本文選題：大股東　切入點：支持行為　出處：《揚州大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,大股東行為已成為公司治理領(lǐng)域研究的熱門問題,“掏空”和“支持”概念則是對公司治理問題的經(jīng)典描述。針對大股東掏空行為,國內(nèi)外學(xué)者利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易進行了大量的理論和實證研究,為理解公司治理和投資者保護提供了豐富的視角和證據(jù)；而已有文獻對大股東支持行為的研究卻較少。已有國內(nèi)學(xué)者研究證明：關(guān)聯(lián)交易也是大股東支持上市公司的重要方式。由于我國資本市場和上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特殊的制度背景,國外的研究文獻有一定的參考價值,但不能揭示我國大股東行為的內(nèi)在動因和行為模式產(chǎn)生的機理。隨著股權(quán)分置改革的完成,率先股改的公司股票限售期開始陸續(xù)解禁,我國深滬A股市場加速進入全流通狀態(tài)。全流通進程下的大小股東有著一致的利益基礎(chǔ)和共同的價值判斷標準,基于市值最大化考慮的大股東會顯著減少對上市公司的“掏空”行為,增加對上市公司的利益支持。 本文在我國證券市場逐步實現(xiàn)全流通這一大背景下,從公司治理角度回顧大股東控制理論、利益趨同效應(yīng)與壕溝防守效應(yīng)等相關(guān)公司治理理論,在此基礎(chǔ)上對上市公司大股東“支持行為”進行研究。理論分析上市公司大股東采取支持行為的方式、動機、影響因素和經(jīng)濟后果等,實證考察關(guān)聯(lián)交易下大股東支持行為的影響因素以及大股東支持行為對公司業(yè)績的影響。本文以全流通進程中的深滬制造業(yè)上市公司2008——2010年的數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,從關(guān)聯(lián)方往來賬戶中的資金支持角度進行多元回歸分析,并得出結(jié)論：關(guān)聯(lián)交易下大股東支持行為與第一大股東持股比例、股權(quán)集中度、股權(quán)制衡度、獨立董事比例等公司治理因素顯著正相關(guān),與全流通進程中引起的當(dāng)年解禁股比例等因素正相關(guān),并驗證了關(guān)聯(lián)交易可以用來支持上市公司,提高上市公司的經(jīng)營業(yè)績。在實證研究的基礎(chǔ)上,本文對制造業(yè)上市公司的大股東支持行為和經(jīng)營業(yè)績情況進行統(tǒng)計分析,進一步驗證前文的結(jié)論。 最后,筆者對本文的研究結(jié)論進行概括并針對性地提出了相關(guān)建議,希望為上市公司的管理者、中小投資者和監(jiān)管部門等提供有益的借鑒。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the behavior of large shareholders has become a hot issue in the field of corporate governance, and the concepts of "tunneling" and "support" are classic descriptions of corporate governance.Aiming at the tunneling behavior of large shareholders, scholars at home and abroad have carried out a large number of theoretical and empirical studies using related party transactions, which provide a rich perspective and evidence for understanding corporate governance and investor protection.However, there is little research on the supporting behavior of large shareholders in the literature.Domestic scholars have proved that affiliated transactions are also an important way for large shareholders to support listed companies.Because of the special institutional background of Chinese capital market and listed company's equity structure, the foreign research literature has some reference value, but it can not reveal the internal motivation and the mechanism of the behavior pattern of the large shareholders in our country.With the completion of the reform of the split share structure, the restricted selling period of the first share reform companies began to be lifted one after another, and the Shenzhen-Shanghai A-share market accelerated into the full circulation state.Large and small shareholders in the process of full circulation have a consistent interest basis and common value judgment standard. The large shareholders based on market value's maximization will significantly reduce the "tunneling" behavior to the listed companies and increase the interest support to the listed companies.Under the background of the gradual realization of full circulation in China's securities market, this paper reviews the theory of corporate governance from the perspective of corporate governance, including the theory of controlling large shareholders, the effect of convergence of interests and the effect of trench defense, and so on.On this basis, the major shareholders of listed companies "support behavior" is studied.This paper theoretically analyzes the ways, motives, influencing factors and economic consequences of large shareholders' supporting behavior in listed companies, and empirically investigates the influencing factors of large shareholders' supporting behavior and the influence of large shareholders' supporting behavior on the company's performance under the related party transactions.Based on the data of Shenzhen-Shanghai manufacturing listed companies in the process of full circulation from 2008 to 2010, this paper carries out multivariate regression analysis from the angle of capital support in the current accounts of related parties.It is concluded that the supporting behavior of large shareholders is significantly positively related to the proportion of the largest shareholders, the degree of equity concentration, the degree of equity checks and balances, the proportion of independent directors, and so on.It is positively related to the proportion of stocks released during the whole circulation process, and proves that related party transactions can be used to support listed companies and improve the operating performance of listed companies.On the basis of empirical research, this paper makes a statistical analysis of the large shareholder support behavior and operating performance of listed manufacturing companies, and further verifies the previous conclusions.Finally, the author summarizes the conclusions of this paper and puts forward relevant suggestions, hoping to provide useful reference for the managers of listed companies, small and medium-sized investors and regulatory authorities.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：揚州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;F276.6

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