本文關(guān)鍵詞： 上市公司 關(guān)聯(lián)交易 盈余管理 實證研究　出處：《山西大學》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：我國的關(guān)聯(lián)交易問題是伴隨證券市場的發(fā)展而提出的。它與初步發(fā)展的中國資本市場和以股份制改造為核心的企業(yè)改制存在著天然的聯(lián)系。中國的公司內(nèi)外部環(huán)境不完善為關(guān)聯(lián)交易提供了滋長的環(huán)境,上市公司的關(guān)聯(lián)交易相當普遍且金額巨大。許多研究證據(jù)表明中國目前的內(nèi)外部環(huán)境不能限制控股股東通過關(guān)聯(lián)交易操縱利潤和侵害中小股東。大量非公允關(guān)聯(lián)交易的存在,扭曲了資本市場資源配置的功能,誤導投資者錯誤投資理念的形成。盡管關(guān)聯(lián)交易一直是我國證券市場的焦點問題,但由于其數(shù)據(jù)收集比較困難以及自身的復雜性,缺少大樣本的實證研究。因此,本文在此領(lǐng)域進行探索。 本文首先在對相關(guān)文獻回顧的基礎(chǔ)上,對關(guān)聯(lián)交易和盈余管理進行了概述,闡明了關(guān)聯(lián)交易的界定標準并界定了盈余管理的相關(guān)概念；同時回顧了國內(nèi)對關(guān)聯(lián)交易監(jiān)管的發(fā)展歷程,指出國內(nèi)上市公司及其關(guān)聯(lián)方利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易進行盈余管理動因。在實證中,以2010年滬深兩市披露重大關(guān)聯(lián)交易并被出具無保留審計意見的A股非金融類上市公司為樣本,對樣本是否利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易進行盈余管理作實證分析；并根據(jù)文中闡述的理論動機提出影響上市公司利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易進行盈余管理的幾個影響因素：扭虧動機、存在控股股東以及改善資產(chǎn)負債率,針對此影響因素進行實證研究。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)：樣本上市公司明顯存在利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易進行盈余管理的行為,并且有扭虧動機的公司、存在配股的公司及改善其資產(chǎn)負債率的行為,關(guān)聯(lián)交易盈余管理動機明顯。 本文的研究表明,要從根本上解決關(guān)聯(lián)交易問題,必須從兩方面入手：既要完善企業(yè)信息披露制度又要完善中小股東保護制度,使上市公司真正成為獨立自主的企業(yè),而不是其他企業(yè)或部門的附屬品。
[Abstract]:The related party transaction problem in China is brought forward with the development of the securities market. It has a natural relationship with the initial development of China's capital market and the reform of enterprises with the core of shareholding system transformation. The internal and external ring of Chinese companies. The imperfect environment provides a growing environment for related party transactions. The related party transactions of listed companies are quite common and the amount of money is huge. Many research evidences show that the current internal and external environment in China cannot restrict controlling shareholders from manipulating profits and infringing small and medium-sized shareholders through related party transactions. The existence of a deal. It distorts the function of capital market resource allocation and misleads the formation of investors' wrong investment idea, although related party transaction has always been the focus of our securities market. However, due to the difficulty of data collection and the complexity of its own, there is a lack of empirical research on large samples. Therefore, this paper explores this field. Firstly, based on the review of relevant literature, this paper summarizes the related transactions and earnings management, clarifies the definition criteria of related party transactions and defines the relevant concepts of earnings management; At the same time, it reviews the development of domestic regulation of related party transactions, and points out that domestic listed companies and their related parties use affiliated transactions for earnings management motivation. In 2010, Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets disclosed significant related party transactions and were issued unqualified audit opinion of A-share non-financial listed companies as a sample, whether the sample use related party transactions for earnings management for empirical analysis; According to the theoretical motivation described in this paper, the paper puts forward several factors that affect the earnings management of listed companies by using related party transactions: the motivation to turn losses, the existence of controlling shareholders and the improvement of the ratio of assets and liabilities. Empirical research on this factor. The results show that: the sample of listed companies obviously use related party transactions for earnings management behavior, and there is a turnaround motivation of the company. Companies with rights issue and the behavior of improving their asset-liability ratio have obvious motivation for earnings management in affiliated transactions. The research in this paper shows that in order to solve the problem of related party transactions fundamentally, we must start from two aspects: we should improve the system of enterprise information disclosure and the protection system of minority shareholders. To make the listed company truly independent and independent, and not a subsidiary of other enterprises or departments.
【學位授予單位】：山西大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F224

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本文編號：1480611