本文選題：資產(chǎn)注入　切入點(diǎn)：非公開(kāi)發(fā)行　出處：《管理評(píng)論》2010年07期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：本文首先對(duì)上市公司非公開(kāi)發(fā)行資產(chǎn)注入行為的股東利益均衡問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了數(shù)理分析,數(shù)學(xué)推導(dǎo)得出,上市公司股東利益均衡的條件是非公開(kāi)發(fā)行的增發(fā)價(jià)等于上市公司每股內(nèi)在價(jià)值。本文繼而選取中國(guó)股市49家通過(guò)非公開(kāi)發(fā)行完成資產(chǎn)注入的上市公司作為樣本進(jìn)行實(shí)證考察。實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)發(fā)現(xiàn),中國(guó)上市公司通過(guò)非公開(kāi)發(fā)行進(jìn)行資產(chǎn)注入的新股定價(jià)普遍偏低,顯著低于股票內(nèi)在價(jià)值;同時(shí),注入的資產(chǎn)大多為非優(yōu)質(zhì)資產(chǎn)。進(jìn)一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn),新股定價(jià)和注入資產(chǎn)的質(zhì)量均與上市公司資產(chǎn)規(guī)模有一定聯(lián)系:定價(jià)偏高的公司普遍資產(chǎn)規(guī)模較小,定價(jià)偏低的公司則資產(chǎn)規(guī)模較大;注入優(yōu)質(zhì)資產(chǎn)的公司規(guī)模一般較大,注入劣質(zhì)資產(chǎn)的公司規(guī)模明顯較小;而成本較高的資產(chǎn)注入行為,都是資產(chǎn)規(guī)模比較小的公司在該輪牛市中指數(shù)上漲最快的時(shí)期實(shí)施的,投機(jī)動(dòng)機(jī)很強(qiáng)。實(shí)證結(jié)果表明,非公開(kāi)發(fā)行資產(chǎn)注入中上市公司股東利益并不均衡,存在著眾多大股東侵占小股東利益的現(xiàn)象。
[Abstract]:In this paper, first of all, the problem of shareholder interest balance in the behavior of non-public asset injection of listed companies is analyzed, and the mathematical derivation is obtained. The equilibrium of shareholders' interests of listed companies is that the additional price of non-public offering is equal to the intrinsic value of each share of the listed company. This paper then selects 49 listed companies in Chinese stock market that have completed the injection of assets through non-public offering as a sample. Empirical investigation. Empirical test found that, The pricing of new shares injected by Chinese listed companies through private issuance is generally on the low side, which is significantly lower than the intrinsic value of the stock; meanwhile, most of the assets injected are non-quality assets. Both the pricing of new shares and the quality of injected assets are related to the scale of assets of listed companies: the companies with high pricing are generally smaller, those with low pricing are larger, and those with high quality assets are generally larger. The companies that inject inferior assets are obviously smaller in size, and the relatively high cost of asset injection is carried out by the smaller companies in the period of the fastest index increase in the bull market. The results show that there is a strong incentive to speculate. The interests of shareholders of listed companies are not balanced in the injection of non-public issuance assets, and many large shareholders encroach on the interests of minority shareholders.
【作者單位】： 長(zhǎng)沙理工大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;長(zhǎng)沙理工大學(xué)金融工程與金融管理研究中心;中國(guó)科學(xué)院數(shù)學(xué)與系統(tǒng)科學(xué)研究院;
【基金】：教育部人文社科青年項(xiàng)目(09YJC90231) 國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目(70701035) 湖南省杰出青年基金項(xiàng)目(09JJ1010) 湖南省教育廳創(chuàng)新平臺(tái)項(xiàng)目(09K065)
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

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本文編號(hào)：1641825