本文選題：信息披露制度 + 自愿性披露��； 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：我國的證券市場(chǎng)自上世紀(jì)90年代初期建立,至今已經(jīng)經(jīng)過了近20年的歷程。相較于西方發(fā)達(dá)國家,我國在極短的時(shí)間內(nèi)實(shí)現(xiàn)了證券市場(chǎng)的飛速發(fā)展,截止2008年末滬深兩市的上市公司已超過1600多家,制度建設(shè)不斷完善,市場(chǎng)效率不斷提高,上市公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)也日趨合理。在肯定成績(jī)的同時(shí),我們不能漠視存在的問題,其中自愿性披露水平不高就是一個(gè)重要方面。從某種意義上說,證券市場(chǎng)本質(zhì)上是一個(gè)信息市場(chǎng),其核心問題是證券價(jià)格能否及時(shí)、準(zhǔn)確的反映公司經(jīng)營(yíng)的基本面信息。然而,證券市場(chǎng)信息的非對(duì)稱性卻是常態(tài),信息風(fēng)險(xiǎn)成為系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的重要組成部分,妨礙了經(jīng)濟(jì)資源配置效率。強(qiáng)化上市公司信息披露制度,是解決這一問題的關(guān)鍵手段之一。信息披露包括了強(qiáng)制性披露與自愿性披露,其中前者是上市公司對(duì)法律法規(guī)的遵循,后者則是出于管理層的一種自利性行為。那么,上市公司的自愿性披露行為對(duì)包括中小股東、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者、債權(quán)人這些外部投資者的利益是否有影響,以及這種行為的動(dòng)機(jī)和影響因素又是什么,是重要的理論與實(shí)際問題。本文正是針對(duì)自愿性披露的公司治理效應(yīng)問題進(jìn)行的理論與實(shí)證研究,其主要內(nèi)容和觀點(diǎn)如下： 第1章：緒論。本章主要介紹了選題背景與研究意義,論文的研究方法、研究邏輯與內(nèi)容結(jié)構(gòu),論文的創(chuàng)新與不足、基本概念界定等。 第2章：自愿性披露與公司治理。本章首先闡釋了自愿性披露的內(nèi)涵,并結(jié)合國內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究,對(duì)其外延進(jìn)行歸結(jié),即自愿性披露的信息包括了上市公司背景、業(yè)績(jī)、核心產(chǎn)品與技術(shù)、內(nèi)部控制、人力資源、未確認(rèn)無形資產(chǎn)、社會(huì)責(zé)任履行和衍生金融工具等八個(gè)方面的信息。其次對(duì)公司治理的內(nèi)涵、公司治理的相關(guān)問題、公司治理機(jī)制、公司治理模式進(jìn)行了分析研究,其中與公司治理相關(guān)的問題包括了資本結(jié)構(gòu)、投資政策、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)四個(gè)方面,而公司治理機(jī)制有內(nèi)部治理與外部治理之分,公司治理模式亦有英美模式、德日模式和家族模式的差異。最后分析了自愿性披露與公司治理的關(guān)系,借鑒OECD關(guān)于信息披露和透明度作為改善公司治理的重要原則之一的表述,筆者認(rèn)為,自愿性信息披露具有公司治理效應(yīng)。準(zhǔn)確的說,包括強(qiáng)制性信息與自愿性信息在內(nèi)的信息披露機(jī)制,是公司治理機(jī)制的重要組成部分,而其目標(biāo)是提高上市公司的透明度,而這一目標(biāo)是改善公司治理的重要原則之一。 第3章：自愿性披露的理論與實(shí)踐的發(fā)展與現(xiàn)狀分析。本章首先介紹了自愿性披露理論基礎(chǔ),即有效市場(chǎng)假說、企業(yè)契約性質(zhì)理論、信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論。其次對(duì)國內(nèi)外關(guān)于自愿性披露的相關(guān)研究進(jìn)行了評(píng)述,在披露的動(dòng)機(jī)、衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、影響因素、經(jīng)濟(jì)后果四個(gè)方面進(jìn)行梳理,并指出其中的不足之處。最后將自愿性與強(qiáng)制性披露相結(jié)合,從整體上闡釋信息披露制度的歷史演進(jìn),比較當(dāng)今世界各國與自愿性披露相關(guān)的規(guī)定,總結(jié)其實(shí)踐發(fā)展的內(nèi)在邏輯。 第4章：自愿性披露與外部股東利益保護(hù)的實(shí)證研究。外部投資者,包括外部股東和債權(quán)人,是自愿性披露信息的主要需求者,本章主要關(guān)注了外部股東收益利益保護(hù)與自愿性披露水平的關(guān)系問題。首先,通過對(duì)國內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)的梳理,筆者認(rèn)為外部股東有中小投資者和機(jī)構(gòu)投資者之分,二者的信息來源與擁有量不同,所以自愿性披露包括了非針對(duì)性信息與有針對(duì)性信息,在此基礎(chǔ)上提出了本章實(shí)證研究的相關(guān)假設(shè)。在研究設(shè)計(jì)中,筆者以2008年上海證券交易所上市的A股公司為研究對(duì)象,以2008年度股票累積報(bào)酬率作為外部股東收益的觀測(cè)變量,分別以臨時(shí)公告數(shù)量和機(jī)構(gòu)持股比例作為衡量非針對(duì)性自愿性披露水平和有針對(duì)性自愿性披露水平的代理變量,在控制公司規(guī)模、盈利能力、行業(yè)等因素的基礎(chǔ)上,回歸結(jié)果表明自愿性披露水平與外部股東收益有明顯的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。 第5章：自愿性披露與債權(quán)人利益保護(hù)的實(shí)證研究。上市公司債權(quán)人包括銀行和公司債券的持有人,其利益保護(hù)涉及投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與投資收益。筆者在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上,提出了研究假設(shè),在研究設(shè)計(jì)中,以2008年上海證券交易所上市的A股公司為研究對(duì)象,以利息保障倍數(shù)和上市公司債務(wù)資本利息率分別作為債權(quán)人投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與收益的觀察變量,在控制公司規(guī)模和資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率兩個(gè)因素的基礎(chǔ)上,得出的回歸結(jié)果表明,自愿性披露水平與債權(quán)人的利益無顯著的相關(guān)關(guān)系,并分析了產(chǎn)生這一結(jié)果的現(xiàn)實(shí)原因。 第6章：政策與建議。本章首先在前文分析的基礎(chǔ)上,對(duì)自愿性披露的公司治理效應(yīng)進(jìn)行了歸結(jié)。其次從理論與實(shí)證的層面分析了自愿性披露行為的影響因素。筆者認(rèn)為,理論上來講,我國上市公司自愿性披露的影響因素主要有：經(jīng)理層主觀因素、公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制和公司外部治理機(jī)制三大類,結(jié)合我國的實(shí)際情況,經(jīng)理層主觀因素主要是公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī),與公司內(nèi)部治理相關(guān)的因素有股權(quán)集中度、董事會(huì)的獨(dú)立性特征,以及董事長(zhǎng)和總經(jīng)理兩職是否相分離,而與公司外部治理相關(guān)的因素有公司規(guī)模、債權(quán)人與機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的參與程度,在此基礎(chǔ)上,提出了相關(guān)的研究假設(shè)。在實(shí)證分析中,筆者沿襲前文方法,以臨時(shí)公告數(shù)量作為衡量自愿性披露水平的代理變量,分別考察了經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)、股權(quán)集中度、董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性、董事長(zhǎng)與總經(jīng)理的職務(wù)分工、公司規(guī)模、財(cái)務(wù)杠桿、機(jī)構(gòu)持股比例七個(gè)變量對(duì)自愿性披露水平的影響。實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)表明,除與公司內(nèi)部治理相關(guān)的三個(gè)因素外,其他四個(gè)變量對(duì)自愿性披露水平都存在著顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。最后,在理論分析與實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,筆者提出了規(guī)范上市公司自愿性披露行為,實(shí)現(xiàn)自愿性披露治理效應(yīng)的政策建議。 本文的創(chuàng)新之處,主要表現(xiàn)在以下三個(gè)方面： 第一,關(guān)于自愿性披露的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果,國內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)已經(jīng)取得了不少研究成果,但是其立足點(diǎn)基本上是披露行為對(duì)上市公司資本成本和股票價(jià)值的影響,卻極少考慮外部投資者的利益保護(hù)問題。本文正是站在外部投資者保護(hù)的立場(chǎng)上,并將外部投資者細(xì)分為中小投資者、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和債權(quán)人,從實(shí)證的角度驗(yàn)證了自愿性披露水平與其三者利益保護(hù)的相關(guān)關(guān)系。 第二,在分析信息披露渠道的基礎(chǔ)上,將自愿性信息分為非針對(duì)性信息與有針對(duì)性信息兩類,認(rèn)為前者是中小投資者的主要信息來源,而后者是機(jī)構(gòu)投資者所獨(dú)占。通過選擇適合的代理變量,分別驗(yàn)證了兩類披露行為對(duì)外部股東收益的正向影響。 第三,關(guān)于機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與自愿性披露水平(主要是非針對(duì)性方面)的關(guān)系的問題,相關(guān)的研究都是在相關(guān)的政策建議中,空泛的提出通過大力發(fā)展機(jī)構(gòu)投資者以促進(jìn)上市公司自愿性披露水平,而未做經(jīng)驗(yàn)的證明。筆者通過構(gòu)建有關(guān)自愿性披露行為影響因素的實(shí)證研究模型,首次證明了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)上市公司持股比例的增加,對(duì)自愿性披露水平的增加具有顯著的正向影響。 本文的不足之處： 由于作者水平有限,論文中也存在著諸多不足。如對(duì)一些問題的理論的整體性把握不夠,雖然對(duì)自愿性披露與外部投資者的利益保護(hù)關(guān)系問題進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)闡述,也提出了相應(yīng)的解決方案,但是這些方案可能是一種理論的推演,是否實(shí)際可行,可能存在些許問題。這也促使我在以后的工作和學(xué)習(xí)中不斷探索,努力進(jìn)一步提高。
[Abstract]:China's securities market has been established in the early 90s of last century and has gone through the course of nearly 20 years. Compared with developed countries in the west, China has realized the rapid development of the securities market in a very short time. By the end of 2008, the listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen two cities have exceeded more than 1600, the system construction has been perfected and the market efficiency has been continuously improved. The governance structure of the listed companies is becoming more and more reasonable. At the same time, we can not ignore the existing problems, and the low level of voluntary disclosure is an important aspect. In a sense, the securities market is essentially an information market, and the core problem is whether the certificate price can be timely and accurately reflect the company's operation. However, the asymmetric information of the securities market is normal, and the information risk becomes an important part of the system risk, which hinders the efficiency of the allocation of economic resources. Strengthening the information disclosure system of the listed companies is one of the key means to solve this problem. It is important for a listed company to follow the laws and regulations, and the latter is a self-interest of the management. Then, what is the importance of the voluntary disclosure of the listed companies on the interests of the small shareholders, institutional investors, creditors, and the motives and influencing factors of such behavior Theoretical and practical problems. This paper is a theoretical and Empirical Study on the effect of voluntary disclosure on corporate governance. Its main contents and viewpoints are as follows:
The first chapter is introduction. This chapter mainly introduces the background and significance of the topic, the research method of the thesis, the research logic and content structure, the innovation and deficiency of the thesis, the definition of basic concepts and so on.
The second chapter: voluntary disclosure and corporate governance. This chapter first explains the connotation of voluntary disclosure, and combines related research at home and abroad to sum up its extension. That is, voluntary disclosure of information includes the background of the listed company, performance, core products and technology, internal control, human resources, unrecognized intangible assets, social responsibility performance and evolution. Secondly, the information of eight aspects of financial instruments. Secondly, the connotation of corporate governance, related problems of corporate governance, corporate governance mechanism, and corporate governance model are analyzed. The problems related to corporate governance include capital structure, investment policy, equity structure and property right structure in four aspects, and the corporate governance mechanism is internal. The corporate governance model also has the difference between the Anglo American model, the German Japanese model and the family model. Finally, it analyzes the relationship between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance, and draws on the statement that OECD is one of the important principles of information disclosure and transparency as one of the important principles to improve corporate governance. The author believes that voluntary disclosure has a company. The mechanism of information disclosure, including mandatory information and voluntary information, is an important part of the corporate governance mechanism, and its goal is to improve the transparency of the listed companies, which is one of the important principles to improve corporate governance.
The third chapter: the development and present situation analysis of voluntary disclosure theory and practice. This chapter first introduces the theoretical basis of voluntary disclosure, namely the effective market hypothesis, the nature of enterprise contract, and the theory of information economics. Secondly, it commented on the related research on voluntary disclosure at home and abroad, and the motivation, measurement standards and influence factors in the disclosure. The four aspects of economic consequences are combed, and the shortcomings are pointed out. Finally, we combine voluntary and mandatory disclosure to explain the historical evolution of the information disclosure system as a whole, compare the relevant provisions of the world and voluntary disclosure in the world, and summarize the internal logic of the development of its practice.
The fourth chapter: An Empirical Study of voluntary disclosure and the protection of the interests of external shareholders. External investors, including external shareholders and creditors, is the main demand for voluntary disclosure of information. This chapter mainly focuses on the relationship between the benefits protection of external shareholders and the level of voluntary disclosure. For the external shareholders, there are small and medium investors and institutional investors, and the two sources are different from the ownership. Therefore, voluntary disclosure includes non targeted information and pertinent information. On this basis, we put forward the relevant hypotheses of the empirical study in this chapter. In the research and design, the author listed the A shares of the stock exchange on the Shanghai Stock Exchange on 2008. As an object of study, the company takes the annual stock return of 2008 as an observation variable for the earnings of the external shareholders, taking the number of temporary announcements and the proportion of institutional shareholding as an agent variable to measure the level of untargeted voluntary disclosure and the level of targeted voluntary disclosure, which is the basis for controlling the scale, profitability and industry of the company. The regression results show that voluntary disclosure is positively correlated with external shareholders' earnings.
The fifth chapter: An Empirical Study of voluntary disclosure and the protection of the interests of the creditors. The creditor of the listed company, including the holders of the bank and the corporate bond, involves the investment risk and the return of the investment. On the basis of the theoretical analysis, the author puts forward the research hypothesis, in the research and design, the A shares listed on the Shanghai stock exchange in 2008. On the basis of the two factors that control the size of the company and the rate of assets and liabilities, the results of the regression results show that there is no significant correlation between the voluntary disclosure level and the interests of the creditors, and the relationship between the interest rate and the interest rate of the debt capital of the listed companies as the observation variables of the investment risk and the income of the creditor respectively. The actual cause of the result is analyzed.
The sixth chapter: policy and suggestion. First, on the basis of the previous analysis, this chapter sums up the corporate governance effect of voluntary disclosure. Secondly, it analyzes the influencing factors of voluntary disclosure from the theoretical and empirical level. In theory, the main factors affecting the voluntary disclosure of Listed Companies in China are: the manager level The subjective factors, the internal governance mechanism of the company and the external governance mechanism of the company are three major categories. In combination with the actual situation of our country, the subjective factors of the manager are mainly the performance of the company. The factors related to the internal governance of the company are ownership concentration, the independence of the board of directors, and the separation of the chairman and the general manager of the two office, and the company with the company. The factors related to external governance include the size of the company, the degree of participation of the creditors and institutional investors, and on this basis, the relevant research assumptions are put forward. In the empirical analysis, the author follows the previous method and takes the number of temporary announcements as a proxy for the voluntary disclosure level, and examines the operating performance, the equity concentration, and the directors. The effect of seven variables on voluntary disclosure level, namely, independence, job division of chairman and general manager, company size, financial leverage and institutional shareholding ratio. The empirical test shows that there are significant positive correlation between the other four variables except the three factors related to corporate governance. On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical test, the author puts forward some policy suggestions to standardize voluntary disclosure behavior of listed companies and achieve voluntary disclosure governance effect.
The innovation of this paper is mainly manifested in the following three aspects:
First, on the economic consequences of voluntary disclosure, a lot of research results have been achieved in the literature at home and abroad, but its foothold is basically the impact of disclosure behavior on the capital cost and stock value of listed companies, but little consideration is given to the protection of external investors. The external investors are subdivided into small and medium investors, institutional investors and creditors to verify the relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure and the protection of the three parties from an empirical point of view.
Second, on the basis of the analysis of information disclosure channels, the voluntary information is divided into two categories of non targeted information and targeted information. The former is the main source of information for small and medium investors, and the latter is monopolized by institutional investors. By choosing the appropriate proxy variables, the two types of disclosure behavior of foreign shareholders are verified. Positive impact.
Third, on the relationship between institutional investors and voluntary disclosure level (mainly non pertinence), the relevant research is in the relevant policy proposals, and it is not a proof that the institutional investors can promote the voluntary disclosure level of the listed companies by vigorously developing the institutional investors, but not the proof of the experience. The empirical research model of the influencing factors of disclosure behavior has proved the increase of institutional investors' shareholding ratio to listed companies for the first time, and has a significant positive impact on the increase of voluntary disclosure level.
The shortcomings of this article are as follows:
Because of the limited level of the author, there are also many shortcomings in the thesis. For example, the overall grasp of the theory of some problems is not enough. Although the relationship between voluntary disclosure and external investors' interests protection is systematically expounded and the corresponding solutions are put forward, this scheme may be a theoretical deduction, and it is practical. Feasible, there may be some problems. This has prompted me to continue to explore in the future work and study, and strive to further improve.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 劉莉,魏亞平;關(guān)于上市公司自愿披露的探討[J];北京工業(yè)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2003年03期

2 陸正飛,湯立斌,盧英武;我國證券市場(chǎng)信息披露存在的主要問題及原因分析[J];財(cái)經(jīng)論叢(浙江財(cái)經(jīng)學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào));2002年01期

3 喬旭東;孫美華;巫升柱;;我國上市公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)影響自愿披露水平的實(shí)證分析[J];財(cái)經(jīng)論叢;2007年01期

4 王華;徐軍輝;;自愿性信息披露監(jiān)管問題研究——基于我國上市公司自愿性披露的分析[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊(學(xué)術(shù)版);2007年05期

5 王正軍;崔雯雯;;自愿性信息披露成本效益分析[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2009年05期

6 張德容;企業(yè)自愿性信息披露芻探[J];財(cái)會(huì)月刊;2002年09期

7 李一平;自愿性會(huì)計(jì)信息披露的利弊分析[J];財(cái)會(huì)月刊;2004年02期

8 廖妍華;王進(jìn)波;;兩種會(huì)計(jì)信息披露方式的比較與啟示[J];財(cái)會(huì)月刊;2006年20期

9 李明輝;;芻議非財(cái)務(wù)信息的披露[J];財(cái)政監(jiān)察;2003年01期

10 劉媛媛;上市公司自愿性信息披露的規(guī)范性分析[J];東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2005年04期

，

本文編號(hào)：1911687