本文選題：國有控股商業(yè)銀行　切入點(diǎn)：公司治理　出處：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：由于歷史以及國情原因,中國的國有控股商業(yè)銀行目前在經(jīng)濟(jì)社會中的地位、銀行體系自身的改革都有其獨(dú)特的演繹路徑。在經(jīng)過了股份制改造并上市、實(shí)行公司治理改革之后,我國國有控股商業(yè)銀行公司治理模式、結(jié)構(gòu)按照現(xiàn)代公司治理理論加以重構(gòu)之后,經(jīng)濟(jì)績效得以大大提高,在經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化的競爭格局中的地位得到了大大提升。但是,與國際上的先進(jìn)銀行比較,國有控股商業(yè)銀行在效益和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理方面并沒有取得與其地位相稱的業(yè)績。 本文通過在銀行產(chǎn)業(yè)這一中觀層次對國有控股商業(yè)銀行公司治理進(jìn)行了較為深入的分析。首先,我們分析了目前的國有控股商業(yè)銀行公司治理現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)的研究,發(fā)現(xiàn)大多數(shù)都是基于委托—代理理論基礎(chǔ)上的公司治理理論在國有控股商業(yè)銀行中的應(yīng)用,還有一些文獻(xiàn)從我國國有控股商業(yè)銀行的特殊性方面與國際商業(yè)銀行進(jìn)行了比較研究。其次,我們對國有控股商業(yè)銀行改革的歷史沿革以及公司治理現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行分析,證明目前我國國有控股商業(yè)銀行公司治理的理論背景與國際通行的商業(yè)銀行公司治理的理論背景并無二致。在第三部分,我們對國際上商業(yè)銀行的公司治理進(jìn)行了比較分析。在此,我們與傳統(tǒng)文獻(xiàn)的研究略有不同的是,我們將商業(yè)銀行公司治理問題放在了產(chǎn)業(yè)這一中觀層次進(jìn)行放大,結(jié)合產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論中的產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)影響企業(yè)行為、并最終決定績效的理論方法,發(fā)現(xiàn)在公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)基本趨同的情況下,國有控股商業(yè)銀行與國際上先進(jìn)銀行之間的績效差異主要來自于產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)不同這一經(jīng)濟(jì)現(xiàn)象。在此分析基礎(chǔ)上,提出了相應(yīng)的政策建議,即國有控股商業(yè)銀行目前公司治理的問題首要的是將公司治理目標(biāo)設(shè)定為建立真正的社會主義市場經(jīng)濟(jì)競爭主體,公司治理行為應(yīng)該放在市場行為上進(jìn)行價(jià)值創(chuàng)造,而不是以非市場行為“俘虜”監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)從而耗散壟斷租金。
[Abstract]:Due to historical reasons and conditions, the China status of state-owned commercial banks in the current economic society, the reform of the banking system itself has its unique interpretation of the path. After the joint-stock reform and listing, after the implementation of the reform of corporate governance, governance of state-owned commercial banks in China after the company, in accordance with the structure of modern company to reconstruct the governance theory, economic performance can be greatly improved, in the competition of economic globalization status has been greatly improved. However, compared with the international advanced banks, state-owned commercial banks in the benefit and risk management did not achieve the status commensurate with its performance.
In this paper, the banking industry level for a more in-depth analysis on the corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks. Firstly, we analyze the research of corporate governance of state-owned commercial banks in the existing literature at present, found that most are principal-agent theory based on the theory of corporate governance in the state-owned commercial banks. Based on some literature from China's state-controlled commercial banks particularity and international commercial banks are studied. Secondly, the history of our state-owned commercial bank reform and corporate governance to analyze the status quo, that at present state-owned commercial banks corporate governance theory background and the international commercial bank the theory of corporate governance as the background. In the third part, we on the international commercial bank corporate governance are compared Analysis. Here, we and the traditional literature research is slightly different, we will be the corporate governance of commercial banks and put it in the middle level of industrial amplification, combined with the enterprise behavior effect of industrial structure in the industrial organization theory, and the final decision theory and method of performance, found in the basic convergence of corporate governance structure under the condition of the performance difference between state-owned commercial banks and international advanced banks mainly from different industrial structure to the economic phenomenon. On the basis of this analysis, put forward the corresponding policy recommendations, namely state-owned commercial banks at present the problem of corporate governance is the primary goal of corporate governance will set up a real socialist market economy competition corporate governance, behavior should be placed on the market behavior of value creation, rather than by non market behavior "captured" regulators to dissipate The rent is monopolized.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.33

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 李心合;公司價(jià)值取向及其演進(jìn)趨勢[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2004年10期

2 楊敏;對深化國有商業(yè)銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)改革的探討[J];福建金融;2005年04期

3 黃雋;李慧;徐俊杰;;美國銀行業(yè)市場結(jié)構(gòu)分析[J];國際金融研究;2010年07期

4 黃金老;論加強(qiáng)國有銀行的公司治理[J];河南金融管理干部學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2004年05期

5 楊瑞龍,楊其靜;追蹤新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的最新發(fā)展動(dòng)態(tài)[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)動(dòng)態(tài);2003年11期

6 馬翊凱,李仁斌;中外商業(yè)銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的差異分析與借鑒[J];金融縱橫;2005年04期

7 李維安,曹廷求;商業(yè)銀行公司治理——基于商業(yè)銀行特殊性的研究[J];南開學(xué)報(bào);2005年01期

8 李文武;;德國銀行業(yè)的特點(diǎn)及啟示[J];農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)展與金融;2010年01期

9 吳敬璉;銀行改革:當(dāng)前中國金融改革的重中之重[J];世界經(jīng)濟(jì)文匯;2002年04期

10 中國銀監(jiān)會“公司治理改革”課題組;完善公司治理是國有商業(yè)銀行改革的核心[J];中國金融;2005年05期

，

本文編號：1636514