本文選題：商業(yè)銀行治理 + 控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)�。� 參考：《中國(guó)社會(huì)科學(xué)院研究生院》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：有關(guān)商業(yè)銀行并購(gòu)等控制權(quán)流通問(wèn)題，已有研究大多局限于商業(yè)銀行經(jīng)營(yíng)管理層面，更多地關(guān)注控制權(quán)交易對(duì)商業(yè)銀行經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效可能產(chǎn)生的影響。雖然也有一部分學(xué)者注意到控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)在商業(yè)銀行治理中存在的價(jià)值，但主要還是將銀行控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)作為解決中國(guó)商業(yè)銀行治理弊端的一種對(duì)策和建議略加表述，而缺少對(duì)這一問(wèn)題的深度分析。 本文的選題正是從整體視角分析當(dāng)前中國(guó)商業(yè)銀行控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)交易日趨活躍的現(xiàn)實(shí)現(xiàn)象，重點(diǎn)探討銀行控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)在中國(guó)商業(yè)銀行治理中的作用和影響。在充分總結(jié)有關(guān)控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)及商業(yè)銀行治理理論的基礎(chǔ)上，本文通過(guò)對(duì)世界各主要國(guó)家商業(yè)銀行控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)發(fā)展情況進(jìn)行比較研究，總結(jié)出中國(guó)銀行控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)存在的問(wèn)題，以及未來(lái)可能發(fā)展的方向。此外，本文還針對(duì)當(dāng)前存在的制度瓶頸，從中提煉出相應(yīng)的對(duì)策建議，以期控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)機(jī)制在中國(guó)商業(yè)銀行治理實(shí)踐中發(fā)揮更大的作用。 在主要結(jié)構(gòu)方面，，本文實(shí)際上按照以下四個(gè)部分依次展開，即商業(yè)銀行治理的特殊性及控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)機(jī)制的價(jià)值、各國(guó)商業(yè)銀行治理的基本模式及控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)機(jī)制的演變路徑、中國(guó)商業(yè)銀行控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)的治理績(jī)效、以及該機(jī)制作用機(jī)理的實(shí)證研究。在以上各部分之間實(shí)際上存在著縝密的內(nèi)在邏輯。首先，第一部分為本文界定了明確的研究對(duì)象，并為后續(xù)研究提供了相應(yīng)的理論基礎(chǔ)。第二部分則進(jìn)一步通過(guò)國(guó)別比較的方式，闡明了在各主要類型國(guó)家當(dāng)中，與其銀行控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)發(fā)展存在密切關(guān)聯(lián)的影響因素及主要?jiǎng)右颍ㄟ^(guò)這一部分的分析使得以下兩方面的結(jié)論得到了明確，即第一，在各國(guó)的銀行治理實(shí)踐中，控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)的作用有利于參與銀行及行業(yè)整體治理績(jī)效的改善；第二，在不同的國(guó)家中，雖然銀行控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)發(fā)展的動(dòng)因，以及該機(jī)制作用的側(cè)重點(diǎn)存在一定的差異，但總體上仍主要集中于以下三個(gè)方面，包括行業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)結(jié)構(gòu)、銀行內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)、以及外部制度環(huán)境的變遷。第三部分承接上文，分別以短期和長(zhǎng)期兩種績(jī)效考核方法對(duì)中國(guó)銀行業(yè)控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)的績(jī)效予以分析和驗(yàn)證。第四部分則進(jìn)一步對(duì)這一績(jī)效改進(jìn)所依賴的內(nèi)部運(yùn)作機(jī)理進(jìn)行了深入的剖析。 結(jié)論表明，控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)機(jī)制對(duì)中國(guó)商業(yè)銀行治理確實(shí)存在顯著的績(jī)效提升作用，其中，股份制銀行的提升效果要整體優(yōu)于四大國(guó)有銀行。另外，通過(guò)多元回歸分析證明，控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)機(jī)制的作用，有賴于目標(biāo)銀行在內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)方面做出必要的調(diào)整，比如，管理科層、董事會(huì)、監(jiān)事會(huì)、以及更為根本的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，只有通過(guò)以上機(jī)制的傳導(dǎo)才能使控制權(quán)市場(chǎng)機(jī)制發(fā)揮相應(yīng)的效力。四大國(guó)有銀行較弱的治理績(jī)效，反映出該類在內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整方面存在著顯著的剛性因素。
[Abstract]:Most of the studies on the circulation of control rights such as mergers and acquisitions of commercial banks have been confined to the level of management of commercial banks, and more attention has been paid to the possible impact of control rights transactions on the performance of commercial banks. Although some scholars have noticed the value of the control market in the commercial bank governance, they mainly put forward the bank control market as a kind of countermeasure and suggestion to solve the malpractice of Chinese commercial bank governance. However, there is a lack of in-depth analysis of this problem. The topic of this paper is to analyze from the overall perspective the reality of the increasingly active trading in the control market of Chinese commercial banks. This paper focuses on the role and influence of the market of bank control in the governance of Chinese commercial banks. On the basis of summing up the control market and the theory of commercial bank governance, this paper makes a comparative study on the development of the control market of commercial banks in major countries in the world, and summarizes the problems existing in the control market of Chinese banks. And the possible future direction. In addition, in view of the existing institutional bottlenecks, this paper also abstracts the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions from them, hoping that the market mechanism of control rights will play a greater role in the practice of the governance of Chinese commercial banks. In fact, this paper is based on the following four parts: the particularity of commercial bank governance and the value of market mechanism of control, the basic mode of governance of commercial banks in various countries and the evolution of market mechanism of control rights. An empirical study on the governance performance of the control market of Chinese commercial banks and the mechanism of the mechanism. There is in fact a careful internal logic between the above parts. First, the first part defines the research object and provides the corresponding theoretical basis for the follow-up study. In the second part, through the method of country comparison, the author clarifies the influence factors and the main causes of the development of the market of bank control, which are closely related to the development of the market of bank control in the main types of countries. Through the analysis of this part, the following two conclusions are made clear: first, in the practice of banking governance in various countries, the role of the control market is conducive to the improvement of the overall governance performance of the participating banks and the industry as a whole; second, In different countries, although there are some differences in the reasons for the development of the market of bank control and the emphasis of the mechanism, it still concentrates on the following three aspects, including the competition structure of the industry, the internal governance structure of the bank. And the change of external institutional environment. The third part carries on the analysis and verification of the performance of China's banking control market with two performance appraisal methods: short-term and long-term respectively. The fourth part further analyzes the internal operation mechanism on which the performance improvement depends. The conclusion shows that the control market mechanism does have a significant effect on the governance of Chinese commercial banks, among which, The promotion effect of joint-stock banks should be better than that of the four major state-owned banks as a whole. In addition, through multiple regression analysis, it is proved that the role of the market mechanism of control depends on the necessary adjustment of the internal governance structure of the target bank, such as the management branch, the board of directors, the board of supervisors, and the more fundamental equity structure. Only through the transmission of the above mechanism can the control market mechanism play a corresponding role. The weak governance performance of the four state-owned banks reflects that there are significant rigid factors in the adjustment of internal governance structure.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)社會(huì)科學(xué)院研究生院
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F224;F832.33

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