本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)投資 + 引導基金��； 參考：《重慶大學》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：我國從1985年開始探索運用財政資金扶持創(chuàng)業(yè)投資發(fā)展。過去20多年的主要做法是通過財政出資設立國有創(chuàng)業(yè)投資公司，直接從事創(chuàng)業(yè)投資。在運作過程中不可避免地遇到了難以建立收益激勵機制和風險約束機制，以及難以發(fā)揮財政資金杠桿放大作用的問題。2005年后，我國政府開始嘗試設立創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導基金，即通過扶持商業(yè)性創(chuàng)業(yè)投資企業(yè)的設立與發(fā)展，引導社會資金進入創(chuàng)業(yè)投資領域，自身不直接從事創(chuàng)業(yè)投資，并且不以營利為目的。引導基金的設立避免了政府過分干預市場運作的缺陷，又可以充分發(fā)揮財政資金的杠桿效應，以吸引更多的創(chuàng)業(yè)資本投向處于種子期及初創(chuàng)期的科技創(chuàng)新企業(yè)，解決單純通過市場配置創(chuàng)業(yè)資本的缺陷。引導基金的出現(xiàn)標志著政府促進創(chuàng)業(yè)投資發(fā)展方式的轉變，是中國創(chuàng)業(yè)投資事業(yè)發(fā)展的重要里程碑。 本文從政府引導創(chuàng)業(yè)投資發(fā)展的視角出發(fā)，以私人創(chuàng)業(yè)資本、創(chuàng)業(yè)投資企業(yè)、創(chuàng)業(yè)投資家作為研究對象，在廣泛搜集國內外相關研究文獻與政策法規(guī)的基礎上，參考國外引導基金的運作模式，結合我國資本市場的客觀條件和政策背景，針對目前我國引導基金激勵機制不足的主要問題，探討了參與各方在創(chuàng)業(yè)投資各階段的利益博弈及相應的激勵機制設計，以期為改進和提高我國創(chuàng)業(yè)引導基金的運作效率提供理論支持和政策建議。論文的主要研究內容包括： 1、吸引私人資本進入創(chuàng)業(yè)投資的補償機制研究。公共資本介入創(chuàng)業(yè)投資活動的目的之一是為了增加對早期階段創(chuàng)新項目的投資，而基于風險/收益的權衡，這一目標通常與利潤最大化目標相沖突。因此，為吸引更多私人資本進入創(chuàng)業(yè)投資領域，公共資本必須對其進行補償。各國政府目前對私人資本的補償機制多種多樣，這些補償機制的特征是什么，對私人資本的激勵強度如何，對社會福利有何不同的影響，如何針對各地不同的情況選擇合適的補償機制？對這些問題的回答是本部分所研究的主要問題。 2、多目標環(huán)境下對創(chuàng)業(yè)投資企業(yè)的激勵機制研究。對商業(yè)性創(chuàng)業(yè)投資的理論研究表明，簽訂按可觀察的產出（利潤）為基準的分成制契約可以有效解決出資人和創(chuàng)投企業(yè)之間的代理問題。而在引導基金運作中，創(chuàng)投企業(yè)通常同時兼顧政府特定項目和自選項目的投資，因此固定比例的分成制契約可能會扭曲創(chuàng)投企業(yè)的激勵：投資處于后期階段的項目風險更小，平均收益可能更高，創(chuàng)投企業(yè)沒有激勵實現(xiàn)政府希望增加對早期階段創(chuàng)新項目或特定行業(yè)（領域）投資的目標。而強制規(guī)定創(chuàng)投企業(yè)必須以一定比例投資于政府指定項目的做法通常不能滿足其激勵相容約束。因此如何設計適當的激勵契約，使創(chuàng)投企業(yè)在投資項目的選擇上能夠自愿兼顧自身收益和政府目標是本部分所探討的主要問題。 3、基于代理人私利的創(chuàng)業(yè)投資家激勵機制研究。已有研究通常都假定創(chuàng)業(yè)投資家以追求項目收益最大化為目標，除此之外沒有其它私人目標，因此對創(chuàng)業(yè)投資家的激勵主要限定在如何刺激其努力投入和防范合謀上。本部分則將創(chuàng)業(yè)投資家從事創(chuàng)業(yè)投資活動的收益劃分為：內部私人收益和外部私人收益兩個部分，在實物期權框架下分析了最優(yōu)激勵合約的設計，討論了不同代理人私利對最優(yōu)投資時刻、激勵效率和激勵成本的影響。 本論文的創(chuàng)新之處在于： 1、將實踐中對私人資本的多種不同補償方式按其特征明確劃分為虧損保底、虧損補償、收益補償、風險/收益獨享4種方式，在私人投資者風險規(guī)避假設下證明了事前承諾對虧損進行補償的機制可以最有效地激勵私人資本的進入，而當前實踐中通常采用的收益補償的方式是一種雙輸機制。從而為現(xiàn)行補償機制的改進提供了理論依據。 2、將創(chuàng)業(yè)投資企業(yè)的激勵問題模型化為一個多任務環(huán)境下的激勵合約設計問題，通過引入不同任務間產出的關聯(lián)性和任務的相對重要性，本文首先從理論上證明，如果任務間的產出分布正相關，或任務間的重要性存在差異，則最優(yōu)的激勵合約可以是對抗性，即在提高一種任務激勵強度的同時必須降低另一任務的激勵強度。這就從理論上拓展了Holmstrom和Milgrom（1991）關于不同任務間的激勵強度必須互補的經典結論；從實踐上本文還證明，對政府指定項目和創(chuàng)業(yè)投資家自選項目應實施差別激勵，特別地，如果指定項目對政府而言非常重要，那么其激勵強度應該嚴格高于自選項目；若政府組建不同類型的創(chuàng)業(yè)投資基金，分別從事政府指定項目和自選項目的投資，則政府能夠從這種專業(yè)化分工模式中獲得更高的凈剩余；而在專業(yè)化分工模式中，對創(chuàng)業(yè)投資家實行相對業(yè)績比較的激勵政策可以進一步提高政府效用。 3、通過引入代理人私利因素拓展了前人對創(chuàng)業(yè)投資家激勵機制的研究，，從如何激勵創(chuàng)業(yè)投資家選擇最優(yōu)投資時刻這一新的視角出發(fā)探討了代理人不同類型的私利對激勵合約的影響，發(fā)現(xiàn)了創(chuàng)業(yè)投資家的外部私人收益與因掌握信息優(yōu)勢而獲得的內部私人收益對最優(yōu)投資時機選擇正反兩方面的作用及其影響機制。
[Abstract]:Since 1985, China began to explore the use of financial funds to support the development of venture capital. The main practice of the past 20 years is to set up state-owned venture capital companies through financial investment, and directly engage in venture capital. In the process of operation, it is inevitable that it is difficult to establish income incentive mechanism and risk constraint mechanism, and it is difficult to play financial capital. After.2005 years, our government began to try to set up a venture capital guidance fund, that is, by supporting the establishment and development of commercial venture capital enterprises, leading social funds into the field of venture capital, not directly engaged in venture capital, and not for profit making purposes. The establishment of guidance fund has avoided the government. The overintervention of the defects in the market operation can also give full play to the leverage effect of financial funds, in order to attract more venture capital to the technological innovation enterprises in the seed period and initial stage, and to solve the defects of the simple market allocation of venture capital. The emergence of the guide fund marks the transformation of the government to promote the development of venture capital. An important milestone in the development of China's venture capital.
From the perspective of government guidance on the development of venture capital, this paper takes private venture capital, venture capital enterprises and venture capitalists as the research object. On the basis of extensive collection of relevant domestic and foreign relevant research documents and policies and regulations, and referring to the operation mode of foreign guidance fund, the objective conditions and policy background of China's capital market are combined. In order to improve and improve the operational efficiency of the Venture guidance fund in China, the main problems of the lack of incentive mechanism in China's guidance fund are discussed, and the theoretical support and policy suggestions are provided to improve and improve the operational efficiency of the Venture guidance fund in China.
1, a study of the compensation mechanism for attracting private capital into venture capital. One of the aims of public capital involvement in venture capital is to increase investment in early stage innovation projects, and this goal is usually in conflict with the goal of profit maximization. Therefore, to attract more private capital into venture capital, it is to attract more private capital to venture capital. In the field, public capital must be compensated. The current compensation mechanisms for private capital are varied. What are the characteristics of these compensation mechanisms, what is the incentive intensity to private capital, the difference in social welfare and how to choose the appropriate compensation mechanism for different situations in different places? The answer is the main problem in this section.
2, research on the incentive mechanism of venture capital enterprises under multi objective environment. The theoretical research on commercial venture investment shows that the signing of the divided contract based on the observable output (profit) can effectively solve the agency problem between the investors and the venture capital enterprises. In the operation of the guidance fund, the venture capital enterprises usually take into account the government at the same time. The investment of specific projects and selected projects, so a fixed proportion of the contract may distort the incentive of the venture capital enterprise: the project risk is smaller in the later stage, the average income may be higher, and the venture capital enterprise does not encourage the government to achieve the goal of increasing the investment of new or specific industry (field) at the early stage. However, it is the main problem that how to design an appropriate incentive contract so that the venture capital enterprises can give consideration to their own income and government goals voluntarily in the choice of investment projects.
3, research on the incentive mechanism of venture capitalists based on the agent's private interest. The existing research usually assumes that the venture investor aims to maximize the benefit of the project. In addition, there are no other private goals. Therefore, the incentive to the venture capitalist is mainly limited to how to stimulate its effort and guard the conspiracy. The income of the entrepreneurs engaged in venture capital activities is divided into two parts: internal private income and external private income. In the framework of real options, the design of the optimal incentive contract is analyzed. The effects of different agents' private interest on the optimal investment time, incentive efficiency and incentive cost are discussed.
The innovation of this paper lies in:
1, according to its characteristics, the different compensation methods of private capital are clearly divided into 4 ways: loss guarantee, loss compensation, income compensation and risk / income alone. Under the assumption of risk aversion of private investors, the mechanism of pre undertaking commitment to loss is proved to be the most effective incentive for private capital to enter. In practice, the way of income compensation is usually a double lose mechanism, which provides a theoretical basis for the improvement of the current compensation mechanism.
2, the incentive model of the venture capital enterprise is modeled as an incentive contract design in a multi task environment. By introducing the relevance of the output of different tasks and the relative importance of the task, this paper first proves that the optimal excitation is optimal if the output distribution between tasks is positive or the importance of the task is different. The incentive contract can be antagonistic, that is, to reduce the incentive intensity of another task while improving the intensity of a task incentive. This extends the classical conclusion of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) on the complementary incentive intensity between different tasks. In practice, this paper also proves that the government designated the project and the venture capitalist. Self selected projects should implement differential incentives, especially if the designated project is very important to the government, then its incentive intensity should be strictly higher than the self selected project. If the government sets up different types of venture capital funds to invest in the government designated and selected projects respectively, the government can get from this specialized division of labor model. In the mode of specialized division of labor, the incentive policy of relative performance comparison for venture capitalists can further improve the effectiveness of government.
3, through the introduction of agents' private interest factors, this paper expands the former research on the incentive mechanism of the venture capitalists. From the new perspective of how to motivate the entrepreneur to choose the best investment time, this paper explores the influence of the agent's different types of private interest on the incentive contract, and finds out the external private income of the venture capitalist and the advantage of mastering the information. The internal private benefits obtained by the potential have two positive and negative effects on the optimal investment timing and their influencing mechanisms.
【學位授予單位】：重慶大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.48

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