發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-11 05:16

  本文選題：信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè) + 官方監(jiān)管　； 參考：《湖南大學(xué)》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：一直以來(lái)被冠以投資者利益守護(hù)者和金融市場(chǎng)看門人稱號(hào)的信用評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)，在解決市場(chǎng)信息不對(duì)稱方面的作用得到了市場(chǎng)和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的普遍認(rèn)可。但信用評(píng)級(jí)質(zhì)量卻在顯著下降，無(wú)論是1997年的東南亞金融危機(jī)，還是2001年的安然丑聞都引發(fā)了公眾對(duì)信用評(píng)級(jí)信息價(jià)值的擔(dān)憂。2007年美國(guó)爆發(fā)的次貸危機(jī)又一次把信用評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)推到了批判的風(fēng)口浪尖。鑒于信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)的重要地位和其不斷遭人詬病的負(fù)面表現(xiàn)，加強(qiáng)對(duì)信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)的監(jiān)管就顯得尤為重要。 本文把信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)的監(jiān)管界定為官方監(jiān)管和聲譽(yù)約束兩部分，按照官方監(jiān)管和聲譽(yù)約束兩條主線，對(duì)我國(guó)信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)監(jiān)管展開(kāi)研究。官方監(jiān)管能夠糾正市場(chǎng)失靈，克服其自身不能解決的缺陷。聲譽(yù)約束是市場(chǎng)內(nèi)生的機(jī)制，是信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)有效運(yùn)行的重要保障。兩者各有其不可替代的功能優(yōu)勢(shì)，因此需要“看得見(jiàn)的手”和“看不見(jiàn)的手”有機(jī)結(jié)合，共同推動(dòng)信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)健康有序的發(fā)展。 信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)存在的負(fù)外部性、自然壟斷、信息不對(duì)稱和利益沖突造成了市場(chǎng)失靈，因此需要官方監(jiān)管來(lái)矯正。信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)健康有序的運(yùn)行還需要聲譽(yù)約束的有效發(fā)揮。信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)聲譽(yù)約束的重要性不僅源于信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)自身的特性，還源于聲譽(yù)約束是官方監(jiān)管的重要補(bǔ)充。通過(guò)構(gòu)建聲譽(yù)約束模型，分析了信用評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)在追逐聲譽(yù)租金過(guò)程中的行為以及投資者和發(fā)行方的反應(yīng)。此外聲譽(yù)約束作用的發(fā)揮需要一定的外部條件和環(huán)境，主要包括交易必須反復(fù)進(jìn)行、適度的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)機(jī)制、失信行為的懲罰機(jī)制和對(duì)聲譽(yù)形成長(zhǎng)期的預(yù)期。 美國(guó)信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)監(jiān)管最初完全是靠聲譽(yù)約束，后來(lái)逐漸過(guò)渡到聲譽(yù)約束為主，官方監(jiān)管為輔的模式。2006年《美國(guó)信用評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)改革法案》明確了美國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)對(duì)NRSROs的直接監(jiān)管，，次貸危機(jī)的爆發(fā)和演變促成了“多德法案”的出臺(tái)，進(jìn)一步完善了對(duì)信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)的監(jiān)管。因此有必要對(duì)美國(guó)信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)及其監(jiān)管的歷史和現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行梳理、分析和反思，從而為我國(guó)信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)監(jiān)管提供借鑒和啟示。 不同于美國(guó)，我國(guó)信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)監(jiān)管一直以官方監(jiān)管為主導(dǎo)，忽略聲譽(yù)約束。從單一主體監(jiān)管階段轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槟壳岸嘀黧w多層次監(jiān)管階段。通過(guò)深入考察我國(guó)評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)官方監(jiān)管的實(shí)施現(xiàn)狀，發(fā)現(xiàn)主要存在著資質(zhì)認(rèn)證不合理、利益沖突監(jiān)管不完善和信息披露監(jiān)管不健全三個(gè)方面的問(wèn)題。對(duì)我國(guó)信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)聲譽(yù)約束運(yùn)行的客觀條件進(jìn)行分析，發(fā)現(xiàn)存在四個(gè)方面的障礙，包括甄別機(jī)制不通暢、控制機(jī)制不健全、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)格局不合理和利益導(dǎo)向不正確。 基于我國(guó)信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)官方監(jiān)管的分析，以問(wèn)題為導(dǎo)向，采用博弈分析方法，對(duì)官方監(jiān)管機(jī)制的構(gòu)架進(jìn)行了研究。以信用評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)、官方監(jiān)管當(dāng)局為參與人，按照靜態(tài)博弈、有限理性演化博弈和完全理性動(dòng)態(tài)博弈的邏輯順序展開(kāi)。并針對(duì)我國(guó)信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)多頭監(jiān)管的現(xiàn)實(shí)情況，對(duì)我國(guó)信用評(píng)級(jí)官方監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的最優(yōu)監(jiān)管水平以及高效率監(jiān)管納什均衡的條件進(jìn)行了分析。 鑒于聲譽(yù)約束在信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)監(jiān)管中的重要地位，本文從理論和實(shí)證兩個(gè)方面對(duì)我國(guó)信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)的聲譽(yù)約束進(jìn)行了分析。由于我國(guó)信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)的產(chǎn)生與發(fā)展屬于政府驅(qū)動(dòng)型，有別于西方的市場(chǎng)驅(qū)動(dòng)型，因此考察我國(guó)信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)的聲譽(yù)約束時(shí)，需要確定聲譽(yù)約束的可行性，即聲譽(yù)約束實(shí)施基礎(chǔ)是否存在，并以此為基礎(chǔ)通過(guò)模型分析對(duì)聲譽(yù)約束的機(jī)理進(jìn)行了闡述。實(shí)證研究方面，則以2008-2011年發(fā)行的中期票據(jù)為研究樣本，對(duì)我國(guó)信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)的聲譽(yù)約束進(jìn)行了實(shí)證分析。結(jié)果顯示出我國(guó)信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)盡管存在著聲譽(yù)約束，但力度不強(qiáng)。 在以上分析的基礎(chǔ)上，從加強(qiáng)官方監(jiān)管和聲譽(yù)約束兩個(gè)方面提出了對(duì)策建議。加強(qiáng)官方監(jiān)管的具體措施包括建立統(tǒng)一協(xié)調(diào)的監(jiān)管主體、優(yōu)化行業(yè)資格認(rèn)證制度、強(qiáng)化利益沖突管理以及引入非請(qǐng)求評(píng)級(jí)制度。加強(qiáng)聲譽(yù)約束作用的具體措施包括促進(jìn)信息披露的有效性、充分發(fā)揮信用評(píng)級(jí)行業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)的作用、弱化監(jiān)管對(duì)信用評(píng)級(jí)結(jié)果的依賴以及建立和完善市場(chǎng)退出機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:Has been dubbed the interests of investors and credit rating agencies to protect the financial market the title, in solving the problem of market information asymmetry effect has been widely recognized by the market and regulatory agencies. But credit rating quality is significantly decreased, both the South East Asian financial crisis in 1997 or 2001, the Enron scandal sparked public concern.2007 years of credit rating information value of the United States subprime crisis once again to the credit rating agencies to criticism. In the teeth of the storm because of the importance of the credit rating industry and constantly criticized the negative performance, it is important to strengthen the supervision of credit rating industry.
The credit rating industry regulation is defined as the two part of the official supervision and restraint, according to official supervision and restraint of the two main line, research on the regulation of credit rating industry in China. The official regulation can correct the market failure, to overcome the defect of its own can not solve the reputation mechanism of the market. The constraint is endogenous, is an important guarantee the effective operation of the credit rating industry. Each one has its irreplaceable function advantage, so we need the "visible hand" and "invisible hand" of the organic combination of the credit rating industry to jointly promote the healthy and orderly development.
The negative externality exists, the credit rating industry of natural monopoly, asymmetric information and conflict of interest caused by market failure, so the official regulation is needed to correct. The healthy and orderly operation of credit rating industry also need to effectively play the reputation constraints. The characteristics and importance of credit rating industry reputation restriction not only from the credit rating industry itself, but also from the reputation mechanism is an important supplement to official regulation. Through building a reputation model, analyzes the behavior of credit rating agencies in the pursuit of reputation rents process as well as the investor and issuer's response. In addition to play the role of reputation constraint requires a certain external conditions and environment, including transaction must be repeated, appropriate competition, punishment the mechanism of dishonest behavior and the formation of long-term expectations for reputation.
Regulation of the credit rating industry initially depends entirely on the reputation constraints, then gradually transition to the reputation constraint based, supplemented by the official supervision mode of.2006 years. American credit rating agency reform act > defines the Commission under the direct supervision of the NRSROs, and the outbreak of the subprime crisis led to the evolution of "Dodd act" introduced to further improve the the credit rating industry regulation. It is necessary to sort out the history and current situation of the credit rating industry and its supervision, analysis and reflection, so as to provide reference and inspiration for China's credit rating industry regulation.
Unlike the United States, China's credit rating industry regulation has been to official regulation as the leading factor, ignore the reputation constraints. The transition from single phase current multi subject supervision subject multi-level regulatory phase. Through in-depth investigation of the status of implementation of official supervision of our rating industry, found mainly in the qualification certification is not reasonable, the conflict of interests regulation is not perfect and the information disclosure regulation is not perfect three aspects. The objective conditions of China's credit rating industry reputation constrained operation is analyzed, it is found that there are four obstacles, including the screening mechanism is not smooth, the control mechanism is not perfect, the competition pattern is not reasonable and interest orientation is not correct.
The analysis of credit rating industry in China based on the official supervision, problem oriented, by using the method of game analysis, framework of official supervision mechanism is studied. By credit rating agencies, the official regulatory authorities for participants, according to the logical order of the static game, evolutionary game and dynamic game. And the reason for the reality the situation of credit rating industry in China long supervision, the optimal level of supervision for China's credit rating regulatory conditions and high efficiency supervision of Nash equilibrium is analyzed.
Because of the importance of reputation constraints in the regulation of credit ratings in the industry, this paper analyzes the reputation constraints on the credit rating industry in China from two aspects of theory and empirical. The emergence and development of credit rating industry in China is government driven, market driven type different from the west, so the study of credit reputation constraint the rating industry in China, the need to determine the feasibility of reputation restriction, namely the implementation of basic reputation constraint exists, then through the model analysis of the mechanism of reputation restriction are discussed. The empirical research, is issued to the 2008-2011 years of the medium-term notes for the study sample, the reputation constraints of the credit rating industry in China an empirical analysis. The results show that China's credit rating industry despite the reputation constraints, but the intensity is not strong.
On the basis of the above analysis, put forward countermeasures and suggestions from two aspects to strengthen the official regulation and reputation constraint. Specific measures to strengthen the coordination of official supervision including the establishment of a unified regulatory body, to optimize the industry certification system, strengthen the management of conflict of interest and introduce unsolicited rating system. Specific measures to strengthen the effectiveness of reputation constraints including promotion information disclosure, credit rating and give full play to the role of industry associations, weakening the regulatory reliance on credit rating results and establish and improve the market exit mechanism.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F203;F832

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