發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-09 05:45

  本文選題：商業(yè)銀行 + 公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)��； 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：商業(yè)銀行在經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)中扮演著不可或缺的角色,銀行的很多特性決定了其高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和脆弱性的特征。而在所有的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中,由信貸業(yè)務(wù)所產(chǎn)生的信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是銀行最主要的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。商業(yè)銀行信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的管理能力關(guān)系到其長遠(yuǎn)的生存和發(fā)展,具有舉足輕重的作用。自20世紀(jì)80年代末開始,各國學(xué)者都致力于信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防范的技術(shù)性探索,建立了很多度量模型。但是隨著歷次金融危機(jī)的爆發(fā),也使得人們的關(guān)注焦點(diǎn)開始從技術(shù)層面轉(zhuǎn)向商業(yè)銀行自身的體制建設(shè)方面。越來越多的學(xué)者認(rèn)為完善的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)可以從根本上加強(qiáng)銀行的信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防范能力。 而隨著我國市場(chǎng)體制和金融業(yè)的改革步伐的不斷加快,以前國有獨(dú)資的大型國有銀行都開始實(shí)行股份制改造,以2010年農(nóng)業(yè)銀行改組上市為標(biāo)志,徹底完成了股份制改造的進(jìn)程。股份制改造的進(jìn)行對(duì)我國商業(yè)銀行信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理產(chǎn)生了積極的效果,不良貸款率和不良貸款額都有大幅度的下降。但是,究其原因卻主要是政府介入的結(jié)果。實(shí)際上我國商業(yè)銀行在其公司治理方面還存在很多問題。而要想從根本上解決我國信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理中存在的問題,就必須溯本求源,先從銀行自身體制出發(fā),完善商業(yè)銀行的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)。 本文從理論和實(shí)證的角度分析了商業(yè)銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響,主要可以分為以下幾個(gè)方面的內(nèi)容： 第一部分是導(dǎo)論。主要介紹了本文的研究背景和研究目的、研究的思路和采取的研究方法,以及主要的貢獻(xiàn)和存在的不足。 第二部分是文獻(xiàn)綜述。該部分主要對(duì)國內(nèi)外有關(guān)商業(yè)銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)以及公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)影響的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行了歸納和闡述,在參考前人研究成果的同時(shí),認(rèn)為基于商業(yè)銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)研究具有十分重要的意義。 第三部分是商業(yè)銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與銀行信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的理論概述。該部分闡述了商業(yè)銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與一般企業(yè)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)相比所具有的特殊性質(zhì)：主要有委托代理關(guān)系的多重性、資本結(jié)構(gòu)的特殊性、信息的非透明性以及政府監(jiān)管的嚴(yán)厲性,并以此為基礎(chǔ)介紹了商業(yè)銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的特點(diǎn)。另外在介紹商業(yè)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)種類之后,重點(diǎn)對(duì)我國的信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)進(jìn)行了相關(guān)研究,重點(diǎn)分析了我國近年來信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的現(xiàn)狀、信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的成因以及信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)取得成效的原因。 第四部分是公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)商業(yè)銀行信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)影響的理論分析。主要從內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)和外部治理結(jié)構(gòu)兩個(gè)方面進(jìn)行闡述。其中,內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)方面主要分析了股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)、監(jiān)事會(huì)以及激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制對(duì)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響,外部治理結(jié)構(gòu)方面重點(diǎn)分析了政府監(jiān)管對(duì)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響。 第五部分是公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)銀行信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)影響的實(shí)證研究。以2007-2010年我國14家上市商業(yè)銀行的面板數(shù)據(jù)作為樣本,其中信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)用不良貸款率來衡量,作為被解釋變量；解釋變量主要有股權(quán)集中度、股權(quán)性質(zhì)、董事會(huì)規(guī)模及獨(dú)立性、監(jiān)事會(huì)規(guī)模、高管薪酬和持股比例等商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)相關(guān)指標(biāo),以及資本充足率和特許權(quán)價(jià)值等外部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的相關(guān)指標(biāo),另外,還參照前期學(xué)者的研究方法,將資產(chǎn)規(guī)模和資本杠桿作為控制變量來進(jìn)行研究。 第六部分是主要結(jié)論與政策建議。該部分主要是就第五章的實(shí)證結(jié)果進(jìn)行總結(jié),得出以下結(jié)論：在股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)方面,第一大股東持股比例越大,信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)越大；第一大股東的國有性質(zhì)對(duì)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的防范具有積極作用；董事會(huì)方面,董事會(huì)規(guī)模越大,商業(yè)銀行信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)越�。槐O(jiān)事會(huì)規(guī)模也與信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)呈負(fù)相關(guān)的關(guān)系；激勵(lì)機(jī)制方面,管理層薪酬越高、持股比例越大,商業(yè)銀行的信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也就越大。而從外部治理結(jié)構(gòu)來看,資本充足率與信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系。另外,商業(yè)銀行的資產(chǎn)規(guī)模和資本杠桿越大,商業(yè)銀行的信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也越小。最后,本文根據(jù)前文的理論分析和實(shí)證結(jié)果對(duì)完善商業(yè)銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)提出了一系列的建議。 總體來講,本文的主要貢獻(xiàn)有： 首先,研究?jī)?nèi)容較為全面。文章主要從商業(yè)銀行的特殊性出發(fā)研究了商業(yè)銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的特點(diǎn)及其對(duì)信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響,并在參照相關(guān)指引文件以及前期學(xué)者研究的基礎(chǔ)上構(gòu)建了商業(yè)銀行的公司治理框架,然后運(yùn)用實(shí)證研究的方法分析了我國商業(yè)銀行目前的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之間的關(guān)系,最后根據(jù)實(shí)證研究的結(jié)果有針對(duì)性的對(duì)我國商業(yè)銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的完善提出了建議。 其次,理論分析較為深入。第一,提出完善商業(yè)銀行公司治理具有重要意義的原因在于,商業(yè)銀行本身具有的特殊性使得商業(yè)銀行具有高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和脆弱性的特征,而商業(yè)銀行的特殊性則主要體現(xiàn)在產(chǎn)品、資產(chǎn)結(jié)構(gòu)、委托代理關(guān)系、信息透明度以及監(jiān)管嚴(yán)厲度幾個(gè)方面。第二,在構(gòu)建商業(yè)銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)時(shí),本文認(rèn)為完善的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)當(dāng)同時(shí)考慮內(nèi)部治理和外部治理兩個(gè)方面,除了加強(qiáng)銀行內(nèi)部利益相關(guān)者之間的制衡機(jī)制,還要重視外部監(jiān)管的力量。就目前我國的情況來看,外部力量主要是指政府的力量,而存款人作為與商業(yè)銀行密切相關(guān)的一方,同樣具有監(jiān)督銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的權(quán)利,所以為了實(shí)現(xiàn)外部力量的多元化,應(yīng)當(dāng)加強(qiáng)存款人和債權(quán)人對(duì)銀行監(jiān)督的力度。第三,本文詳細(xì)分析了銀行內(nèi)部公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)和外部公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)分別商業(yè)銀行信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響。第四,搜集整理了我國2007-2010年商業(yè)銀行不良貸款情況的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù),通過分析數(shù)據(jù)發(fā)現(xiàn),我國不良貸款總額中占比最大的是國有商業(yè)銀行,說明國有銀行在改革前的遺留問題還很多,股份制需要進(jìn)一步深化。 再次,實(shí)證研究較為充分。在研究數(shù)據(jù)方面,本文利用我國14家上市商業(yè)銀行作為樣本,選取了2007-2010年的面板數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行研究,盡可能彌補(bǔ)我國商業(yè)銀行相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)較少的不足。在研究方法方面,運(yùn)用了時(shí)間序列-截面數(shù)據(jù)回歸分析的方法,利用實(shí)證模型更為全面的分析了商業(yè)銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)其信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響。在變量選取方面,主要結(jié)合我國的實(shí)際情況,以不良貸款率來衡量信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn),作為被解釋變量；選取的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)方面也較為全面的包含了內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)和外部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的相關(guān)指標(biāo)。 最后,政策建議具有針對(duì)性。根據(jù)前文理論分析和實(shí)證分析的結(jié)構(gòu),本文提出了一系列完善商業(yè)銀行公司治理的建議。一是建設(shè)性的提出了債權(quán)人治理內(nèi)部化的觀點(diǎn),商業(yè)銀行信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的管理和防范與銀行存款者的利益密切相關(guān),而目前我國監(jiān)事會(huì)起到的作用有限,因此可以將二者有機(jī)結(jié)合起來,讓債權(quán)人也加入監(jiān)事會(huì),加強(qiáng)監(jiān)事會(huì)的監(jiān)管效果；二是提出將信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)作為公司管理層績(jī)效考核的指標(biāo),避免管理者由于追求短期利益而從事高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的行為；三是認(rèn)為我國商業(yè)銀行要在晚上內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)和提高信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理水平的基礎(chǔ)上適度推行資本充足監(jiān)管,不能操之過急。 但是,由于筆者水平有限,本文仍然還存在了以下不足：一是由于篇幅有限,在對(duì)商業(yè)銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行理論分析時(shí),未像后文分析信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)那樣結(jié)合我國商業(yè)銀行公司治理的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行闡述。二是由于我國上市商業(yè)銀行數(shù)量過少,上市時(shí)間較短且不一致,所以在樣本選取方面具有一定的局限性,樣本數(shù)量少、時(shí)間跨度段是最主要的問題,另外,由于我國商業(yè)銀行改革時(shí)間不長,很多數(shù)據(jù)不易獲得或者準(zhǔn)確性有待考證,所以對(duì)實(shí)證分析結(jié)果的準(zhǔn)確性也有可能會(huì)造成影響。
[Abstract]:Commercial banks play an indispensable role in economic activities. Many characteristics of the banks determine their high risk and vulnerability. In all the risks, credit risk caused by credit business is the main risk of the bank. The management ability of the credit risk of commercial banks is related to its long-term survival and development. Since the end of 1980s, scholars of all countries have devoted themselves to the technical exploration of credit risk prevention and set up a lot of measurement models. However, with the outbreak of the financial crisis, the focus of attention has begun to turn from the technical level to the system construction of commercial banks themselves. More and more scholars have been concerned. It is believed that a sound corporate governance structure can fundamentally strengthen the bank's credit risk prevention capability.
With the rapid pace of the reform of the market system and the financial industry in our country, the former state-owned large state-owned banks have begun to carry out the reform of the shareholding system. In 2010, the reform of the stock system has completed the process of the reform of the stock system completely. The reform of the stock system has produced the credit risk management of the commercial banks of our country. However, the main reason is the result of the government intervention. In fact, there are still many problems in the corporate governance of commercial banks in China. But to solve the problems in the management of credit risk in our country, we must go back to the source and start from the silver. Embarking on its own system and improving the corporate governance structure of commercial banks.
From the theoretical and empirical point of view, this paper analyzes the impact of corporate governance structure on credit risk of commercial banks, which can be divided into the following aspects:
The first part is the introduction, which mainly introduces the background and purpose of the study, the ideas and methods to be taken, and the main contributions and shortcomings of the research.
The second part is the literature review. This part mainly summarizes and expounds the related literature about the corporate governance structure and the impact of corporate governance on credit risk at home and abroad. In the reference of previous research results, it is considered that the credit risk research based on the corporate governance structure of commercial banks is very important. Significance.
The third part is the theoretical overview of the corporate governance structure and the bank credit risk of commercial banks. This part expounds the special nature of the corporate governance structure of commercial banks compared with the general corporate governance structure: the multiplicity of the principal agent relationship, the particularity of the capital structure, the non transparency of the information and the government supervision. On the basis of this, it introduces the characteristics of the corporate governance structure of commercial banks. After introducing the risk types of commercial banks, it focuses on the related research on the credit risk of our country, focusing on the status of the credit risk in recent years, the causes of the credit risk and the reasons for the success of the credit risk.
The fourth part is the theoretical analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the credit risk of commercial banks, mainly from two aspects of the internal governance structure and external governance structure. Among them, the internal governance structure mainly analyzes the ownership structure, the board of directors, the board of supervisors and the impact of incentive contract mechanism on the credit risk, and the external governance structure. In terms of structure, the impact of government regulation on credit risk is analyzed.
The fifth part is an empirical study on the impact of corporate governance on bank credit risk. In the past 2007-2010 years, the panel data of 14 listed commercial banks in China are taken as samples. The credit risk is measured by the rate of bad loans, which are interpreted as the variables. The explanatory variables are mainly ownership concentration, equity nature, board size and independence, and the supervision of the board of directors. The related indexes of the internal governance structure of commercial banks, such as the scale of the event, the executive compensation and the proportion of the shareholding, as well as the related indexes of the external governance structure, such as the capital adequacy ratio and the franchise value, are also studied with reference to the previous scholars' research methods, and the assets scale and the capital leverage as control variables.
The sixth part is the main conclusion and policy recommendations. This part is mainly a summary of the empirical results of the fifth chapter, and draws the following conclusions: in the ownership structure, the larger the proportion of the first large shareholders, the greater the credit risk; the state-owned nature of the first major shareholders has a positive effect on the prevention of credit risk; the board of directors, the board of directors. The larger the scale, the smaller the credit risk of the commercial banks and the negative correlation between the scale of the board of supervisors and the credit risk; the higher the salary of the management level, the greater the proportion of the stock, the greater the credit risk of the commercial banks, and the positive correlation between the rate of capital filling and the credit risk. The larger the asset scale and the capital leverage, the smaller the credit risk of commercial banks. Finally, a series of suggestions are put forward to improve the corporate governance structure of commercial banks based on the theoretical analysis and empirical results of the previous article.
In general, the main contributions of this article are as follows:
First, the research content is more comprehensive. The article mainly studies the characteristics of the commercial bank's corporate governance structure and its impact on the credit risk from the particularity of commercial banks, and constructs the corporate governance framework of commercial banks on the basis of relevant guidance documents and previous scholars' research, and then uses the empirical research method. This paper analyzes the relationship between the current corporate governance structure and the credit risk of the commercial banks in China, and finally puts forward some suggestions on the improvement of the corporate governance structure of China's commercial banks according to the results of the empirical study.
Secondly, the theoretical analysis is more thorough. First, the reasons for improving the corporate governance of commercial banks are that the particularity of commercial banks makes commercial banks have the characteristics of high risk and vulnerability, while the particularity of commercial banks is mainly embodied in product, asset structure, principal-agent relationship, and information transparency. Second, when constructing the corporate governance structure of commercial banks, this paper thinks that the perfect corporate governance structure should consider both internal and external governance at the same time. Besides strengthening the balance mechanism among the stakeholders in the bank, we should pay more attention to the power of external supervision. The external force mainly refers to the power of the government, and the depositor, as a party closely related to the commercial bank, also has the right to supervise the bank risk. Therefore, in order to realize the diversification of the external forces, the depositors and creditors should strengthen the supervision of the banks. Third. This paper analyzes the internal corporate governance in the bank in detail. The influence of structure and external corporate governance structure on the credit risk of commercial banks respectively. Fourth, collecting and sorting out related data of non-performing loans in China's 2007-2010 year commercial banks. Through the analysis of data, it is found that the largest proportion of the total amount of non-performing loans in China is the state-owned commercial bank, indicating the legacy problems of the state-owned banks before the reform. Many, the shareholding system needs to be further deepened.
Thirdly, the empirical research is more sufficient. In the field of research data, this paper uses 14 Chinese listed commercial banks as samples and selected 2007-2010 year panel data to make up the shortage of less related data in China's commercial banks. In the research method, the method of regression analysis of time series - section data is used, The empirical model is used to analyze the influence of the corporate governance structure on the credit risk of commercial banks more comprehensively. In the selection of variables, it mainly combines the actual situation of our country to measure the credit risk with the bad loan rate as an explanatory variable; the selected corporate governance structure also contains the internal governance structure and the internal governance structure in a more comprehensive way. The related indicators of the external governance structure.
Finally, the policy proposal is pertinent. According to the structure of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, this paper puts forward a series of suggestions to improve the corporate governance of commercial banks. First, it puts forward the viewpoint of the internalization of the creditor governance constructively. The management and anti model of the credit risk of commercial banks are closely related to the interests of the bank depositors. The former China board of supervisors plays a limited role, so we can combine the two parties together, let the creditors join the board of supervisors, strengthen the supervision effect of the board of supervisors; two, put forward the credit risk as the performance evaluation index of the company management, and avoid the high risk behavior of the managers in pursuit of short-term interests; three, I think that I China's commercial banks should appropriately implement capital adequacy supervision on the basis of internal governance structure and improve the level of credit risk management in the evening.
However, because of the limited level of the author, this paper still has the following shortcomings: first, because of the limited length of the text, the theoretical analysis of the corporate governance structure of the commercial banks is not like the analysis of the current situation of the corporate governance of the commercial banks in our country. Two is that the number of the listed commercial banks in our country is too small. The listing time is short and inconsistent, so the sample selection has some limitations, the sample size is small, the time span is the most important problem. In addition, because the time of the reform of China's commercial banks is not long, a lot of data are not easy to be obtained or the accuracy is still to be tested, and the accuracy of the results of the empirical analysis may also be caused. Influence.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.33;F224

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前4條

1 李志國;張春雨;;董事會(huì)治理能改善銀行的財(cái)務(wù)質(zhì)量嗎——依據(jù)商業(yè)銀行的實(shí)證數(shù)據(jù)[J];審計(jì)與經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2009年06期

2 熊衛(wèi);周小全;;論我國國有商業(yè)銀行上市后公司治理的完善[J];投資研究;2007年05期

3 張宗益;吳俊;劉瓊芳;;資本充足率監(jiān)管對(duì)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的影響[J];系統(tǒng)工程理論與實(shí)踐;2008年08期

4 夏冠軍;商業(yè)銀行的特殊性對(duì)其公司治理的影響[J];浙江金融;2005年02期

，

本文編號(hào)：1864830