本文關(guān)鍵詞：中國上市公司高管激勵與公司績效研究　出處：《重慶大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 公司高管 政治激勵 物質(zhì)激勵 公司績效

【摘要】：高管激勵問題的產(chǎn)生來源于現(xiàn)代企業(yè)所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)的相互分離，高級管理者與股東之間存在著目標不一致、信息不對稱等代理問題，現(xiàn)代企業(yè)經(jīng)營的復(fù)雜性和不確定性更是加劇了這一問題的嚴重性，而通過簽訂一份契約，設(shè)計和執(zhí)行一套良好的激勵機制，更有效解決上市委托代理問題。在人才是第一生產(chǎn)力的知識時代，人才競爭是企業(yè)之間的最主要競爭，而公司高管是企業(yè)中最稀缺也是最重要的人力資源，如何有效地吸引并留住高管進而增加企業(yè)的價值已經(jīng)成為企業(yè)求發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵，高管激勵正是起著這樣一種作用。 本文主要分析了中國上市公司高管激勵與公司績效之間的關(guān)系，并將上市公司通過終極控股原理分為國有上市公司和民營上市公司兩個類型，并研究了國有上市公司高管的物質(zhì)激勵、政治激勵與公司績效的關(guān)系，民營上市公司高管的政治激勵與公司績效關(guān)系，并且研究了民營上市公司高管政治身份對公司經(jīng)營帶來的優(yōu)勢。 對于國有上市公司來說，研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)，國有上市公司高管的薪酬激勵不能顯著改善公司績效，而股權(quán)激勵與公司績效之間存在正的相關(guān)關(guān)系，總體上政治激勵與公司績效之間存在正的相關(guān)關(guān)系。公司高管持股普遍不高，股權(quán)激勵作為一種有效的激勵方式?jīng)]有被很好利用。上級職能部門對公司績效的認可更多是給予董事長政治上的晉升，總經(jīng)理物質(zhì)上的回報。而當存在晉升機會的時候，績效對物質(zhì)報酬的邊際貢獻下降，此時物質(zhì)激勵和政治激勵之間存在著替代關(guān)系。 對于民營上市公司來說，研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)，對民營上市公司高管實施政治激勵是對物質(zhì)激勵的一種有效補充，政治激勵在一定程度上也能有效激勵民營上市公司高管認真經(jīng)營企業(yè)，但是政府干預(yù)民營上市公司的經(jīng)營顯著不利于公司績效。并且，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)當民營上市公司高管獲得政治身份后，能為公司帶來融資便利性，在政府干預(yù)強烈的地區(qū)，這種高管政治身份的融資便利性更加顯著。
[Abstract]:The problem of executive incentive comes from the separation of ownership and management right of modern enterprises. There are some agency problems such as inconsistent objectives and asymmetric information between senior managers and shareholders. The complexity and uncertainty of modern enterprise management aggravate the seriousness of this problem, and by signing a contract, design and implement a set of good incentive mechanism. In the knowledge age where talent is the first productive force, talent competition is the most important competition among enterprises, and company executives are the scarcest and most important human resources in enterprises. How to effectively attract and retain executives and then increase the value of enterprises has become the key to the development of enterprises, executive incentive is playing such a role. This paper mainly analyzes the relationship between executive incentive and corporate performance of listed companies in China, and divides the listed companies into state-owned listed companies and private listed companies through the ultimate holding principle. And studied the material incentive of the senior executives of the state-owned listed companies, the relationship between the political incentives and corporate performance, and the relationship between the political incentives and corporate performance of the senior executives of private listed companies. It also studies the advantages brought by the political identity of private listed companies to the management of the company. For the state-owned listed companies, the results show that the executive compensation incentives of state-owned listed companies can not significantly improve corporate performance, but there is a positive correlation between equity incentives and corporate performance. Overall, there is a positive correlation between political incentives and corporate performance. Equity incentive as an effective incentive method has not been used very well. The recognition of corporate performance by higher functional departments is more to give the chairman of the political promotion. When there are opportunities for promotion, the marginal contribution of performance to material reward decreases, and there is a substitute relationship between material incentive and political incentive. For private listed companies, the results of the study found that the implementation of political incentives to private listed company executives is an effective supplement to material incentives. To a certain extent, political incentives can also effectively encourage executives of private listed companies to seriously manage enterprises, but government intervention in the management of private listed companies is significantly detrimental to corporate performance. We find that when private listed company executives obtain political identity, it can bring financing convenience for the company. In the regions where government intervention is strong, the financing convenience of this kind of executive political identity is more significant.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;F272.92;F224

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