存款保險(xiǎn)制度下的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)及對(duì)策——借鑒美國(guó)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-06-23 15:31
本文選題:存款 + 保險(xiǎn); 參考:《國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)合作》2013年02期
【摘要】:正防止銀行擠兌,維護(hù)金融穩(wěn)定是世界各國(guó)建立存款保險(xiǎn)制度的主要原因。但是,存款保險(xiǎn)制度存在一個(gè)內(nèi)在缺陷——道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因此,如何控制道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)成為存款保險(xiǎn)制度構(gòu)建的核心問(wèn)題。1934年美國(guó)在全球首創(chuàng)建立存款保險(xiǎn)制度,在此之前,部分州曾經(jīng)嘗試建立過(guò)存款保險(xiǎn)。但是,無(wú)論是早期的制度還是正式制度都深受道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問(wèn)題的困擾,尤其是造成了
[Abstract]:Preventing bank runs and maintaining financial stability are the main reasons for the establishment of deposit insurance system in the world. However, the deposit insurance system has an inherent defect-moral hazard. Therefore, how to control moral hazard becomes the core problem in the construction of deposit insurance system. In 1934, the United States established the deposit insurance system in the world, before that, some states had tried to establish deposit insurance. However, both early and formal institutions are plagued by moral hazard problems, especially as a result of
【作者單位】: 清華大學(xué);
【分類號(hào)】:F837.12
,
本文編號(hào):2057594
本文鏈接:http://sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/huobilw/2057594.html
最近更新
教材專著