本文關(guān)鍵詞：對(duì)證券公司違規(guī)行為監(jiān)管的分析　出處：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：現(xiàn)在,證券市場(chǎng)已經(jīng)成為現(xiàn)代市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體系中的重要組成部分,對(duì)一國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展起著至關(guān)重要的作用。而證券公司作為證券市場(chǎng)的重要參與主體,起著連接投資者和籌資者的橋梁作用,并且隨著創(chuàng)新業(yè)務(wù)的開展,對(duì)于證券市場(chǎng)的重要性仍在提升。 證券市場(chǎng)是最為活躍的市場(chǎng),存在著其他市場(chǎng)普遍存在的市場(chǎng)失靈,有必要引入政府的監(jiān)管,規(guī)范證券市場(chǎng)參與主體的行為。證券市場(chǎng)失靈主要表現(xiàn)在由于外部性導(dǎo)致的金融風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和泡沫,由于信息不對(duì)稱導(dǎo)致的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和逆向選擇,以及資金雄厚的投資者操縱股價(jià)所導(dǎo)致的價(jià)格扭曲等等。證券公司作為證券市場(chǎng)最重要的參與主體,既占據(jù)著嚴(yán)重不對(duì)稱的信息優(yōu)勢(shì),又擁有雄厚的資金后盾,具有影響證券市場(chǎng)走向的強(qiáng)大實(shí)力。如果沒有對(duì)證券公司的嚴(yán)格監(jiān)管,證券公司就特別容易出現(xiàn)機(jī)會(huì)主義行為,侵犯廣大投資者的利益。因此,各國(guó)都非常重視對(duì)證券公司的監(jiān)管,通過設(shè)立監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu),制定法律法規(guī)對(duì)證券公司進(jìn)行嚴(yán)格管理,維護(hù)證券市場(chǎng)的健康發(fā)展和投資者的利益。 我國(guó)的證券公司是順應(yīng)國(guó)有企業(yè)股權(quán)改革的產(chǎn)物,整個(gè)行業(yè)基礎(chǔ)薄弱,法制不健全、運(yùn)作不規(guī)范、內(nèi)幕交易、操作市場(chǎng)、證券欺詐等違規(guī)行為層出不窮。因此,對(duì)證券公司的監(jiān)管就顯得尤為重要。如何加強(qiáng)對(duì)證券公司的監(jiān)管,保護(hù)廣大投資者尤其是中小投資者的利益,促進(jìn)市場(chǎng)的公平和效率,是中國(guó)證券行業(yè)監(jiān)管部門所面臨的重要課題。 本文通對(duì)證券公司違規(guī)原因的剖析,對(duì)政府管制理論的回顧,分析了對(duì)證券行業(yè)進(jìn)行監(jiān)管的理論依據(jù),并對(duì)比分析了國(guó)外證券公司監(jiān)管模式的優(yōu)缺點(diǎn),結(jié)合我國(guó)實(shí)際,指出適合我國(guó)國(guó)情的監(jiān)管模式發(fā)展方向。本文通過建立博弈模型,分析了監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和證券公司的支付函數(shù),指出引導(dǎo)證券公司規(guī)范運(yùn)營(yíng)的關(guān)鍵在于,提高監(jiān)管技術(shù)、加大監(jiān)管力度和違規(guī)懲罰力度、推進(jìn)信息公開、發(fā)動(dòng)群眾監(jiān)督、建立針對(duì)監(jiān)管者的監(jiān)管機(jī)制等。
[Abstract]:At present, the securities market has become an important part of the modern market economy system, which plays a vital role in the development of a country's economy. It acts as a bridge between investors and financiers, and with the development of innovative business, the importance of the securities market is growing. The securities market is the most active market, and there are market failures in other markets, so it is necessary to introduce government supervision. The failure of securities market is mainly reflected in financial risk and bubble caused by externality, moral hazard and adverse selection caused by asymmetric information. As the most important participants in the securities market, securities companies not only occupy a serious asymmetric information advantage, but also have strong financial backing. If there is no strict supervision of the securities companies, the securities companies are particularly vulnerable to opportunism, which infringes the interests of the majority of investors. All countries attach great importance to the supervision of securities companies, through the establishment of regulatory agencies, formulate laws and regulations to strictly manage the securities companies, to safeguard the healthy development of the securities market and the interests of investors. The securities companies of our country are the product of the stock right reform of the state-owned enterprises, the whole industry foundation is weak, the legal system is not perfect, the operation is not standard, the insider trading, the operation of the market. Therefore, the supervision of securities companies is particularly important. How to strengthen the supervision of securities companies to protect the interests of the majority of investors, especially small and medium-sized investors. Promoting market fairness and efficiency is an important subject that China's securities industry regulators are facing. This paper analyzes the reasons of securities companies' violation, reviews the theory of government regulation, analyzes the theoretical basis of securities industry supervision, and compares the advantages and disadvantages of foreign securities companies' regulatory model. Combined with the reality of our country, this paper points out the direction of development of regulatory model suitable for China's national conditions. This paper analyzes the payment function of regulatory agencies and securities companies by establishing a game model. It is pointed out that the key to guide securities companies to regulate their operation lies in improving the supervision technology, increasing the intensity of supervision and punishment, promoting the publicity of information, arousing mass supervision, and establishing the supervision mechanism for the regulators, etc.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F224.32

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