的村鎮(zhèn)銀行主要是為當(dāng)?shù)氐霓r(nóng)民、農(nóng)業(yè)和農(nóng)村發(fā)展提供金融服務(wù)。村鎮(zhèn)銀行是一種制度的創(chuàng)新,是對大型商業(yè)銀行和合作金融經(jīng)營模式的重要補充。村鎮(zhèn)銀行對于活躍我國農(nóng)村金融市場,有效的改善農(nóng)村金融服務(wù),支持新農(nóng)村建設(shè)做出了重要的貢獻。 然而值得關(guān)注的是,村鎮(zhèn)銀行在運行的幾年中,盡管其整體態(tài)勢良好,但仍然有一些矛盾與問題暴露出來,如村鎮(zhèn)銀行市場定位易偏離服務(wù)“三農(nóng)”目標(biāo),支農(nóng)制度構(gòu)建有待完善,投資方式、設(shè)立方式及投資比例限制等致使村鎮(zhèn)銀行資金短缺問題突出。主發(fā)起行制度以及衍生的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)失衡以及村鎮(zhèn)銀行的獨立性問題嚴(yán)重,治理結(jié)構(gòu)存在嚴(yán)重缺陷,存款人利益保護機制缺位等等。因此,有必要詳細(xì)的了解我國村鎮(zhèn)銀行股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)現(xiàn)狀,對于目前村鎮(zhèn)銀行股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的存在第一大股東持股明顯過高等缺陷,對于其可持續(xù)發(fā)展產(chǎn)生了不利的影響。通過深入分析我國村鎮(zhèn)銀行股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),探索股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)優(yōu)化路徑有助于促進和規(guī)范村鎮(zhèn)銀行更好的服務(wù)于新農(nóng)村金融建設(shè)。 本文在理論探討的基礎(chǔ)上,通過收集公開信息,建立了截止2012年12月末,所有銀監(jiān)會已經(jīng)批準(zhǔn)設(shè)立的村鎮(zhèn)銀行的數(shù)據(jù)庫,并在此基礎(chǔ)上進行描述性統(tǒng)計分析,對于我國村鎮(zhèn)銀行的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)現(xiàn)狀進行系統(tǒng)詳細(xì)的描述,然后根據(jù)獲得的數(shù)據(jù)建立多元線性回歸模型對我國村鎮(zhèn)銀行的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和經(jīng)營績效進行相關(guān)分析。 從股權(quán)約束的角度看。一個合理的公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)該既避免股權(quán)的過度分散。又避免股權(quán)的過度集中。股權(quán)過度分散易導(dǎo)致股權(quán)約束的弱化。進而引發(fā)公司“內(nèi)部人控制”情況下的全體股東利益受損問題;股權(quán)過度集中。形成某一股東對公司的絕對控股。則又容易造成“一股獨大”條件下的濫用控股權(quán)問題。不但中小股東利益受損。而且公司自身的獨立性亦難以保障。因此。無論是理論角度還是實踐角度。適度集中的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)都是公司最有效的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。追求適度集中的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)該是我國村鎮(zhèn)銀行股權(quán)改革的方向和目標(biāo)。在股權(quán)相對分散基礎(chǔ)上的相對集中或控股。是村鎮(zhèn)銀行股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的最優(yōu)選擇。 本文的章節(jié)安排如下：在第一章緒論部分陳述了村鎮(zhèn)銀行設(shè)立的背景、銀監(jiān)會的政策等以及本文的研究意義、文獻綜述、主要方法和邏輯結(jié)構(gòu)。第二部分是對本文所采用的數(shù)據(jù)的一個簡單的說明,第三部分是對目前股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)理論的闡述,并說明了股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和公司治理的關(guān)系以及對激勵機制和經(jīng)營績效的影響。第四部分是結(jié)合獲取的數(shù)據(jù)從發(fā)起行的種類、注冊資金還有發(fā)起行對股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的影響還有少數(shù)股東等方面系統(tǒng)的描述我國村鎮(zhèn)銀行股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的現(xiàn)狀。第五部分是從實證的角度說明現(xiàn)有的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是和村鎮(zhèn)銀行的績效呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系的。第六和第七部分講述了我國村鎮(zhèn)銀行股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)現(xiàn)狀的原因和影響,并且提出了本文對于村鎮(zhèn)銀行股權(quán)機構(gòu)優(yōu)化的目標(biāo)和路徑,最后第八章提出了相關(guān)配套的政策建議。
[Abstract]:Rural finance has always been the weakest link in China's financial system. The withdrawal of state-owned commercial banks, the monopoly and inefficient management of rural credit cooperatives have made the financial supply and demand in rural areas seriously unbalanced. The village bank is an innovation of the local farmers, agriculture and rural development. The village bank is an innovation of the system. It is an important supplement to the large commercial banks and the cooperative financial management model. The village bank is effective for the active rural financial market in China. It has made important contributions to improving rural financial services and supporting the construction of new countryside.
However, it is worthy of concern that in the years of the village and town banks, although the overall situation is good, there are still some contradictions and problems exposed, such as the market positioning of the village bank is easy to deviate from the "three rural" targets, the construction of the supporting agriculture system is to be perfected, the way of investment, the method of setting up and the limit of investment ratio, etc, which lead to the capital of the village and town bank The problem of shortage is prominent. The main departure system and the unbalance of the equity structure and the independence of the village banks are serious. There are serious defects in the governance structure, the absence of the depositor's interest protection mechanism and so on. Therefore, it is necessary to have a detailed understanding of the ownership structure of the village and town banks in our country and the existence of the current ownership structure of the village and town banks. The first large stockholders' stock ownership is obviously too high, which has a negative impact on its sustainable development. Through the in-depth analysis of the ownership structure of the village and town banks in China, the exploration of the optimization path of the equity structure is helpful to promote and standardize the village banks to better serve the new rural financial construction.
On the basis of theoretical discussion, by collecting public information, the database of village banks which have been approved by all China Banking Regulatory Commission by the end of 12 month of 2012 is set up. On this basis, a descriptive statistical analysis is carried out on the basis of a detailed description of the current situation of the equity structure of the village banks in China, and then according to the obtained data. A multiple linear regression model is established to analyze the ownership structure and business performance of rural banks in China.
From the perspective of equity constraints, a reasonable company ownership structure should not only avoid excessive decentralization of equity, but also avoid excessive concentration of equity. The excessive decentralization of equity will lead to the weakening of equity constraints. The absolute holding of the company makes it easy to cause the abuse of controlling rights under the condition of "one stock one". Not only the interests of the small shareholders are damaged, but also the independence of the company is difficult to guarantee. Therefore, both the theoretical and practical angles. The moderate and centralized ownership structure is the most effective equity structure of the public company. The ownership structure in the village and town bank should be the direction and goal of the equity reform of the village and town banks in China. The relative concentration or holding on the basis of the relative decentralization is the best choice for the equity structure of the village and town banks.
The chapters of this article are arranged as follows: in the first chapter, the background of the establishment of village and town banks, the policy of the CBRC, the significance of the research, the literature review, the main methods and the logical structure are presented. The second part is a simple explanation of the data used in this article, and the third part is the exposition of the current ownership structure theory. And the relationship between the ownership structure and corporate governance and the impact on the incentive mechanism and performance. The fourth part is the status of the ownership structure of the village and town bank in China. The fifth part is the current situation of the ownership structure of the village and town bank in China. It is from an empirical point of view that the existing ownership structure is negatively related to the performance of village banks. The sixth and seventh parts describe the reasons and effects of the current equity structure of village and town banks in China, and put forward the objectives and paths for the optimization of the equity institutions in villages and towns, and the last eighth chapters put forward related matching. Policy recommendations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.35

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