本文關(guān)鍵詞： 非效率投資 股東-管理層代理沖突 終極股東-小股東代理沖突 融資約束 產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)　出處：《華東師范大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：投資作為企業(yè)重要的財(cái)務(wù)決策,對(duì)公司成長(zhǎng)和社會(huì)資源配置效率均有重要的作用。在完美資本市場(chǎng)條件下,企業(yè)投資決策僅取決于項(xiàng)目的凈現(xiàn)值,企業(yè)投資支出僅取決于公司的投資機(jī)會(huì),然而現(xiàn)實(shí)中,偏離企業(yè)最優(yōu)投資規(guī)模的投資過度和投資不足均大范圍的存在,學(xué)界將這些行為統(tǒng)稱為非效率投資。 本文對(duì)股東-管理層代理沖突、終極股東-小股東代理沖突和融資約束對(duì)非效率投資的影響進(jìn)行了規(guī)范性分析,提出以下理論假設(shè)：管理層建立企業(yè)帝國的偏好將引發(fā)投資過度,其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)厭惡特征將引發(fā)投資不足；終極股東獲取控制權(quán)私有收益的動(dòng)機(jī)將引發(fā)投資過度；融資約束程度越高,企業(yè)投資不足程度越嚴(yán)重。 本文以2004-2010年A股上市公司為基礎(chǔ)樣本進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),并根據(jù)終極股東控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離度與終極股東產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)對(duì)樣本分組,并進(jìn)一步檢驗(yàn)。 在終極股東控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)未分離的樣本中,終極股東為國家的樣本表現(xiàn)為過度投資,主要原因?yàn)楣芾韺泳哂薪⑵髽I(yè)帝國的偏好,且企業(yè)融資約束程度較輕；終極股東為國有法人的樣本不存在顯著的非效率投資現(xiàn)象,顯示出較好的公司治理效果,原因在于管理層治理水平較好,且企業(yè)融資約束程度較低；終極股東為非國有法人和個(gè)人的樣本表現(xiàn)為投資不足,主要原因?yàn)槿谫Y約束程度較高。 在終極股東控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離的樣本中,終極股東為國家的樣本表現(xiàn)為過度投資,原因主要在于終極股東缺位,管理層仍有擴(kuò)張動(dòng)機(jī)；終極股東為國有法人的樣本表現(xiàn)為過度投資,主要由于終極股東有擴(kuò)大投資以獲取控制權(quán)私有收益的動(dòng)機(jī),且企業(yè)融資約束程度較低；終極股東為非國有法人或個(gè)人的樣本未表現(xiàn)出明顯的投資過度或不足,主要因?yàn)榻K極股東有獲取控制權(quán)私有收益的動(dòng)機(jī),但企業(yè)融資約束程度較高,兩者對(duì)投資規(guī)模的影響相反,因而疊加效應(yīng)不確定。 實(shí)證結(jié)果驗(yàn)證了兩類代理沖突和融資約束對(duì)投資行為存在影響,同時(shí)也為產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)差異對(duì)管理層行為特征與融資約束程度的影響提供了經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù),據(jù)此,本文提出以下政策建議：完善投資者權(quán)益保護(hù)的法律法規(guī)體系；完善獨(dú)立董事制度,約束內(nèi)部人控制行為；完善信息披露制度,確保投資者知情權(quán)；建立有效的國企經(jīng)理人市場(chǎng),完善國企分紅制度；大力發(fā)展債券市場(chǎng),緩解民營企業(yè)融資約束。
[Abstract]:Investment as an important financial decision of the company business, an important role in growth and efficiency of the allocation of social resources. All in perfect capital market conditions, the net present value of investment decisions depend only on project investment opportunities, business investment spending depends only on the company, but in reality, deviating from the optimal investment scale enterprises and over investment investment exist widely in academic circles, these are called non efficiency investment.
In this paper, the shareholders and management agency conflict, the influence of ultimate shareholders and Minority Shareholders Agency Conflict and financing constraints on non efficiency investment of normative analysis, put forward the following hypothesis: the management to set up a business empire preference will lead to excessive investment, the risk aversion characteristics will lead to insufficient investment; the ultimate shareholders to obtain private benefits of control the motivation will lead to excessive investment; the higher the degree of financing constraints, insufficient investment is more serious.
Based on the sample of 2004-2010 years A share listed companies, this paper conducts an empirical test, and further tests the samples based on the separation of ultimate shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights and the property rights of ultimate shareholders.
In the ultimate shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights are not separated in the sample, the ultimate shareholder of the state sample is the main reason for the excessive investment, management has set up a business empire preference, and the degree of financing constraints is lower; the ultimate shareholder is the state-owned corporate sample does not exist in the non efficiency of investment significantly, display better corporate governance, because the management level of management is better, and the degree of financing constraints is low; the ultimate shareholder is non-state-owned legal person and individual samples, manifested in the lack of investment, the main reason for the high degree of financing constraints.
In the sample of ultimate shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights separation, the ultimate shareholder is the sample of countries for over investment, the reason mainly lies in the absence of ultimate shareholders, management is still expanding motivation; the ultimate shareholder is the state-owned corporate samples showed excessive investment, mainly because the ultimate shareholder has to expand investment to obtain private benefits of control the motivation and the degree of financing constraints is low; the ultimate shareholder is non-state-owned corporate or individual samples showed no obvious investment excessive or insufficient, mainly because the ultimate shareholders have the motivation to obtain private benefits of control, but the higher the degree of financing constraints, the two effects on the scale of investment on the contrary, so the superimposed effect of uncertainty.
The empirical results show that two types of agency conflicts and financing constraints has an impact on investment behavior, but also for the property influence on the characteristics and the degree of financing constraints management behavior provides empirical evidence, therefore, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: perfecting the system of investor protection laws and regulations; improve the system of independent directors, internal constraints control behavior; improve the information disclosure system to ensure investors' right; establish effective managers of state-owned enterprises and market, improve the bonus system of state owned enterprises; vigorously develop the bond market, private enterprises to ease financing constraints.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275.5;F832.51;F224

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 連玉君;程建;;投資—現(xiàn)金流敏感性:融資約束還是代理成本?[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2007年02期

2 鄒平;付瑩;;我國上市公司控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離——理論研究與實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)[J];財(cái)經(jīng)研究;2007年09期

3 胡建平;干勝道;;錢多辦“壞”事:自由現(xiàn)金流量與過度投資[J];當(dāng)代財(cái)經(jīng);2007年11期

4 韓志麗;楊淑娥;史浩江;;企業(yè)終極所有者“掏空”行為的影響因素[J];系統(tǒng)工程;2006年09期

5 鐘海燕;冉茂盛;文守遜;;政府干預(yù)、內(nèi)部人控制與公司投資[J];管理世界;2010年07期

6 劉芍佳,孫霈,劉乃全;終極產(chǎn)權(quán)論、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)及公司績(jī)效[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2003年04期

7 辛清泉;林斌;王彥超;;政府控制、經(jīng)理薪酬與資本投資[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2007年08期

8 俞紅海;徐龍炳;陳百助;;終極控股股東控制權(quán)與自由現(xiàn)金流過度投資[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2010年08期

9 王鵬;周黎安;;控股股東的控制權(quán)、所有權(quán)與公司績(jī)效:基于中國上市公司的證據(jù)[J];金融研究;2006年02期

10 唐雪松;周曉蘇;馬如靜;;政府干預(yù)、GDP增長(zhǎng)與地方國企過度投資[J];金融研究;2010年08期

，

本文編號(hào)：1551088