本文選題：控股股東　切入點：代理行為　出處：《沈陽工業(yè)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：近年來控股股東行為的頻繁發(fā)生，嚴(yán)重的侵害了中小投資者的利益，損害公司的整體價值，與公司價值最大化這樣一個目標(biāo)背道而馳。嚴(yán)重影響了我國資本市場的投資效率，因此，識別和研究上市公司控股股東代理行為對上市公司的影響已迫在眉睫。 本文以控股股東行為對公司價值的影響作為切入點，把控股股東代理行為分為五個維度，分別是控股股東操縱上市公司信息披露行為，控股股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易行為，控股股東影響上市公司獨立性行為，控股股東投融資行為以及控股股東增減持行為。選取2010年滬市、深市主板上市的公司為樣本，首先運用假設(shè)檢驗的方法，以五種維度為分組依據(jù)，對存在控股股東代理行為與不存在控股股東代理行為的上市公司托賓Q值進(jìn)行檢驗，驗證控股股東代理行為存在與否公司價值的變化是否具有顯著性。其次，用上市公司凈資產(chǎn)收益率代替托賓Q值對假設(shè)檢驗的結(jié)果進(jìn)行穩(wěn)健性分析，驗證對托賓Q值的檢驗是否具有可靠性。經(jīng)過穩(wěn)健性分析，，本文得出了以下結(jié)論：即在存在控股股東操縱公司信息披露行為的上市公司中，公司價值的變化并不顯著，而在存在關(guān)聯(lián)交易、影響上市公司獨立性、投融資及增減持行為的上市公司中，公司價值的變化具有顯著性的結(jié)論。 最后，選取2010年滬市、深市上市公司，共1856個樣本。把樣本公司分為六組，分別為具有五種控股股東代理行為的上市公司及不具有控股股東代理行為的公司，把上市公司的托賓Q值從低到高分為12組。運用對應(yīng)分析的方法，驗證控股股東代理行為與上市公司價值的相關(guān)性。通過驗證，發(fā)現(xiàn)不存在控股股東代理行為的上市公司其對應(yīng)的公司價值高于存在控股股東代理行為的上市公司。
[Abstract]:The frequent occurrence of controlling shareholder behavior in recent years has seriously infringed on the interests of small and medium-sized investors, damaged the overall value of the company, and ran counter to the goal of maximizing the company value. It has seriously affected the investment efficiency of our country's capital market. Therefore, it is urgent to identify and study the influence of controlling shareholder agency behavior on listed companies. Based on the influence of controlling shareholder's behavior on company value, this paper divides the controlling shareholder's agency behavior into five dimensions: controlling shareholder manipulating information disclosure of listed company and controlling shareholder's related transaction behavior. The behavior of controlling shareholders influencing the independence of listed companies, the behavior of investing and financing of controlling shareholders, and the behavior of increasing and decreasing holding of controlling shareholders are selected as the samples of companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2010 and listed on the main Board of Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and the method of hypothesis test is used first. On the basis of five dimensions, this paper tests the Tobin Q value of listed companies with or without controlling shareholder agency behavior. Secondly, using the return on net assets of listed companies to replace Tobin Q value to analyze the robustness of the results of hypothesis test. After robust analysis, this paper draws the following conclusions: in listed companies with controlling shareholders manipulating the disclosure of company information, the change of company value is not significant. However, in the listed companies with related party transactions, which affect the independence, investment and financing of listed companies, and increase or decrease their holdings, the change of corporate value has a significant conclusion. Finally, we select 1856 samples of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2010. The sample companies are divided into six groups, which are listed companies with five kinds of controlling shareholder agency behavior and companies without controlling shareholder agency behavior. The Tobin Q value of listed company is divided into 12 groups from low to high. By using the method of correspondence analysis, the correlation between controlling shareholder's agency behavior and the value of listed company is verified. It is found that the value of listed companies without agency behavior of controlling shareholders is higher than that of listed companies with controlling shareholder agency behavior.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：沈陽工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F224

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