本文選題：中小企業(yè)質(zhì)押融資 + 供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)��； 參考：《武漢紡織大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：中小企業(yè)融資難是限制中小企業(yè)發(fā)展的重要因素。盡管?chē)?guó)家出臺(tái)一系列相關(guān)政策鼓勵(lì)商業(yè)銀行開(kāi)通中小企業(yè)融資業(yè)務(wù)，但由于中小企業(yè)資信、規(guī)模等因素使銀行在融資業(yè)務(wù)面臨巨大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，故而中小企業(yè)融資問(wèn)題仍無(wú)法解決。近年來(lái)，存貨質(zhì)押融資這種由銀行、第三方物流企業(yè)、中小企業(yè)三方共同參與的新型融資模式逐步開(kāi)始在部分商業(yè)銀行開(kāi)展起來(lái)，有望解決中小企業(yè)由于資信問(wèn)題無(wú)法獲得融資的難題。質(zhì)押融資主要通過(guò)物流企業(yè)在銀行與中小企業(yè)之間作為中介進(jìn)行溝通，解決兩者之間信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)問(wèn)題，幫助減少融資的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、降低融資成本。 隨著國(guó)內(nèi)供應(yīng)鏈的迅速發(fā)展，供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)的中小企業(yè)質(zhì)押融資過(guò)程中表現(xiàn)出與普通供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)押融資不同的特點(diǎn)。本研究通過(guò)對(duì)普通供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)押融資業(yè)務(wù)研究的基礎(chǔ)上，對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)內(nèi)資金流的特點(diǎn)進(jìn)行定性研究，分析供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)質(zhì)押融資運(yùn)行模式及業(yè)務(wù)中存在的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，并對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制提出建議。研究表明，在產(chǎn)業(yè)集群下供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)的資金流效率高于普通供應(yīng)鏈，供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)內(nèi)部的企業(yè)之間的協(xié)同作用增加了質(zhì)押融資對(duì)于中小企業(yè)的發(fā)展作用和融資效率，同時(shí)也有利于減少銀行在融資業(yè)務(wù)中遭受的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 為增強(qiáng)整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，加快供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)內(nèi)部中小企業(yè)的發(fā)展，需要增加中小企業(yè)在質(zhì)押融資中獲得的貸款。本研究在考慮風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的情況下，為提高質(zhì)押融資的質(zhì)押率，考慮供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)內(nèi)部核心企業(yè)作為中小企業(yè)的擔(dān)保方，與中小企業(yè)捆綁為一體形成供應(yīng)鏈捆綁模式尋求銀行的借貸資金。通過(guò)建立數(shù)學(xué)模型和數(shù)值分析研究表明，在庫(kù)存相等的情況下，捆綁融資可從銀行獲得更高的質(zhì)押率和貸款金額；隨著庫(kù)存的增加，捆綁融資質(zhì)押率逐漸降低；在違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)下銀行確定的質(zhì)押率要大于不違約風(fēng)險(xiǎn)下的質(zhì)押率；融資企業(yè)零售商、制造商、供應(yīng)鏈三方所獲得的利潤(rùn)增加，增長(zhǎng)的幅度隨著庫(kù)存的增加而減��；當(dāng)銀行為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性下，更傾向選擇與個(gè)體融資企業(yè)進(jìn)行合作；而在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避下，會(huì)選擇與捆綁融資企業(yè)合作。 除了分析業(yè)務(wù)內(nèi)部因素對(duì)于質(zhì)押融資產(chǎn)生影響，外部的國(guó)家宏觀利率對(duì)于融資決策也有重要的影響，本研究在研究供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)捆綁融資的基礎(chǔ)上，建立數(shù)學(xué)模型，分析在銀行率變化與融資資金有限制下對(duì)于融資的影響。研究表明，中小企業(yè)無(wú)貸款限制且自有資金不變的情況下，隨著銀行貸款利率的增加，零售商的最佳訂購(gòu)量和所獲得的利潤(rùn)都隨之減少，銀行自身利潤(rùn)隨之增加；中小企業(yè)存在貸款限制且自有資金不變的情況下，零售商在訂購(gòu)量只能限制在銀行最佳利潤(rùn)時(shí)的訂購(gòu)量范圍內(nèi)，，期間零售商利潤(rùn)減少，銀行的利潤(rùn)增加。
[Abstract]:The difficulty of small and medium-sized enterprises financing is an important factor restricting the development of small and medium enterprises. Although the state has issued a series of relevant policies to encourage commercial banks to open SME financing business, but because of the SMEs' credit, scale and other factors, banks are facing huge risks in financing business, so the financing problem of SMEs can not be solved. In recent years, inventory pledge financing, a new financing model involving banks, third-party logistics enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises, has gradually begun to develop in some commercial banks. It is expected to solve the problem that SMEs can not get financing due to credit problems. Pledge financing mainly through logistics enterprises between banks and small and medium-sized enterprises as an intermediary to solve the problem of information asymmetry between the two to help reduce the risk of financing and reduce financing costs. With the rapid development of domestic supply chain, the financing process of small and medium-sized enterprises in supply chain network is different from that of common supply chain pledge financing. On the basis of the research on the common supply chain pledge financing business, this paper makes a qualitative study on the characteristics of the capital flow in the supply chain network, and analyzes the operation mode of the supply chain network pledge financing and the risks in the business. And put forward the suggestion to the risk control. The research shows that the efficiency of capital flow in supply chain network is higher than that in common supply chain under industrial cluster, and the synergy among enterprises in supply chain network increases the development effect and financing efficiency of pledge financing for small and medium-sized enterprises. It also helps to reduce the risk banks face in their financing operations. In order to enhance the competitiveness of the whole supply chain network and accelerate the development of SMEs within the supply chain network, it is necessary to increase the loans obtained by SMEs in pledge financing. In order to improve the pledge rate of pledge financing, the core enterprises in the supply chain network are considered as the guarantors of small and medium-sized enterprises under the consideration of risk. Form the supply chain binding mode with the small and medium-sized enterprises as a whole to seek the bank's loan funds. The mathematical model and numerical analysis show that under the condition of equal inventory, the bundled financing can obtain higher pledge rate and loan amount from the bank, and with the increase of inventory, the pledge rate of bundled financing decreases gradually. Under the default risk, the pledge rate determined by the bank is larger than that under the non-default risk, and the profit obtained by the retailer, manufacturer and supply chain of the financing enterprise increases, and the increase decreases with the increase of inventory. When banks are risk-neutral, they tend to cooperate with individual financing enterprises, while under risk aversion, they choose to cooperate with bundled financing enterprises. Besides analyzing the influence of internal business factors on pledge financing, the external national macro interest rate also has an important impact on financing decision. This study establishes a mathematical model based on the study of supply chain network bundled financing. This paper analyzes the influence of the change of the bank rate and the limitation of the financing funds on the financing. The research shows that with the increase of the interest rate of bank loan, the optimal order quantity and profit of the retailer will decrease, and the profit of the bank will increase with the small and medium-sized enterprises having no limit on loan and no change of their own capital. In the case of small and medium-sized enterprises having loan restrictions and their own funds unchanged, the retailer's order quantity can only be limited within the range of the bank's best profit. During this period, the retailer's profit decreases and the bank's profit increases.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢紡織大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F276.3;F832.4

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 陳寶峰;馮耕中;李毅學(xué);;存貨質(zhì)押融資業(yè)務(wù)的價(jià)值風(fēng)險(xiǎn)度量[J];系統(tǒng)工程;2007年10期

2 黨夏寧;供應(yīng)鏈風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素的分析與防范[J];管理現(xiàn)代化;2003年06期

3 李蓓;;物流金融在進(jìn)出口貿(mào)易中的應(yīng)用[J];金融與經(jīng)濟(jì);2006年10期

4 冷麗蓮;;物流金融業(yè)務(wù)中的商業(yè)銀行的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)及防范[J];物流科技;2008年03期

5 楊鳳梅;毛思星;;銀行開(kāi)展物流金融業(yè)務(wù)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)及對(duì)策研究[J];全國(guó)商情(經(jīng)濟(jì)理論研究);2009年05期

6 嚴(yán)學(xué)軍;;倉(cāng)單質(zhì)押貸款業(yè)務(wù)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)價(jià)與防范[J];企業(yè)家天地;2004年03期

7 李娟;徐渝;馮耕中;;基于存貨質(zhì)押融資業(yè)務(wù)的博弈分析[J];生產(chǎn)力研究;2007年20期

8 閆俊宏;許祥秦;;基于供應(yīng)鏈金融的中小企業(yè)融資模式分析[J];上海金融;2007年02期

9 劉偉;;倉(cāng)單質(zhì)押的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理分析[J];商品儲(chǔ)運(yùn)與養(yǎng)護(hù);2007年03期

10 張媛媛;朱梅紅;吉彩紅;;質(zhì)押貸款下的貸款價(jià)值比的研究[J];數(shù)學(xué)的實(shí)踐與認(rèn)識(shí);2009年13期

本文編號(hào)：1943271