本文選題：國有銀行　切入點：改革　出處：《東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：我國四大國有銀行長期以來被資產(chǎn)質(zhì)量差、盈利能力低等問題困擾。國有銀行低效的根源在于其單一的國有產(chǎn)權(quán),由于國家是非人格化的所有者,沒有維護自身利益的能力,導(dǎo)致了在國有銀行所有者和經(jīng)營者的博弈中出現(xiàn)了失衡,造成內(nèi)部人控制,代理成本巨大。 我國四大國有銀行以往改革可分為三個階段：國家專業(yè)銀行的恢復(fù)和設(shè)立、國家專業(yè)銀行向企業(yè)化經(jīng)營的轉(zhuǎn)變和國有獨資商業(yè)銀行改革。期間采取的種種改革措施對完善我國銀行體系、增加銀行市場競爭等發(fā)揮了一定作用。但由于這些改革措施并未觸及國有銀行的產(chǎn)權(quán)制度,所以改革效果并不顯著。2003年開始的新一輪改革,其最大亮點是開始改變國有銀行單一的產(chǎn)權(quán)制度。改革中,四大國有銀行基本采用了：財務(wù)重組-公司治理改革-資本市場上市的“三步走”改革模式。 本文首先從產(chǎn)權(quán)和公司治理兩個角度對2003-2010年國有銀行改革效果進行了定性分析。從產(chǎn)權(quán)改革看,改革后四大國有銀行由產(chǎn)權(quán)單一的國有企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)楫a(chǎn)權(quán)多元化的股份有限公司,一定程度上解決了國有銀行的所有者虛置問題,但股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)上的國家絕對控股也給國有銀行績效改善帶來了隱憂。本輪改革非常重視公司治理建設(shè),把建設(shè)良好的銀行公司治理作為國有銀行改革的核心。改革后,四大國有銀行都參照國際先進銀行建立了形式完整的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),現(xiàn)代公司治理機制初步開始運作。但公司治理內(nèi)生于產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),來源于公司所有者和公司經(jīng)營者之間的利益博弈。但到目前為止,我國國有銀行尚未完全解決所有者虛置問題,由此導(dǎo)致我國國有銀行公司治理機制內(nèi)在動力不足,“形似”而“神異”。 本文然后運用財務(wù)指標(biāo)分析和DEA模型兩種方法對改革后四大國有銀行改革有效性進行了實證分析。本文第五章用銀監(jiān)會《國有商業(yè)銀行公司治理及相關(guān)監(jiān)管指引》規(guī)定的三大類共七項指標(biāo)考核國有銀行改革后的財務(wù)指標(biāo),發(fā)現(xiàn)四大國有控股銀行較好實現(xiàn)了銀監(jiān)會設(shè)定的目標(biāo),本文隨后對國有控股銀行取得良好績效的原因進行了簡要分析。本文第六章運用DEA模型對改革后國有銀行效率進行實證分析,結(jié)果表明,四大國有銀行的平均技術(shù)效率高于股份制銀行,但把技術(shù)效率進一步分解為純技術(shù)效率和規(guī)模效率后發(fā)現(xiàn),國有控股銀行雖然平均技術(shù)效率高于股份制銀行,但其平均純技術(shù)效率低于股份制銀行,其較高的技術(shù)效率水平主要是由其較高的規(guī)模效率導(dǎo)致的。 文章接下來闡述了國有銀行本輪改革中有爭議的兩個具體問題：匯金公司在國有銀行改革中的作用和國有銀行引進外國戰(zhàn)略投資者的成效。第七章分析了匯金公司在國有銀行改革中的作用,匯金公司在國有銀行改革中的積極作用包括：匯金公司注資充實了國有銀行的資本金,保證了國有銀行財務(wù)重組的順利完成；通過匯金公司注資四大國有銀行,在某種程度上解決了四大銀行的所有者虛置問題。但匯金公司目前未享有完全的出資人權(quán)利,并且匯金公司是國有獨資公司,其自身同樣存在所有者虛置問題。第八章分析了國有銀行引進外國戰(zhàn)略投資者的成效。引進國外戰(zhàn)略投資者,對我國國有銀行在境外資本市場成功上市發(fā)揮了積極作用；希望通過引進戰(zhàn)略投資者學(xué)習(xí)國際先進銀行管理經(jīng)驗、技術(shù)和方法的目的并未達到；引入外國戰(zhàn)略投資者后,國有銀行公司治理水平未得到實質(zhì)性提高。 本輪改革取得的成績主要有：四大國有銀行成功實現(xiàn)了產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的多元化；建立了形式完整的公司治理架構(gòu),初步形成了有效激勵、相互制衡的公司治理機制；各行加強了內(nèi)控機制建設(shè),風(fēng)險防范體系不斷完善;國有銀行規(guī)模業(yè)績得到全面提升,財務(wù)狀況根本好轉(zhuǎn)等。此次改革存在的不足包括：改制上市后國有股依然占絕對控股地位,國有銀行的所有者虛置問題并未得到根本解決；改革中各國有銀行已經(jīng)搭建了形式完整的公司治理架構(gòu),但相互制衡的治理機制尚不能有效運作。 目前我國國有銀行改革仍處在起步階段,后續(xù)改革工作仍然任重道遠。就國有銀行產(chǎn)權(quán)改革而言,今后仍面臨著產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)進一步多元化的任務(wù)。根據(jù)我國漸進性的改革原則,國有股權(quán)的釋放應(yīng)該是一個緩慢的過程,可先由目前的國家絕對控股變?yōu)閲蚁鄬毓�。在條件成熟以后,可考慮選擇一兩個國有控股銀行嘗試放棄國家控股權(quán)。將來我國四大銀行不能由外國資本控股,只能由民間資本控股。在民間資本控股銀行后,銀行體系穩(wěn)健運行的關(guān)鍵是提高銀行監(jiān)管能力。
[Abstract]:The four major state-owned banks in China has long been plagued by poor quality assets, low profitability. The root of state-owned banks is its inefficient state-owned property rights as the country is a single, non personification of the owner, do not have the ability to safeguard their own interests, resulting in the imbalance of state-owned banks and operators in the game. Due to the internal control, the agency cost is huge.
The four major state-owned banks in China before reform can be divided into three stages: the recovery and the establishment of specialized state banks, the reform of the national specialized bank to enterprise management and state-owned commercial banks. During the take all sorts of reform measures to improve China's banking system has played a certain role in increasing competition in the banking market. But because of these reforms did not touch the state-owned bank property right system reform, so the effect is not significant in.2003 began a new round of reform, the biggest bright spot is beginning to change the single property rights of state-owned banks. In the reform, the four major state-owned banks: the basic use of the financial restructuring corporate governance reform - the capital market "three step model of reform.
This paper from two aspects of property rights and corporate governance on the 2003-2010 years of the reform of state-owned banks effect by qualitative analysis. From the property rights reform, the reform of state-owned enterprises after the four major state-owned banks from the property into a single property diversification of the Limited by Share Ltd, to a certain extent, solve the problem of the nominal owner of state-owned banks, but the ownership structure the country also gives absolute holding of state-owned banks to improve the performance of the current round of reform has brought worries. Attach great importance to the construction of corporate governance, the construction of good corporate governance of banks as the core of the reform of state-owned banks. After the reform, the four major state-owned banks are based on the international advanced bank to establish a corporate governance structure complete, modern corporate governance mechanism preliminary operation but within the corporate governance structure of property rights, from the interests of the game between company owners and operators, but up to now. Only, state-owned banks in China have not yet completely solved the nominal owner problem, resulting in the lack of China's state-owned bank corporate governance mechanism of intrinsic motivation, "shape" and "miraculous".
In this paper, and then use the financial index analysis and DEA model two methods of reform after the empirical analysis of the four major state-owned banks reform effectiveness. In the fifth chapter, with the CBRC < three categories of state owned commercial bank corporate governance guidelines and relevant regulatory provisions > seven indicators of financial indicators assessment of state-owned bank reform, found the four major state-owned banks can achieve the CBRC's target, this paper gives a brief analysis on the causes of state-owned banks to achieve a good performance. The sixth chapter uses the DEA model to reform the state-owned bank efficiency of empirical analysis, the results show that the average technical efficiency of the four big state-owned banks is higher than joint-stock banks, but the technical efficiency found further decomposed into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency of state-owned banks, although the average technical efficiency is higher than that of joint-stock banks, but its average net technology The efficiency is lower than the joint-stock bank, and its high technical efficiency is mainly caused by its higher scale efficiency.
This paper expounds the following two specific issues disputed in the current round of reform of state-owned banks: Huijin in the reform of state-owned banks and the role of state-owned banks to introduce foreign strategic investors results. The seventh chapter analyzes the role of Huijin in the state-owned bank reform, including the positive role in the reform of state-owned banks in Huijin Huijin Company: pumped up the state-owned bank capital, guarantee the state-owned bank financial restructuring smoothly; through Huijin injected four big state-owned banks, to a certain extent to solve the four major banks in the nominal owner. But Huijin is currently not fully enjoy the rights of investors, and Huijin Company is a wholly state-owned company, the there is also the nominal owner. The eighth chapter analyzes the effect of the introduction of foreign strategic investors of state-owned banks to introduce foreign strategic investors, Played a positive role in China's state-owned commercial banks listed in the overseas capital market; to learn from advanced international experience of bank management through the introduction of strategic investors, technology and methods did not reached the purpose; after the introduction of foreign strategic investors, corporate governance of state-owned banks has not been substantially improved.
This round of reform, the main achievements are: the four major state-owned banks successfully realize the diversification of property rights structure; establish the corporate governance structure form complete, the initial formation of effective incentive, corporate governance mechanism; all strengthen the construction of internal control mechanism, risk prevention system and constantly improve the performance of state-owned banks; scale comprehensive upgrading the financial situation is improved. The shortcomings of the reform include: restructuring after the listing of state-owned shares still dominate, the owner of state-owned banks fause problem has not been fundamentally solved; in the reform of state banks have set up corporate governance structure form complete, but the effective operation of the governance mechanism of checks and balances are not.
The reform of state-owned banks in China at present is still in the initial stage, the subsequent reform work remains to be done. The state-owned bank property right reform, the future still faces further diversification of property rights structure task. According to the principle of gradual reform in China, state-owned shares should release is a slow process, but the current state of absolute control variable for the state relative holding. When conditions are ripe, can choose the one or two state-owned holding banks try to give up state-controlled ownership. In the future, China's four largest banks by foreign capital not only by private capital holdings, holdings. In private capital holding bank, key to the steady operation of the banking system is to improve the ability of bank supervision.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.1

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本文編號：1573913