本文關(guān)鍵詞： 上市公司 關(guān)聯(lián)并購 并購績效　出處：《重慶工商大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：2008年金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)陷入了發(fā)展困境，而我國整體經(jīng)濟(jì)依然保持增長，資本市場運(yùn)行的市場化水平不斷提高，資本市場監(jiān)管的有效性顯著提高。金融危機(jī)導(dǎo)致世界經(jīng)濟(jì)格局的重新洗牌，在新一輪的競爭中，機(jī)遇與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)并存，我國政府希望本土企業(yè)能抓住這一歷史機(jī)遇，優(yōu)化我國的產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)，實(shí)現(xiàn)我國經(jīng)濟(jì)的跨越式發(fā)展。在這樣的經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢和政治形勢下，并購活動更加頻繁，成為我國上市公司快速擴(kuò)張和戰(zhàn)略調(diào)整的一種重要形式。 我國上市公司大多是由國企改制而來，上市公司與集團(tuán)公司之間關(guān)系錯綜復(fù)雜，為了上市公司更好的發(fā)展集團(tuán)公司可以暫時犧牲整體利益，同時上市公司發(fā)展到一定程度時，集團(tuán)公司又會通過關(guān)聯(lián)交易轉(zhuǎn)移上司公司的利益。經(jīng)過股改，我國資本市場實(shí)現(xiàn)了全流通，理論上講同股同權(quán)，但是我國上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是股權(quán)集中，控股股東與中小股東在上市公司中的話語權(quán)存在明顯差異，控股股東控制著上市公司的經(jīng)營決策權(quán)，中小股東處于被動地位，缺乏影響力。大股東與中小股東的利益并非總是一致，尤其是在外部治理環(huán)境不夠完善的條件下，大股東有動機(jī)也有能力通過關(guān)聯(lián)交易獲取私人收益。關(guān)聯(lián)并購是關(guān)聯(lián)交易的一種重要形式，，一般都是在控股股東的主導(dǎo)下發(fā)生的，在市場不規(guī)范、公司治理不完善的環(huán)境下，控股股東擁有上市公司的經(jīng)營決策權(quán)，為了自身的發(fā)展利益，控股股東通過關(guān)聯(lián)并購在并購雙方之間進(jìn)行利益輸送或者轉(zhuǎn)移，對上市公司有“支持行為”也有“掏空行為”，究竟哪種行為占主導(dǎo)地位根據(jù)形勢而定。眾多學(xué)者的研究表明，長期看來，控股股東的關(guān)聯(lián)并購降低了公司的經(jīng)營業(yè)績，侵害了中小股東的利益。 本文按照理論分析-實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)-對策建議的思路展開。首先從國內(nèi)外并購動機(jī)理論和控制權(quán)私人收益理論出發(fā)，充分借鑒國內(nèi)外有關(guān)學(xué)者的研究成果，結(jié)合國內(nèi)外經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢的變化，認(rèn)為現(xiàn)階段無論是關(guān)聯(lián)并購還是非關(guān)聯(lián)并購，我國上市公司發(fā)生的并購更多傾向于戰(zhàn)略調(diào)整型并購，屬于實(shí)質(zhì)性并購，即使是關(guān)聯(lián)并購活動也會對公司績效產(chǎn)生正向影響，即提高公司績效，為股東創(chuàng)造價(jià)值。但實(shí)證結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)關(guān)聯(lián)并購依然是控股股東侵占中小股東利益的一種手段，關(guān)聯(lián)并購發(fā)生后上市公司整體績效持續(xù)下降，有一半以上的上市公司績效是上升的，有將近一半的上市公司績效是下降的。最后在實(shí)證的基礎(chǔ)上提出了提高我國上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)并購的對策建議。
[Abstract]:In 2008, when the financial crisis broke out, the global economy was caught in a difficult position, while the overall economy of our country remained growing, and the level of marketization of the capital market continued to improve. The financial crisis has led to a reshuffle of the world economic structure. In the new round of competition, opportunities and risks coexist. The Chinese government hopes that local enterprises will seize this historical opportunity. Under such economic and political situation, M & A activities become more frequent and become an important form of rapid expansion and strategic adjustment of listed companies in China. Most of the listed companies in our country come from the reform of state-owned enterprises, and the relationship between listed companies and group companies is complicated. In order to better the development group companies of listed companies, they can temporarily sacrifice the overall interests, while the listed companies develop to a certain extent. Group companies will also transfer the interests of their superior companies through related party transactions. After share reform, China's capital market has realized full circulation, theoretically speaking, the same shares and the same rights, but the equity structure of listed companies in our country is equity concentration. There are obvious differences between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders in the speaking rights of the listed companies. The controlling shareholders control the management decision-making power of the listed companies, and the minority shareholders are in a passive position. Lack of influence. The interests of large and small shareholders are not always the same, especially when the external governance environment is not perfect, Major shareholders have motivation and ability to obtain private income through related party transactions. Affiliated mergers and acquisitions are an important form of related party transactions, which generally take place under the control of controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholder has the management decision-making power of the listed company. For the sake of its own development, the controlling shareholder conveys or transfers the benefits between the two sides of the merger and acquisition through related mergers and acquisitions. There is "support behavior" and "tunneling behavior" for listed companies, which behavior dominates depending on the situation. Many scholars' studies show that, in the long run, the controlling shareholders' related mergers and acquisitions have reduced the company's operating performance. It infringes the interests of minority shareholders. This paper is based on the theoretical analysis, empirical test and countermeasures. Firstly, based on the theory of M & A motivation at home and abroad and the private income theory of control right, the author draws on the research results of domestic and foreign scholars. Considering the changes of economic situation at home and abroad, it is considered that at this stage, the M & A of listed companies in our country is more inclined to strategic adjustment M & A, which belongs to substantive M & A. Even related mergers and acquisitions can have a positive impact on corporate performance, that is, to improve corporate performance and create value for shareholders. But the empirical results show that affiliated mergers and acquisitions are still a means for controlling shareholders to encroach on the interests of minority shareholders. After the affiliated mergers and acquisitions, the overall performance of listed companies continues to decline, more than half of the listed companies' performance is rising, Nearly half of the listed companies' performance is declining. Finally, on the basis of empirical analysis, the author puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to improve the related mergers and acquisitions of listed companies in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F271;F832.51;F224

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