發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-23 14:42

  本文選題：中央銀行獨(dú)立性　切入點(diǎn)：金融監(jiān)管　出處：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文選取中央銀行的獨(dú)立性和金融監(jiān)管這兩個(gè)方面,對中國中央銀行即中國人民銀行的情況進(jìn)行考察。本文希望在考察當(dāng)中,不僅能夠厘清中國人民銀行在獨(dú)立性和金融監(jiān)管兩個(gè)方面的情況,同時(shí)還能夠發(fā)現(xiàn)中國人民銀行存在的更深層次的結(jié)構(gòu)性問題,并提供一些相應(yīng)的改進(jìn)意見以供參考。這些是本文進(jìn)行此次研究的基本目的和對成果的設(shè)想。 本文在對現(xiàn)有理論,特別是對中央銀行獨(dú)立性和中央銀行金融監(jiān)管職能的最新研究進(jìn)行梳理的過程中發(fā)現(xiàn),中央銀行的獨(dú)立性和金融監(jiān)管兩項(xiàng)職能看似沒有太多的聯(lián)系,實(shí)際上卻存在著隱含的邏輯關(guān)系。各國的中央銀行在最初建立的時(shí)刻可能更多地承擔(dān)了“政府的銀行”的職能。然而隨著時(shí)代的發(fā)展,中央銀行逐漸成為“政府的銀行”、“發(fā)行的銀行”和“銀行的銀行”的結(jié)合,分別對應(yīng)著具體的政策職能和相應(yīng)的政策工具。其中,中央銀行作為金融市場的“最后貸款人”的職能逐漸成為其核心職能,貨幣政策、獨(dú)立性和金融監(jiān)管職能實(shí)質(zhì)上成為“最后貸款人”的延伸。而獨(dú)立性和金融監(jiān)管的本質(zhì)是分別防范政府和商業(yè)銀行由于中央銀行作為“最后貸款人”的存在而存在道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn),致使金融市場的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)上升。因此,這兩種職能是出于保護(hù)“最后貸款人”職能合理有效地履行而出現(xiàn)的,在邏輯上應(yīng)該同時(shí)存在。這是本文在研究中采用的基本分析框架。本文通過對中國人民銀行在中央銀行獨(dú)立性和金融監(jiān)管兩方面的考察,認(rèn)為中國人民銀行在這兩個(gè)職能上都處于比較低的水平。由此導(dǎo)致政府和商業(yè)銀行有更大的可能采取風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較高的行為,使得金融市場的穩(wěn)定性難以保障。 本文的結(jié)論是中國人民銀行的中央銀行獨(dú)立性與金融監(jiān)管職能都處于比較低的水平,與其“最后貸款人”職能并不匹配。這個(gè)問題可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致中國人民銀行的“最后貸款人”職能被濫用,同時(shí)也提高了金融市場的系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn),造成更多的問題。本文建議提高中國人民銀行的獨(dú)立性,同時(shí)恢復(fù)其金融監(jiān)管職能,使其能夠更好地運(yùn)用貨幣政策,履行金融市場“最后貸款人”的核心職能。
[Abstract]:This paper selects the independence of the central bank and financial supervision to investigate the situation of the central bank of China, the people's Bank of China. It can not only clarify the two aspects of the people's Bank of China in terms of independence and financial supervision, but also discover the deeper structural problems of the people's Bank of China. It also provides some suggestions for reference. These are the basic purpose of this study and the assumption of the results. In the course of combing the existing theories, especially the latest research on the independence of the central bank and the function of the financial supervision of the central bank, this paper finds that the independence of the central bank and the financial supervision function do not seem to be closely related. In fact, there is an implicit logical relationship. The central banks of various countries may have assumed more of the functions of "government banks" at the time of their initial establishment. However, with the development of the times, The central bank has gradually become a combination of "government banks", "issuing banks" and "banks of banks", corresponding to specific policy functions and corresponding policy instruments, respectively. The central bank's function as the "lender of last resort" of the financial market has gradually become its core function, monetary policy, Independence and financial supervision function actually become the extension of "lender of last resort". The essence of independence and financial supervision is to prevent moral hazard of government and commercial bank because of the existence of central bank as "lender of last resort". Thus, these two functions arise out of the reasonable and effective performance of the "lender of last resort" function. Logically, it should exist simultaneously. This is the basic analytical framework used in this study. This paper examines the independence of the central bank and financial supervision of the people's Bank of China. It is believed that the people's Bank of China is at a relatively low level in these two functions. As a result, the government and commercial banks are more likely to take risky actions, which makes the stability of the financial market difficult to guarantee. The conclusion of this paper is that the independence of the central bank and the function of financial supervision of the people's Bank of China are at a relatively low level. It does not match its "lender of last resort" function. The problem could lead to abuse of the people's Bank of China's "lender of last resort" function and raise systemic risk in financial markets. This paper proposes to improve the independence of the people's Bank of China and to restore its function of financial supervision so that it can better use monetary policy and fulfill the core function of "lender of last resort" in the financial market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.31;F832.1

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