本文選題：宏觀審慎監(jiān)管 + 微觀審慎監(jiān)管��； 參考：《武漢大學(xué)》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：美國(guó)金融危機(jī)之后，主要經(jīng)濟(jì)體和國(guó)際組織都認(rèn)識(shí)到微觀審慎監(jiān)管對(duì)抗系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的無(wú)能為力，以防范系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)為主要目標(biāo)的宏觀審慎監(jiān)管遂成為各經(jīng)濟(jì)體金融監(jiān)管改革的重要內(nèi)容。 20國(guó)集團(tuán)將宏觀審慎監(jiān)管納入全球金融監(jiān)管模式；FSB成為以維護(hù)全球金融穩(wěn)定為目標(biāo)的宏觀審慎監(jiān)管?chē)?guó)際組織；美國(guó)簽署了《多德-弗蘭克華爾街改革及消費(fèi)者保護(hù)法案》；歐盟委員會(huì)組建了負(fù)責(zé)宏觀審慎監(jiān)管的歐洲銀行系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理委員會(huì)（ESRB）；《巴塞爾協(xié)議Ⅲ》最終問(wèn)世，標(biāo)志著對(duì)銀行業(yè)的監(jiān)管從單純微觀審慎監(jiān)管過(guò)渡到“宏微觀審慎并重”的監(jiān)管模式。加強(qiáng)宏觀審慎監(jiān)管也引起了我國(guó)金融管理部門(mén)的高度重視。中國(guó)人民銀行2009年第二季度以來(lái)發(fā)布的歷次《中國(guó)貨幣政策執(zhí)行報(bào)告》，2011年3月通過(guò)的《國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)發(fā)展第十二個(gè)五年規(guī)劃綱要》等，都多次提到加強(qiáng)宏觀審慎監(jiān)管，維護(hù)金融體系穩(wěn)定，防范系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的重要性。 本文正是基于這樣的國(guó)際國(guó)內(nèi)背景，通過(guò)對(duì)比分析微觀審慎監(jiān)管未能抵御系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的原因與宏觀審慎監(jiān)管防范系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的有效性，來(lái)探索適于我國(guó)的宏觀審慎監(jiān)管框架的構(gòu)建。 首先，本文分別對(duì)銀行監(jiān)管的理論與實(shí)踐變遷和系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的理論框架進(jìn)行了文獻(xiàn)梳理，在此基礎(chǔ)上探討了微觀審慎監(jiān)管對(duì)系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)監(jiān)管缺失的原因。微觀審慎監(jiān)管理念認(rèn)為，每個(gè)銀行監(jiān)管好了，每家銀行的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制住了，整個(gè)銀行系統(tǒng)就不會(huì)有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)了。但是它忽視了銀行業(yè)相互間的傳染性與相互依存關(guān)系。即使在嚴(yán)格的微觀審慎監(jiān)管下，，銀行間的相互依存關(guān)系與相互感染性導(dǎo)致銀行的監(jiān)管資本套利行為，同時(shí)，銀行經(jīng)營(yíng)行為對(duì)貨幣政策的正向反饋機(jī)制帶來(lái)了順周期性。美國(guó)次貸危機(jī)的爆發(fā)，充分顯現(xiàn)了這一特點(diǎn)。 然后，文章對(duì)宏觀審慎監(jiān)管抵御系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的有效性進(jìn)行探討。宏觀審慎監(jiān)管的提出基于微觀審慎監(jiān)管抵御系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的不足，以維護(hù)金融穩(wěn)定為目標(biāo)。本文通過(guò)對(duì)宏觀審慎監(jiān)管與微觀審慎監(jiān)管進(jìn)行深入比較與分析，在此基礎(chǔ)上，探討了以宏觀審慎監(jiān)管防范系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的合理性與必要性，并提出了宏觀審慎監(jiān)管的一般性框架。 最后，本文為我國(guó)實(shí)施巴塞爾協(xié)議Ⅲ提出了政策建議。中國(guó)原計(jì)劃于2011年全面實(shí)施巴塞爾協(xié)議Ⅱ之際，正值巴塞爾銀行監(jiān)管委員會(huì)頒布巴塞爾協(xié)議Ⅲ，我國(guó)也在此基礎(chǔ)上于2011年8月頒布了《商業(yè)銀行資本管理辦法（征求意見(jiàn)稿）》。文章通過(guò)對(duì)巴塞爾協(xié)議Ⅲ內(nèi)容的分析，尤其是宏觀審慎監(jiān)管原則的體現(xiàn)，探討中國(guó)如何汲取巴塞爾協(xié)議Ⅲ精神，構(gòu)建適合我國(guó)的宏觀審慎監(jiān)管框架。
[Abstract]:In the wake of the financial crisis in the United States, major economies and international organizations have come to realize that microprudential regulation is powerless to counter systemic risks.Macroprudential supervision, which aims at preventing systemic risk, has become an important part of financial supervision reform in various economies.The G20 brings macro-prudential supervision into the global financial regulatory model and FSB becomes an international organization of macro-prudential supervision aiming at maintaining global financial stability.The United States signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; the European Commission set up the European Banking systemic risk Management Committee, which is responsible for macroprudential regulation; and the Basel III Agreement finally came into being.It marks the transition of banking supervision from microprudential supervision to macro-microprudential supervision.Strengthening macro-prudential supervision has also aroused the great attention of our financial management department.Since the second quarter of 2009, the people's Bank of China has issued successive "report on the implementation of China's Monetary Policy" and the "outline of the Twelfth Five-year Plan for National Economic and Social Development", adopted in March 2011, all of which have repeatedly mentioned strengthening macro-prudential supervision.The importance of maintaining the stability of the financial system and guarding against systemic risks.This paper is based on this international and domestic background, through comparative analysis of the reasons why microprudential supervision failed to resist systemic risk and the effectiveness of macro-prudential supervision to prevent systemic risk.To explore the establishment of a macro-prudential regulatory framework suitable for our country.First of all, this paper reviews the theoretical and practical changes of banking supervision and the theoretical framework of systemic risk, and then discusses the reasons for the lack of supervision of systemic risk by micro-prudential supervision.The idea of microprudential regulation is that once every bank is regulated and each bank's risk is under control, the entire banking system will not be at risk.But it ignores the contagion and interdependence of banking.Even under strict microprudential supervision, the interdependence and mutual infection between banks lead to the arbitrage of bank's regulatory capital. At the same time, the positive feedback mechanism of the bank's operation brings a pro-cyclical effect on monetary policy.The outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States has fully demonstrated this characteristic.Then, the article discusses the effectiveness of macro-prudential supervision against systemic risks.Macro prudential supervision is based on the deficiency of micro-prudential supervision to resist systemic risk, aiming at maintaining financial stability.Based on the comparison and analysis of macro-prudential supervision and micro-prudential supervision, this paper discusses the rationality and necessity of macroprudential supervision to prevent systemic risks, and puts forward the general framework of macro-prudential supervision.Finally, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions for the implementation of Basel Accord 鈪

本文編號(hào)：1750957