本文選題：信息不對(duì)稱 + 信貸系統(tǒng)平臺(tái)��； 參考：《安徽農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：“三農(nóng)”問題貫穿我國經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的始終,其基礎(chǔ)戰(zhàn)略性地位不言而喻。對(duì)該問題的重視,既是我國經(jīng)濟(jì)長久穩(wěn)定發(fā)展的保障,更是夯實(shí)以內(nèi)需拉動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的新模式的基礎(chǔ)。農(nóng)民經(jīng)濟(jì)收入增速慢是“三農(nóng)”問題的核心,農(nóng)村地區(qū)缺乏必要的金融支撐則是制約農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展及農(nóng)民收入提高的主要因素。涉農(nóng)小額信貸問題具體表現(xiàn)為農(nóng)戶貸款難,涉農(nóng)信貸資金外流嚴(yán)重等情況。于是,就產(chǎn)生了研究涉農(nóng)小額信貸問題的成因及解決對(duì)策這—社會(huì)主義新農(nóng)村建設(shè)過程中亟待解決的一個(gè)重要問題。 涉農(nóng)小額信貸一直是我國農(nóng)村金融的重要組成部分,隨著國家支農(nóng)扶農(nóng)政策力度的加強(qiáng),近年來農(nóng)戶貸款難這一現(xiàn)象有所好轉(zhuǎn),但問題仍然存在。對(duì)于這個(gè)問題,國內(nèi)外專家學(xué)者大多從金融抑制和金融深化的角度展開分析和探討,而本文認(rèn)為農(nóng)村涉農(nóng)信貸市場中的信息不對(duì)稱現(xiàn)象是造成農(nóng)戶貸款難問題的主因,金融機(jī)構(gòu)和農(nóng)戶作為農(nóng)村金融市場中信貸資金的供需雙方,對(duì)彼此都存在著信息不對(duì)稱。一方面,農(nóng)戶不能及時(shí)迅速地了解金融機(jī)構(gòu)最新的涉農(nóng)貸款業(yè)務(wù),另一方面金融機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)農(nóng)戶的還款能力等方面的信息缺乏必要的了解。在信息不對(duì)稱的逆向選擇效應(yīng)和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)效應(yīng)的作用下,很容易造成金融機(jī)構(gòu)涉農(nóng)貸款發(fā)放難、回收率低以及農(nóng)戶貸款難等制約農(nóng)村經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展和農(nóng)戶貸款難等問題的產(chǎn)生。因此,本文選擇從信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)角度入手,通過構(gòu)建農(nóng)戶信貸市場模型,分析涉農(nóng)信貸市場中因信息不對(duì)稱產(chǎn)生的逆向選擇效應(yīng)和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)效應(yīng),并在此基礎(chǔ)上分析農(nóng)戶貸款難的具體成因以及具有針對(duì)性的對(duì)策建議。 本文認(rèn)為對(duì)我國涉農(nóng)小額信貸問題的研究,可以從信息不對(duì)稱理論的視角去展開,本文主要從以下五個(gè)部分展開研究思路： 第一部分,總體介紹本文的選題背景、研究內(nèi)容及方法,同時(shí)綜述國內(nèi)外學(xué)者對(duì)該問題的研究成果。 第二部分,對(duì)涉農(nóng)小額信貸進(jìn)行簡要概述,并分別對(duì)我國涉農(nóng)信貸市場供需雙方進(jìn)行需求預(yù)測,并借助現(xiàn)有的統(tǒng)計(jì)資料和調(diào)研數(shù)據(jù),剖析農(nóng)戶貸款難問題的現(xiàn)狀及成因。 第三部分,基于信息不對(duì)稱理論建立我國涉農(nóng)信貸市場模型,借由它詳細(xì)剖析涉農(nóng)信貸市場中的逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 第四部分,針對(duì)農(nóng)戶貸款難問題的現(xiàn)狀及成因提出解決對(duì)策：構(gòu)建涉農(nóng)信貸信息系統(tǒng)平臺(tái)和推廣小額信貸公司。 第五部分,結(jié)合我國現(xiàn)階段的具體國情提出一些與本文所提的兩種對(duì)策相適的政策建議,以期更好的解決農(nóng)戶貸款難問題。 總之,本文認(rèn)為從信息不對(duì)稱角度對(duì)我國涉農(nóng)小額信貸問題展開研究分析并提出相應(yīng)的對(duì)策建議,不僅具有較強(qiáng)的理論創(chuàng)新意義,而且對(duì)我國當(dāng)前的農(nóng)村金融改革以及社會(huì)主義新農(nóng)村建設(shè)而言具有現(xiàn)實(shí)指導(dǎo)意義。
[Abstract]:The issue of agriculture, rural areas and farmers runs through the economic development of our country, and its basic strategic position is self-evident. Paying attention to this problem is not only the guarantee of the long-term and stable development of China's economy, but also the foundation of the new model of domestic demand driving economic growth. The slow growth rate of farmers' economic income is the core of the "three rural areas" problem, and the lack of necessary financial support in rural areas is the main factor that restricts the development of rural economy and the increase of farmers' income. The problems of agriculture-related microcredit are difficult for farmers and serious outflow of funds for agricultural credit. As a result, the research on the causes and countermeasures of the agricultural microfinance problem is an important problem to be solved in the process of the construction of the new socialist countryside. Agricultural microfinance has always been an important part of rural finance in China. With the strengthening of the national policy of supporting agriculture and agriculture, the phenomenon of farmers' loan difficulties has improved in recent years, but the problem still exists. Most experts and scholars at home and abroad analyze and discuss this problem from the angle of financial suppression and financial deepening, and this paper holds that the information asymmetry phenomenon in the rural agriculture-related credit market is the main cause of the problem of farmers' loan difficulties. As the supply and demand of credit funds in rural financial market, financial institutions and farmers have asymmetric information to each other. On the one hand, farmers can not understand the latest loan business of financial institutions in time, on the other hand, the financial institutions lack the necessary understanding of the farmers' repayment ability and other aspects of information. Under the influence of adverse selection effect and moral hazard effect of asymmetric information, it is easy to bring about the problems such as the difficulty of agricultural loan issuance by financial institutions, the low recovery rate and the difficulty of farmer's loan, etc., which restrict the development of rural economy and the difficulty of farmer's loan. Therefore, from the angle of information economics, this paper analyzes the adverse selection effect and moral hazard effect caused by asymmetric information in agricultural credit market through the construction of farmer credit market model. On this basis, the paper analyzes the specific causes of farmers' loan difficulties and relevant countermeasures. This paper holds that the research on the problem of agricultural microfinance in China can be carried out from the perspective of information asymmetry theory. This paper mainly starts from the following five parts: the first part, the overall introduction of the background of this paper, The research contents and methods are summarized, and the research results of domestic and foreign scholars on this issue are summarized. In the second part, the author gives a brief overview of agricultural microfinance, forecasts the demand of both supply and demand of agricultural credit market in China, and analyzes the present situation and causes of farmers' loan difficulties with the help of existing statistical data and investigation data. In the third part, the agricultural credit market model of our country is established based on the information asymmetry theory, by which the reverse selection and moral hazard in the agricultural credit market are analyzed in detail. In the fourth part, the author puts forward the countermeasures to solve the problem of farmers' loan difficulty: constructing the platform of agricultural credit information system and popularizing the micro-credit company. The fifth part, combined with the specific situation of our country at present, puts forward some policy suggestions suitable to the two countermeasures put forward in this paper, in order to better solve the problem of farmers' loan. In a word, this paper holds that the research and analysis of the problem of agricultural microfinance in China from the angle of information asymmetry, and the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions, are not only of great theoretical significance, but also of great significance. Moreover, it has practical guiding significance for the current rural financial reform and the construction of new socialist countryside.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.43

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