本文選題：投票權(quán)代理　切入點(diǎn)：投票權(quán)交易　出處：《山西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)》2010年12期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：借鑒投票權(quán)代理及交易理論,將股改博弈劃分為流通股東內(nèi)部博弈和流通與非流通股東之間博弈兩個(gè)階段,分別考察機(jī)構(gòu)投資者行使投票權(quán)對(duì)流通股東的股改收益預(yù)期、股改方案滿意度及股改總收益三個(gè)方面的影響,借此判斷機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在股改中是維護(hù)還是損害了流通股東的利益。研究表明:一方面,參與股改的流通股東普遍相信機(jī)構(gòu)投資者能夠維護(hù)他們的利益;另一方面,在與非流通股東的股改博弈中,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者也確實(shí)起到了維護(hù)流通股東利益的積極作用。結(jié)論認(rèn)為,在我國上市公司的股改事件中,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的投票權(quán)控制有利于流通股東的利益實(shí)現(xiàn)。
[Abstract]:Referring to voting right agent and transaction theory, the share reform game is divided into two stages: the internal game of circulating shareholders and the game between circulating and non-circulating shareholders. In order to judge whether institutional investors maintain or impair the interests of circulating shareholders in the stock reform, the research shows that, on the one hand, The circulating shareholders involved in the reform generally believe that institutional investors can safeguard their interests. On the other hand, in the game of share reform with non-circulating shareholders, institutional investors do indeed play an active role in safeguarding the interests of circulating shareholders. In the stock reform of listed companies in China, the voting rights control of institutional investors is beneficial to the realization of the interests of circulating shareholders.
【作者單位】： 廈門大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：教育部人文社會(huì)科學(xué)規(guī)劃基金項(xiàng)目“證券投資基金運(yùn)行與資本市場穩(wěn)定研究”(07JA790032)
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

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1 陳誠;上市公司委托書征集法律制度研究[D];西南大學(xué);2009年

2 趙彤;公司股東表決權(quán)委托制度研究[D];對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué);2007年

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本文編號(hào)：1605664