本文選題：高管　切入點(diǎn)：薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)　出處：《首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：改革開放以來(lái)，我國(guó)民營(yíng)企業(yè)不斷發(fā)展壯大，對(duì)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的貢獻(xiàn)不斷增長(zhǎng)；隨著我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的完善與成熟，有關(guān)公司治理與企業(yè)績(jī)效之間關(guān)系的探索越來(lái)越多。但是，對(duì)于民營(yíng)企業(yè)的公司治理狀況與其企業(yè)績(jī)效之間的研究卻不是很多，在實(shí)踐中，民營(yíng)企業(yè)的委托人亟需建立健全的代理人薪酬激勵(lì)制度，以最大限度地降低代理成本，從根本上改善企業(yè)績(jī)效。 本文采用2008年至2010年之間滬深A(yù)股的民營(yíng)上市公司為研究樣本，以委托代理理論為理論基礎(chǔ)，從薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)決定因素的角度，對(duì)民營(yíng)企業(yè)的高管薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行分析，探討各種激勵(lì)形式與公司績(jī)效的內(nèi)在關(guān)系，為高管激勵(lì)實(shí)踐提供理論支持，以推動(dòng)企業(yè)效率的提高。 本文第一章主要是闡述論文的研究背景、研究理論價(jià)值和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義，以及本文的研究?jī)?nèi)容和研究方法，并指出了本文的主要?jiǎng)?chuàng)新之處。第二章是文獻(xiàn)綜述部分。主要是對(duì)該領(lǐng)域內(nèi)的研究成果進(jìn)行回顧，重點(diǎn)分析了激勵(lì)理論相關(guān)的管理學(xué)激勵(lì)理論、人力資本理論、交易費(fèi)用理論、代理理論、契約理論和企業(yè)績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)理論等。第三章主要是對(duì)民營(yíng)企業(yè)高管薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)的現(xiàn)狀和薪酬與績(jī)效關(guān)系進(jìn)行分析：首先對(duì)本文研究過程中涉及到的相關(guān)概念進(jìn)行界定，說明數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)源和樣本選擇的依據(jù)，并對(duì)公司高管薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行分析；通過對(duì)薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)現(xiàn)狀的比較分析，指出我國(guó)企業(yè)高管人員的收入與其價(jià)值嚴(yán)重背離的現(xiàn)狀，同時(shí)，在經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究的基礎(chǔ)上分析薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響機(jī)理，從而為有針對(duì)性地建立我國(guó)民營(yíng)上市企業(yè)高層管理人員激勵(lì)機(jī)制提供基礎(chǔ)。第四章開始構(gòu)建企業(yè)績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)體系。從上市公司年報(bào)中摘取盈利能力、周轉(zhuǎn)能力、短長(zhǎng)期償債能力、成長(zhǎng)能力四方面的指標(biāo)，通過主成分分析方法得出加權(quán)平均后的績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，，力求科學(xué)全面的解釋公司績(jī)效。第五章實(shí)證分析部分，選取2008~2010年滬深兩市A股的民營(yíng)公司為樣本，采用相關(guān)性分析方法對(duì)薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行統(tǒng)計(jì)分析，并得出有效結(jié)論；第六章，結(jié)論與建議部分，對(duì)研究問題進(jìn)行總結(jié)，由此提出一些政策建議，并指出本文的主要局限，為下一步的研究做鋪墊。 民營(yíng)企業(yè)是我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)中的新生代力量，在國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)中的地位和作用日益凸顯，但是民營(yíng)企業(yè)在發(fā)展中存在不少問題。公司治理機(jī)制的不完善制約了民營(yíng)企業(yè)的健康發(fā)和持續(xù)性展，如何解決這一問題，將是業(yè)內(nèi)學(xué)者共同努力的方向。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, private enterprises in China have been developing and expanding, and their contribution to the national economy has been growing. With the perfection and maturity of the capital market in China, more and more researches have been made on the relationship between corporate governance and enterprise performance. However, there is not much research on the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance of private enterprises. In practice, the clients of private enterprises urgently need to establish a sound incentive system of agent compensation in order to minimize agency costs. Fundamentally improve corporate performance. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the executive compensation structure of private enterprises from 2008 to 2010 from the perspective of the determinant factors of salary structure, using the private listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares as the research samples, and taking the principal-agent theory as the theoretical basis. To explore the internal relationship between various incentive forms and corporate performance, to provide theoretical support for executive incentive practice, in order to promote the efficiency of enterprises. The first chapter of this paper is mainly about the research background, theoretical value and practical significance, as well as the research content and research methods. And points out the main innovation of this paper. The second chapter is the literature review part. It mainly reviews the research results in this field, focusing on the incentive theory related to management incentive theory, human capital theory, transaction cost theory. The third chapter mainly analyzes the current situation of executive compensation structure and the relationship between compensation and performance in private enterprises. Firstly, it defines the related concepts involved in the research process of this paper. Explain the data source and the basis of sample selection, and analyze the current situation of the executive compensation structure of the company, through the comparative analysis of the status quo of the compensation structure, point out that the income of the senior managers in our country deviates from its value seriously, at the same time, On the basis of empirical research, this paper analyzes the influence mechanism of compensation structure on corporate performance. So as to provide the foundation for establishing the incentive mechanism of the senior managers of the private listed enterprises in China. Chapter 4th begins to construct the standard system of enterprise performance evaluation, taking the profitability and turnover ability from the annual report of the listed companies. Four indicators of short-term and long-term solvency, growth ability, through principal component analysis method to get the weighted average after the performance evaluation criteria, in order to scientifically and comprehensively explain corporate performance. 5th chapter empirical analysis, From 2008 to 2010, the private companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares were selected as samples, and the correlation analysis method was used to analyze the relationship between compensation structure and corporate performance, and the effective conclusions were drawn; Chapter 6th, conclusions and recommendations, This paper summarizes the research problems, puts forward some policy suggestions, and points out the main limitations of this paper, paving the way for the next research. The private enterprise is the new generation strength in our country's economy, and its position and function in the national economy are increasingly prominent. However, there are many problems in the development of private enterprises. The imperfection of corporate governance mechanism restricts the healthy development and sustainable development of private enterprises. How to solve this problem will be the direction of the joint efforts of scholars in the industry.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F276.5;F832.51;F224

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