本文選題：物流金融服務(wù)創(chuàng)新　切入點(diǎn)：雙重委托代理關(guān)系　出處：《南開大學(xué)》2012年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著物流金融服務(wù)在我國(guó)的迅猛發(fā)展，越來(lái)越多的中小企業(yè)通過物流金融運(yùn)作獲得了銀行貸款授信而改善了企業(yè)的資金鏈；同時(shí)，眾多知名的物流企業(yè)和銀行都因提供物流金融服務(wù)找到了新的利潤(rùn)增長(zhǎng)點(diǎn)。然而，在物流金融服務(wù)發(fā)展過程中，由于金融機(jī)構(gòu)、融資企業(yè)和物流企業(yè)三方參與主體間的信息不對(duì)稱，使處于信息劣勢(shì)的金融機(jī)構(gòu)、物流企業(yè)面臨著很多業(yè)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，如融資企業(yè)造假違約、物流企業(yè)監(jiān)管不力、物流企業(yè)與融資企業(yè)合謀欺騙等現(xiàn)象均影響著金融機(jī)構(gòu)提供物流金融融資服務(wù)的積極性。由于金融機(jī)構(gòu)往往通過制定嚴(yán)格規(guī)定，最大限度地將部分風(fēng)險(xiǎn)責(zé)任轉(zhuǎn)嫁給物流企業(yè)，而對(duì)物流企業(yè)的報(bào)酬激勵(lì)不夠等諸多因素的限制，，一些物流企業(yè)參與高級(jí)的物流金融服務(wù)模式的積極性。換言之，激勵(lì)機(jī)制的不完善制約著物流金融服務(wù)創(chuàng)新的發(fā)展。 基于上述研究背景，本文以物流金融服務(wù)創(chuàng)新模式以及物流金融服務(wù)三方參與主體之間的契約關(guān)系為研究對(duì)象，以委托代理理論和激勵(lì)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論為理論基礎(chǔ)，綜合運(yùn)用歸納分析和演繹分析、定性分析與定量分析以及案例研究和比較分析等多種研究方法，在雙重委托代理下對(duì)物流金融服務(wù)創(chuàng)新及其激勵(lì)機(jī)制進(jìn)行研究。具體而言，在對(duì)傳統(tǒng)物流金融服務(wù)的各種模式進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)歸納和比較分析的基礎(chǔ)上，首先識(shí)別了不同運(yùn)作模式下物流金融服務(wù)的雙重委托代理關(guān)系；進(jìn)而，在對(duì)物流金融服務(wù)創(chuàng)新的內(nèi)在動(dòng)力進(jìn)行分析的基礎(chǔ)上，在營(yíng)運(yùn)流程視角下較為系統(tǒng)地研究了物流金融服務(wù)創(chuàng)新的主要模式，并在信息不對(duì)稱下對(duì)中國(guó)臺(tái)灣地區(qū)物流金融服務(wù)創(chuàng)新進(jìn)行了案例分析；最后，對(duì)物流金融服務(wù)創(chuàng)新三方參與主體的行為進(jìn)行了博弈均衡分析，嘗試在雙重委托代理關(guān)系下構(gòu)建了一套物流金融服務(wù)創(chuàng)新的有效激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制，進(jìn)而提出了完善我國(guó)物流金融服務(wù)委托代理激勵(lì)機(jī)制的對(duì)策建議并進(jìn)行了研究展望。
[Abstract]:With the logistics financial services in China's rapid development, more and more small and medium-sized enterprises through the logistics financial operation to obtain a bank loan credit and improve the enterprise's capital chain; at the same time, many well-known logistics companies and banks for providing logistics financial services to find new profit growth point. However, in the process of logistics financial services in the development of the financial institutions, financing enterprises and the three party logistics enterprises in the information asymmetry between subjects, the financial institutions in the inferior position of information, logistics enterprises are facing a lot of business risks, such as financing fraud breach, logistics enterprise supervision, actively logistics enterprises and financing enterprises are affected by the phenomenon of conspiracy to defraud financial institutions provide logistics finance service. Because financial institutions often make strict regulations, to maximize the risk responsibility to the logistics enterprise, and There are many factors such as insufficient reward and incentive for logistics enterprises, and some logistics enterprises take part in the initiative of advanced logistics financial service mode. In other words, the imperfection of incentive mechanism restricts the development of logistics financial service innovation.
Based on the above research background, this paper takes the service innovation mode of financial logistics and three party logistics financial service contract relationship between the main body as the research object, using principal agent theory and incentive mechanism design theory as the theoretical basis, the comprehensive use of inductive analysis and deductive analysis, qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis, case study and comparative analysis and other research methods in the dual agency, to conduct a study on the logistics financial services innovation and incentive mechanism. Specifically, the basic system of induction and comparative analysis of the traditional model of logistics in a variety of financial services, the first to identify double principal-agent relationship between logistics financial services in different operation mode; then, on the base of analyzing internal power on the innovation of logistics financial services, in the operation process from the perspective of a more systematic research on the logistics financial services innovation The main mode, case analysis and the innovation of logistics financial services in Taiwan Chinese under asymmetric information; finally, the three party logistics financial services innovation in the main behavior of the game equilibrium analysis, try in the dual principal-agent relationship to construct a set of logistics financial services innovation and effective incentive mechanism, and then put forward the countermeasures and suggestions of perfecting the logistics financial services agency incentive mechanism and the research prospects.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：南開大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F259.2;F832

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