本文選題：網(wǎng)絡(luò)聯(lián)保貸款　切入點(diǎn)：道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在資本市場上，由于信息不對稱，銀行放貸時(shí)面臨著逆向選擇、道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、審計(jì)成本和合約執(zhí)行四大難題。這些難題使得銀行選擇不向那些難以提供擔(dān)保和抵押的中小企業(yè)提供貸款，從而導(dǎo)致信貸市場失靈。而以往的研究已經(jīng)證明，聯(lián)保貸款對于信貸市場失靈發(fā)揮了重要作用。 聯(lián)保貸款從誕生至今的短短幾十年中，便因其驚人的高還款率對緩解貧困的卓越表現(xiàn)吸引了各界人士的廣泛關(guān)注。其中孟加拉鄉(xiāng)村銀行的成功受到各國政府的重視，，包括美國在內(nèi)的50多個(gè)發(fā)展中國家和發(fā)達(dá)國家紛紛效仿，試圖將這一新型的信貸模式移植本國。 正是受到Y(jié)unus教授聯(lián)保貸款模式的啟發(fā)，同時(shí)，結(jié)合我國實(shí)際國情，中國建設(shè)銀行與阿里巴巴于2007年合作推出了一項(xiàng)無抵押無實(shí)物擔(dān)保的中小企業(yè)貸款模式——網(wǎng)絡(luò)聯(lián)保貸款。這一我國自主創(chuàng)新的新型貸款模式能否像聯(lián)保貸款一樣獲得成功，如果能成功，又是如何有效提高資本市場的資源配置效率就構(gòu)成了本文的主要研究目的。 本文旨在就網(wǎng)絡(luò)聯(lián)保貸款能否得到廣泛開展和影響資本配置原因的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)方面，從長期一般均衡角度，對網(wǎng)絡(luò)聯(lián)保貸款能否有效規(guī)避道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題，從而緩解信貸市場的失靈，以及它是如何發(fā)揮作用的進(jìn)行了探討。 為此，從長期演化角度，就聯(lián)保體內(nèi)企業(yè)間建立了兩個(gè)道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)模型，對企業(yè)獲得貸款后的投資生產(chǎn)活動以及橫向監(jiān)督行為進(jìn)行了分析，結(jié)果模型證明在長期一般均衡中，投資生產(chǎn)活動與短期聯(lián)保貸款的結(jié)論一致，能夠有效避免企業(yè)的“搭便車”行為，現(xiàn)有理論中的宣稱聯(lián)保貸款“搭便車”行為普遍盛行的說法是錯(cuò)誤的。但在對橫向監(jiān)督行為的研究中發(fā)現(xiàn)，其結(jié)論與聯(lián)保貸款不一致，在長期一般均衡中，網(wǎng)絡(luò)聯(lián)保貸款的橫向監(jiān)督行為存在嚴(yán)重的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題，“搭便車”行為普遍盛行。并且，就各因素變化從長期角度對博弈結(jié)果的影響進(jìn)行了分析。 緊接著，從長期演化角度，就聯(lián)保體與銀行間是否愿意采取網(wǎng)絡(luò)聯(lián)保模式進(jìn)行貸款建立了一個(gè)博弈模型，分析得出網(wǎng)絡(luò)聯(lián)保貸款中的網(wǎng)絡(luò)信息披露機(jī)制使得聯(lián)保體傾向于不與銀行合作，即在長期角度，不愿意采取網(wǎng)絡(luò)聯(lián)保進(jìn)行貸款，這一結(jié)論為現(xiàn)實(shí)中網(wǎng)絡(luò)聯(lián)保貸款出現(xiàn)的叫座不叫好的情況提供了理論依據(jù)。 由于國內(nèi)相關(guān)研究的貧乏，本文研究結(jié)果將會對網(wǎng)絡(luò)聯(lián)保貸款今后的實(shí)踐發(fā)展及后續(xù)研究起到一定的借鑒作用。
[Abstract]:In the capital market, because of information asymmetry, banks are faced with adverse selection and moral hazard in lending. Audit costs and contract enforcement are four major challenges that have led banks to opt out of lending to small and medium-sized enterprises that find it difficult to provide guarantees and mortgages, leading to a failure in the credit market. UNPROFOR loans played an important role in the failure of the credit market. In the short decades since its inception, UNPROFOR loans have attracted wide attention from all walks of life because of their remarkable performance in alleviating poverty, and the success of Grameen Bank of Bangladesh has attracted the attention of governments. More than 50 developing and developed countries, including the United States, are trying to transplant the new credit model to their own countries. It was inspired by Professor Yunus's UNPROFOR loan model, and at the same time, combined with the actual situation of our country, In 2007, China Construction Bank and Alibaba jointly launched an unsecured, unsecured loan model for small and medium-sized enterprises, the network UNPROFOR loan. Can this new type of loan model, which is independent and innovative, be as successful as the UNPROFOR loan? If successful, how to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in capital market is the main purpose of this paper. The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether the network UNPROFOR loan can be widely carried out and the moral hazard which affects the reason of capital allocation, and whether the network UNPROFOR loan can effectively avoid the moral hazard from the point of view of long-term general equilibrium. In order to alleviate the failure of the credit market, and how it is to play a role is discussed. Therefore, from the perspective of long-term evolution, two moral hazard models are established for the enterprises in UNPROFOR, and the investment and production activities and horizontal supervision behavior of enterprises after obtaining loans are analyzed. The results show that the models are in the long-term general equilibrium. Investment in production activities is consistent with the conclusion of short-term UNPROFOR loans, which can effectively avoid the "hitchhiking" behavior of enterprises. It is wrong to claim in the existing theories that the "hitchhiking" behavior of UNPROFOR loans is prevalent. However, in the study of horizontal supervision, it is found that the conclusions are inconsistent with UNPROFOR loans and are in general equilibrium in the long run. There are serious moral hazard problems in the horizontal supervision of network UNPROFOR loan, and the "hitchhiking" behavior is prevalent. Furthermore, the influence of various factors on the game result is analyzed from a long-term perspective. Then, from the perspective of long-term evolution, a game model is established on whether or not the UNPROFOR and the banks are willing to take the network model to make loans. The analysis shows that the network information disclosure mechanism in the network protection loan makes UNPROFOR tend not to cooperate with the bank, that is, in the long run, it is unwilling to take the network protection to make the loan. This conclusion provides a theoretical basis for the situation that network UNPROFOR loan does not win popularity in reality. Due to the paucity of relevant research in China, the results of this paper will be useful for the future development of network UNPROFOR loan and its follow-up research.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F830.5;F224.32

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